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SOVIET UNION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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LETTER TO THE EDITORIAL OFFICE

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UNITY URGED FOR EACH LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY'S LEFTIST PARTIES

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 5-7

[Article under the rubric "Editor's Column": "The Problem of the Unity of Leftist Forces"]

[Text] A chronic disease of the leftist parties and movements in the countries of Latin America is their fragmentation. This negative phenomenon does not need to be proven; it suffices merely to cite a few examples to recall its scope. In Peru, for example, in the late 1970's and early 1980's, more than 30 leftist parties, trends, and groupings could be counted. Eight candidates from leftist parties competed in the presidential elections of May 1980 and it was not surprising that the reactionary politics of Belaunde Terry gained the upper hand at that time. The number of leftist parties and groups in Bolivia was even greater, which also prevented them from resisting pressure from the right.

Fragmentation, dispersement of forces, and inability to concentrate on what unifies rather than separates has also appeared among the leftists in Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere. Unfortunately, at times this also applies to parties resting on Marxist ideology. It is another matter that practical conclusions from apparently one and the same theory or its "applied role" differ, sometimes substantially and sometimes not so substantially. Nonetheless, a bitter struggle may be waged among the leftist trends, and at times one with such intensity that it is hard to identify who is the greatest enemy--the rightwing parties and circles related to imperialism or those who together seem to form the left wing of the political spectrum in the country.

We will not try to pose the question of the reasons for this phenomenon. Most likely a special and quite extensive study is needed for a detailed answer. Of course, reference to the Latin American temperament alone would not explain anything: to say that what in other latitudes is explained through discussion within the party here serves as the reason for its split. After all, centrist and rightwing parties operating in these same latitudes as a rule demonstrate an envious ability to refrain from going downhill toward fragmentation and amorphousness. Usually two or three centrist and right bourgeois parties

function which get the lion's share of the votes. Still, when searching for an explanation one must not completely disregard the specifics of the political culture of the continent's countries.

But if psychological explanations are sought, then most likely one may speak of the tendency which has become established of many leftist parties and trends to claim a monopoly on "possessing the truth", a monopoly right to interpret a particular doctrine, and the monopoly role of the vanguard. The perniciousness of this pursuit leads to weakness, and weakness impels them to the path of struggle against those who are taking away "their" potential support among the masses.

The importance of this problem is not determined merely by the results of elections, of course. Knowing how cunningly bourgeois democracy serves the interests of the bourgeoisie, let us not overemphasize the purely electoral aspects of the phenomena under study. As V.I. Lenin noted, "the strength of the revolutionary proletariat, from the standpoint of influencing the masses and involving them in the struggle, is incomparably greater in the extraparlimentary struggle than in the parliamentary struggle." And nonetheless, elections are to a certain extent the reflection of the political disposition of forces and they in part help to identify the particular tendencies in the parties' struggle for the support of the masses.

In recent years the obvious fact that centrifugal tendencies among the leftists are more and more giving way to centripetal tendencies inspires optimism. As soon as this leads to tangible changes, we see no less tangible results in the liberation struggle and in the struggle for democracy, and this is in the different forms of this struggle.

I would like to recall first of all that it was only after the unification of the three insurgent groupings in Nicaragua that the Sandinist National Liberation Front began to gain decisive victories and destroyed the antipeople dictatorship of Somoza (incidentally, all this time certain leftist and even Marxist parties in the country continued an endless argument about which of them was more to the right...). The unification of the leftist organizations in El Salvador immediately sharply strengthened their positions among the masses and their combat capabilities during the civil war.

More or less the same kind of change is seen in the electoral processes. Let us recall the successes of Popular Unity in Chile and the Broad Front in Uruguay. Even the temporary agreement to advance one candidate (J.V. Rangel) specially timed for the elections in Venezuela in 1979 resulted in the leftist candidate getting about 18 percent of the votes. And after all, this was not preceded by lengthy and basic organizational work, and genuine unity of actions of the leftist forces did not emerge. This was why they got 18 percent--more than ever before but less than the centrist and rightwing parties received. In the very same Bolivia the temporary unity achieved made it possible for the government of Siles Zuazo to function for several years, from 1982. However, as soon as the unity collapsed, the social base of this government weakened. In Peru in 1983 a large degree of unity of the leftists was achieved (although it did not yet mean full unification). And immediately

came the unforeseen results of the municipal elections; 29 percent of the votes throughout the country and one-third of them in the capital--as a result their candidate became the mayor of the city of Lima. Experience shows that in such cases what happens is not a simple arithmetical increase in supporters' votes, but a major expansion of the base among the masses which was not attainable before. The confidence of the voter who sympathizes with the leftists that his vote will not be lost in vain grows.

That is why the process of unifying the leftist forces in Mexico which is gathering strength is especially important. Of course, there is no question of the leftist forces shaking the position of the ruling party the PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party] in the near future. Their task is not that but to stop the advance of the right party PAN [National Action Party] toward a fundamental role in the country's political life. To a certain extent we are obviously also speaking of creating more difficult conditions for the right elements in the PRI itself, which is attempting to little by little turn the controls of state government several degrees away from the center "without washing dirty linen in public."

The process of unifying the leftist parties in Mexico began in 1981 when the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM) was created. At that time the Mexican Communist Party, the Mexican People's Party, the Socialist Unity and Action Movement, the Revolutionary Socialist Party, and the Unity of People's Action Movement united. The second stage of this process is now going on. The Third PSUM Congress was held in late March. At the same time congresses of the Mexican Workers' Party, the Patriotic Revolutionary Party, the Unity of Leftist Communists, and the People's Revolutionary Movement were held. The process of unifying them should be finished in September. The new party will also nominate its candidate for president. But that last circumstance is not the crux of the matter. The crux here in Mexico is, of course, not the results of elections as such. Elections only help see how correct the course of the unified leftist force to represent the interests of the popular masses not only in ideology but also in practice and in daily political activity is. For the leftist party "by definition" must be in each case the mass party in the sense of its social base. After all, a correct idea should pave the way to the masses. Successes on this way are the main task which the vanguard of the liberation movement poses for itself.

So, the phenomenon of fragmentation gives way to a tendency toward unity. This tendency may also be observed in Argentina and the Dominican Republic and again in Uruguay and among parties struggling against the dictatorship of Pinochet in Chile.

In conditions of an interdependent world, when the peoples of the world perceive themselves more and more as in the same boat, this tendency which reflects a unique kind of "new thinking" in the strategy and tactics of struggle against the forces of reaction is not just timely. It is natural and obligatory and therefore inevitable. It envisions a decisive rejection of dogmatic approaches and a revision of fixed stereotypes. Its development, the successes on the road to unifying the leftist forces, and their alliance with all patriotic, democratic, and peaceloving forces will undoubtedly result in the liberation movements making their contribution to the struggle against the forces of militarism and aggression and hence, to consolidating peace on Earth.

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IDEAS, ACTIONS OF 'SENDERO LUMINOSO', PERU'S RESPONSE VIEWED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 8-26

[Article by Ye.N.Starikov and A. A.Slinko (Voronezh): "Peru: Problems of Political Development"]

[Excerpts] In 1980-1985 when the government of F. Belaunde Terry was in power, the right alternative was allowed to completely exhaust itself. In 1985 after establishing its extreme right position, the pendulum of Peru's political life began a new swing to the left. The coming to power of the Aprista's [members of APRA--American Popular Revolutionary Alliance] and the success of the United Left (IU) marked a turning point in the country's history which completed the 17-year cycle and opened a new chapter in it. In conditions of the multistructured and "fragmentized" society which was enduring an acute crisis, it was precisely that party which better than others (although eclectically) managed to reduce the most diverse political aspirations and social interests to a common denominator.

A Biography of "Sendero"

But exactly what is the "Sendero Luminoso" organization?

It arose in 1970 after splitting off from the "Red Homeland" organization which in turn in 1969 had separated from the Maoist "Red Flag" Communist Party of Peru. Up until 1982 it did not appear to stand out from the mixed conglomerate of Trotskyite-Maoist ultraleftist sects. It irregularly published its publication VOZ POPULAR, which sharply criticized China's communist party for "deviating from Chairman Mao's line." It operated within the department of Ayacucho and therefore was considered a regional organization.

And suddenly in 1982 not only the Peruvian press but also respectable foreign newspapers and journals began to speak about this remote Maoist sect. Showing no signs of life during the 2 years of Belaunde Terry's rule, this organization forced people to begin talking about it after 2 March 1982 when 250 people were freed from the city of Ayacucho's prison as a result of a lightning operation. It is true that most of them were convicted for trading in narcotics, but among them were also a significant group of "Sendero Luminoso" members.

Further events developed swiftly. The tactics called "moving actions from the countryside to the city" led to strikes and incidents in the cities of Andahuaylas, Huancavelica, and Tingo Maria. As the activities of the Senderists escalated, besides the police the civil guard, the republic guard, and then regular army subdivisions and finally rangers and marines began to be brought into the struggle against them. Even the PIP (Security Police of Peru) began to actively "watch over" the Senderists.

Such a sensational beginning and the continually increasing scope of actions attested to the many years of exceptionally serious preparation. In the course of 8-10 years in conditions of the deepest secrecy "Sendero" created its own underground infrastructure, infiltrating the Indian population of Ayacucho, and professionally prepared the military-technical prerequisites of "insurgence."

"Chairman Gonzalo" is the head of the organization. His real name is Abimael Guzman Reynoso. He is a doctor of philosophy. A former professor at the University of San Cristobal. Married to a woman from Ayacucho. Information about him is limited and contradictory. So, the journal 30 DIAS describes the image of an authoritarian personality who declared his birthday a "popular holiday" and created a cult and a corresponding ritual around his name by which his supporters make contact with one another using nothing other than a long formula which begins "In the name of Chairman Gonzalo"... By contrast, Alfonso Barrantes, who in 1979 was in prison along with Guzman, describes a very modest and patient, even shy man who stoically endured hardships and never participated in the debates which took place in prison. A. Barrantes suggests that Guzman is surrounded by a group of fanatics who commit evil deeds while extolling him as leader.¹

These conflicting descriptions can hardly explain anything in the activity of the Senderists' organization itself. Let us merely recall that Maximilien Robespierre, who began his political career in 1789, was also a very shy and benevolent man who insisted on abolishing capital punishment. After 4 years he already was the head of the Jacobin terror and his personal modesty did not prevent the formation of a cult of religious adoration around his name.

Putting aside the subjective personal characteristics of the Senderists' leader, let us try to figure out the more objective realities--the structure of the organization, its purposes, tactics, and system of recruiting cadres, and so on. And here we encounter difficulties much greater than when evaluating any other conspiratorial terrorist organization--be it the Uruguayan "Tupamaros," the Italian "Red Brigades," or the West German RAF [Red Army Faction]. Despite all their conspiratorial characteristics, the above-named organizations engaged in propaganda of their ideas and purposes, published proclamations, and made contacts with the mass information media. Unlike them "Sendero" does not publicly articulate its goals. "It does not enter into a dialogue with anyone," writes A. Barrantes, "terror is not accompanied by demands, and none of the types of terrorist actions which they commit receive any evaluation."²

Before us is a kind of "black box," a "scarecrow" shrouded in a curtain of impenetrable secrecy obviously without the least desire to explain anything to anyone. But is that so? If one considers that the Indians as a rule do not read and generally have little to do with the mass communications media, the situation begins to clear up. Let us recall the Indian subculture mentioned above, "fear and adoration" and their distrust of the chatter of radiostations and isolation from the outside world. The manner of behavior of "Sendero," which is unusual from the standpoint of "civilized society," becomes understandable if one considers that it is appealing not to this society but to the Indian peasants. "Sendero" simply ignores the coastal region with all its urban civilization, newspapers, radio, and television. For it the coastal region is the enemy and people do not talk with the enemy, they destroy the enemy. Incidentally, it is not a bad idea to sometimes give the enemy a graphic show of your power, as "Sendero" did during the visit of the Roman Pope, John-Paul the Second to Lima in February 1985. After cutting off the light throughout Lima, "Sendero" lit up an enormous hammer and sickle on the hill. Although the press tried to hush this incident up and LA GENTE and COMERCIO with unceremonious familiarity lumped communists and Senderists together (an old and well-known method--pile the sins of the noncommunist leftists on the communists), they were forced to recognize the effectiveness of the nighttime illumination arranged by "Sendero Luminoso" "in honor" of the Pope.

As we see, the passion for stunts and "releasing outbursts" characteristic of all leftists is not alien to such a "serious" and business-like organization as "Sendero." But the main conclusion which may be drawn from this nighttime stunt is this: it was impossible to do it without the participation of many hundreds of people, among them a large number of specialists. Consequently, not just some poor rural peasants support "Sendero." But for now just let us note that flaunted opposite the police stations are "unerasable" inscriptions painted on walls like: "Long Live the Partisan War!" and "A Million Peasants Will Soon Rise Up!" These signs are "unerasable" for the reason that somewhere in the corner or toward the bottom of the sign there is a barely noticeable inscription which recommends that this sign not be erased. After several attempts to destroy such a sign, those who wanted to perform this operation disappeared. The warning proved to be effective.

Proceeding from the scanty factual materials available, let us still try to identify what the ideology of "Sendero" is. The overwhelming majority of authors assert that "Sendero" has no precise positive program. Most likely that is true. It is true that "shy" Guzman is keeping silent on this account and we cannot know what ideas he is harboring. In the meantime one thing is clear: with the help of paupers and marginal members of society "Sendero" is trying to seize power and possibly it intends to treat the population of the coastal region as the population of Phnom Penh and other cities was treated in Kampuchea in 1975. In the article "Sendero Tenebroso" ("The Dark Path") Augustin Aya writes: "They think that Ayacucho is Peru and that the working class, like the middle strata, is not an ally of the revolution." Alfonso Barrantes notes: "For 'Sendero' there are no other leftists and no other bearers of revolutionary truth in the last instance but them, and not only in Peru but throughout the world." In A. Aya's words, the Senderists consider

themselves the source "not only of the Ayacucho and Peruvian movement but of the planet-wide movement."³

It must be mentioned that the idea of the revival of modernized "Incan socialism" is implicitly contained in "Sendero" ideology. Practically all the political movements of Peru except the communist party have come down with the "childhood disease" of Indianism. Even Belaunde Terry, an underling of the proimperialist oligarchy, was at one time a militant Indianist. The founder of APRA Aya de la Torre in his early works also preached the messianic role of the Indians, rejected "European Marxism," and saw the moving force of the coming revolution in the "aboriginal legacy" of the Incanate and in the communist instincts of commune members.

J.C. Mariategui brilliantly predicted all the component parts of this ideology: the desire to restore Tahuantinsuyu in modernized form and carry out the revolution with Indians exclusively, without the participation of the working class. He wrote that it is "foolish and dangerous to pit the racism of those who exaggerate the role of the Indians, believing that Providence is destining them for a special mission in the revival of America, against the racism of those who scorn the Indians."⁴ Theory is well and good, but social reality again and again inexorably generates Indian myths in modern packaging, and J.C. Mariategui, who spoke with utmost clarity against Indian racism, is considered by "Sendero" ideologues one of the founders of this ideology.

The assertion that the idea of reconstructing a modernized Incanate is the basis of the "theoretical" postulates of "Sendero" is confirmed by C.I. Degregori, whom we already mentioned above: "For the Andes population the party must be something like a new Inca and take its place."⁵

So, the components of the ideological package of the Senderists are the following: restoration of modernized "communist" Tahuantinsuyu (such was the goal of the revolution; its moving force was the Indian peasantry and the enemy was "white civilization"); egalitarian utopia based on primitive notions of barracks communism in conditions of a subsistence economy; hatred of commodity-money relations and their embodiment--banks and their clients (expressed even now in attempts to blow up all banks which they can get at); moralizing in the spirit of primitive asceticism; obscurantism (so characteristic of members of the intelligentsia⁶ who seized absolute power) manifested in blowing up scientific and experimental centers; extreme cruelty toward their victims (who frequently have no relationship to the "struggle" the Senderists are waging)--murder is committed following some kind of Incan rituals and accompanied by pathological sadism.⁷

"Sendero" revolutionaries are recruited above all from young peasants who are forcibly taken away to "people's schools" where young people are turned into fanatics and then thrown into battle.

Representatives of the authorities, police and military subunits, electric power lines, and railroads are the objects of attack. In the capital and major cities they blow up banks, stores, and administrative buildings. Before the 1985 presidential elections, the Popular Unity Party premises were the main objects of attack in Lima. With the PAP [Popular Action Party] coming to

power, the "dynamite campaign" was reoriented to its functionaries and party premises. Barrantes asserts that many leftists perished at the hands of "Sendero." In March 1986 the Senderists threw dynamite charges into the People's Republic of China Embassy in Lima--"revenge for betraying the ideas of Mao." In passing dynamite was thrown at the embassies of the United States, Great Britain, and the FRG-- the "struggle against imperialism," of course. At the same time the embassies of Argentina, Spain, and India suffered--for what reason, no one knows.

The Government Confronted by Terror

The second week of the APRA government's tenure in power was marked by a step-up in the militant actions of the "Sendero Luminoso." And many acts were of a clearly anti-APRA nature. Even on the eve of the inauguration of A. Garcia explosions occurred at the army and police headquarters in Lima, and they were not far from the place where many heads of foreign states and governments who had come for the ceremony of Peru's new president taking office were gathered. A high-powered explosion took place at the local branch of the APRA Party in Huancaayo at a moment when 200 people were holding a meeting there. On 3 December 1985 "Sendero" produced a series of more than 100 explosions in Lima, and dynamite attacks were made on one of the APRA district committees and on the ranch where the founder of the APRA Aya de la Torre had spent his last days.

"Sendero's" hostility toward all of Peru's leftist forces was already written about above. A. Aya said that "Sendero" always acts as a dissenter. If the leftists do it one way, then "Sendero" would do it the other. At the present time the representatives of the leftist forces are more and more often becoming victims of "Sendero." And if this ultraleftist organization is now striking the main blow against the APRA members rather than the IU [United Left], it is only because they are the ruling party and consequently are considered enemy No 1.

In response to the Senderists' actions the government resorted to tough measures. In October 1985 it extended the state of seige and suspension of constitutional guarantees for 60 days in 29 Peruvian provinces. The government decree specified that these provinces were in the departments of Ayacucho, Huancaavelica, Apurimac, Pasco, Huanuco, and San Martin. The political-military leadership in these provinces was entrusted to the armed forces. Since that time the state of seige has been renewed every 60 days.

By the time the Aprista's came to power the facts describing the arms forces in a by no means rosy light began to appear. The reader of Peruvian newspapers accustomed to articles painting the incredible brutality of "Sendero" received fragmentary information on the no less extreme brutality which the army showed toward Indians in the zone of military actions. Corpses of peasants with signs of fanatical torture are found in Sierra and Selva. Civil guards acting as Senderists attack the civilian population and kill children. The army tries to imitate the Guatemalan experience, forcibly setting up anti-Senderist detachments of peasants who march ahead of the military and are the first to perish.

The APRA government, on the one hand, waged a battle against corruption and the most odious manifestations of brutality in the armed forces. In September 1985 the chairman of the Unified Command of the Armed Forces General of Aviation Cesar Enrico Praeli was replaced for inability to wage anti-insurrectionist war. On the other hand, the emphasis in solving the problem of the insurrectionist movement is as usual put above all on military-technical measures.

Striking a blow at the government's intentions to reduce military expenditures, such measures at the same time certainly do not yield results in the struggle against "Sendero." Certain higher officers who consider the problems of the Indians in the south social-economic rather than military problems understand this. That is the reason for the attempts at social maneuvering by the PAP in regions in the state of emergency. In November 1985 partial elections were held in those regions (22 provinces and 160 districts) where the actions of "Sendero Luminoso" did not permit them to be held earlier. Although PAP nominally gained victory, most of the voters in Ayacucho did not show up at the polls.

Measures are being taken to develop these regions. However, let us recall that on the eve of the Islamic revolution in Iran the Shah's government squandered money on the left and the right in attempts to cool down the struggle. But the Shah had a lot of petrodollars--Peru's treasury cannot compare. Moreover, the terror is developing according to its own internal logic, creating a special stable "ecosystem" which is impenetrable to social philanthropic measures. "We live in a state of psychosis."⁸ That is how Ayacucho residents themselves describe this infernal "ecosystem."

At the present time the state of affairs can be described in one sentence which is repeated in the Peruvian press as a refrain: "Sendero" is coming. From the southern part of the country its activities are spreading to the northern regions bordering on Colombia. The organization has provided itself with its own aircraft, which is not so very difficult to do considering the practically unlimited international market of outdated military equipment and Selva's enormous size where it is easy to build landing fields. At the very least, if underground traders in narcotics have their own aircraft, then why should the Senderists not manage to have them? (Back in the 1960's the Marketalia partisans used obsolete American Martin B-25 bombers).

A characteristic feature of the guerrilla war in the present stage is its ever-increasing expansion, not only in rural areas but in cities as well. It was already indicated above that "Sendero" deliberately adjusted its tactics to take into account the support which the urban marginal strata--frequently those same peasants who fled from the army terror in the urban suburbs--are giving it. Of the 5.5 million residents of the Lima-Callao agglomeration, the number of migrants reaches 2.2 million--40 percent. "Blocks" of rural life are being shifted to the cities. All this served as the basis for the question which was posed by sociologists: what essentially is happening--urbanization of the rural population or "ruralization" of the city?

Recently the urban guerrilla war has been reinforced with participants in the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) which many consider the "capital

branch" of "Sendero Luminoso," although this must not be considered a proven fact. MRTA receives the main support in the marginal quarters. With the particular similarity of actions and social base of the urban branches of "Sendero" and "Tupamaros," certain differences exist which are manifested above all in the specific "division of labor" and "staging" of terrorist acts. "Sendero" carries out its operations in cities silently in the Indian way, guided by the Maoist principle of "the countryside surrounds the city" and relying above all on the marginal members of society (although it does not reject the services of engineering-technical personnel and students--just recall the operation to "meet" the Roman Pope).

The MRTA on this level differs from "Sendero" in that it copies the methods, tactics, and ideological cliches of the "common" urban guerrillas of the Uruguayan "Tupamaros" type and Argentine "Montoneros," or rather even its West German "colleagues" from the "Red Brigades" and the RAF. MRTA identifies itself as an organization of the working class and popular masses with a "Marxist-Leninist" ideology.⁹ The organization puts great emphasis on recruiting students into its ranks. Thus, in May of last year a group from MRTA captured four colleges in various parts of the capital and appealed to the students to join the armed struggle. Among the MRTA revolutionaries are many women, also characteristic of "standard" urban guerrillas. Unlike "Sendero" MRTA is oriented to the urban subculture and mass information media, abundantly commenting on and publicizing each of its steps and capturing radio stations and television channels to do so. "Robin Hood" measures, which have already become hackneyed, are widely used to win popularity in poor quarters. A typical example: five people (four of them are women) seized a milk truck and distributed 600 liters of milk among the poor peasants of the Comos quarter. The group called itself an MRTA organizational subunit.

Such, in general outlines, is the situation of the "internal war" in which the Aprista government is being compelled to resolve the most difficult tasks of domestic and foreign policy. The noncommunist leftist terror of "Sendero" and MRTA coexists with the foreign economic terror of the International Monetary Fund. Indeed Belaunde Terry left a heavy legacy to the victor in the presidential elections.

The coming to power of PAP was an attempt to escape the crisis through reform. The explosive situation was temporarily relieved. A strong party apparatus, a nation-wide political structure, a talent for decisive actions, and the personal popularity of the new president--all this testified to surmounting the "crisis at the top." The activism of the masses was channeled into an anti-imperialist direction and the PAP's tough position on questions involving restoring trampled national sovereignty helped. Peru's international prestige rose sharply, especially in Latin America, thanks to the fact that the country took a principled and unequivocal stance regarding the United States' interventionist plans.

The measures taken to improve the material condition of the broad popular masses and the struggle against unemployment and inflation helped to relieve social tension somewhat, which in turn could not fail to be met with approval by the ruling classes. Extensive social maneuvering in regard to the popular masses as a whole with the government's energetic intervention in the economic

sphere in order to stimulate business activity yielded its results. It must be noted here that purely external factors which did not depend on them worked to the benefit of the Aprista's: in 1983 the world capitalist economy went through a cyclical slump zone (in Peru the gross national product fell by 10.8 percent that year) and since 1984 has begun to revive (the gross national product has increased by 3.5 percent in Peru), which in 1985 exceeded the rise in production. It was in that year that the growth rate of the country's GNP took second place (after Brazil) in Latin America, achieving 4.4 percent, for which the Aprista's immediately took credit.

It would seem that the picture of the successes achieved in the PAP's year of rule are impressive. But if one looks deeper, its impact on the masses is more linked to psychological factors; the government showed concern for their needs and created the illusion that the new measures taken were only the start of a broad program to fight against poverty and unemployment. Financial difficulties sharply restrict the field for social maneuver and, remaining within the structural framework of existing production relations, the government objectively does not have real potential to improve the status of working people. The insignificant growth in GNP is merely "growth" as compared to the slump period, that is, relative growth.

In these conditions, the country's destiny is the exclusive responsibility of the United Left. Will it become the subjective factor which turns the objectively maturing revolutionary potential into reality? Will the IU manage to turn from an electoral conglomerate into a genuinely revolutionary vanguard, strong in its cohesion, organization, and existence of a structure of lower-ranking organizations throughout the country and a concrete program of actions? Objectively the projected situation is developing to the benefit of the leftists. But the future will show whether the IU, on which history has placed the burden of being the leftist alternative, can realize it. But at the present time the PAP with its party apparatus and undissipated moral credit among the masses is the only real force capable of managing the country in conditions of crisis. However, when the reforms exhaust themselves, a crisis of power is inevitable. How will the Aprista's respond to it? If the leftist tendencies in the PAP win, and in alliance with the UI it begins to tear down the whole structure of dependent capitalism, then the sacramental question will face the leftists (already in the broad sense of the word now): "What is to be done?" In general the answer is clear: tear it down. But how? In conditions of foreign economic suffocation and in conditions of the "Sendero" terror which makes no contacts and will accept no compromises? At the present time the leftists do not have a clear answer to these questions.

If they do not consolidate themselves and manage to "establish a grip on" the leftward tendency, the situation will begin to "rot" and "Sendero" and the army, who are settling accounts with one another, will feed on this "rot." A military-fascist dictatorship or a Pol Pot-type dictatorship will become the alternatives. Is the picture too gloomy to become reality?

But meanwhile "Sendero" and the MRTA are attacking the anti-imperialist populist government which is carrying out progressive transformations, and thereby aggravating the country's already difficult situation by creating the grounds for right extremist "Pinochet" tendencies in the army. The blockade

must be lifted from the Mafioso-"Gamonalist" [translation unknown] subculture of ethnic exclusiveness and contact made with the population of Sierra. But the milieu of psychosis which is producing a stable "ecosystem" of exclusivity and hostility prevents the "blockade from being lifted." The government clearly does not have the financial means nor political infrastructure in Sierra to "break through" the dense wall of misunderstanding.

All these problems undoubtedly will be the focus of attention of the Ninth Peruvian CP Congress scheduled for the end of May.

FOOTNOTES

1. LA REPUBLICA, Lima, 28 October 1983.
2. Ibidem.
3. EL CABALLO ROJO, 2 January 1983.
4. J.C. Mariategui, "Obras completas" [Complete Works], Lima, 1980, Vol 13, p 30.
5. EL CABALLO ROJO, 23 January 1983.
6. Barrantes links the phenomenon of the formation of the Senderist "counterelite" to the position of the peasant semi-intelligentsia member (student) in the city ("not people of the West but not peasants either"), that is, with the unique cultural marginalization of the Indian intelligentsia (a phenomenon repeatedly described in Western literature). The very term "marginat," introduced into scientific practice by R.E. Park in 1928, meant nothing less than a "person on the edge of cultures."
7. D. Bekker wrote that its ("Sendero"--authors) violent acts "cost it the sympathies of potential allies throughout the country."
8. EL DEBATE, No 28, 1984, p 33.
9. GRANMA, Havana, 21 June 1985.

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PERUVIAN COMMUNIST PARTY FIGURE ON COUNTRY'S SITUATION

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 27-30

[Interview with Valentin Pachó, vice-president of the World Federation of Trade Unions, general secretary of the General Confederation of Workers of Peru (GCWP), member of the Political Commission of the Peruvian CP Central Committee, and senator: "The Face of Violence"; date, place, and occasion of interview not specified; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] Valentin Pachó, the vice-president of the World Federation of Trade Unions, general secretary of the General Confederation of Workers of Peru (GCWP), member of the Political Commission of the Peruvian CP Central Committee, and senator, visited the journal's editorial office. He was asked questions dealt with by the authors of the article published above.

[Question] What is your evaluation of the domestic political situation?

[Answer] Peru has entered a new stage of its history. Before one could hear about imperialism only from communists and certain leftist parties. Today this word resounds everywhere and the anti-imperialist sentiments of the popular strata as well as part of the bourgeoisie are reflected in the Aprista government's policies. But the crisis remains the main domestic problem, and in order to solve it the existing social structures must be changed. But until the government decides to deal with them, and as long as it continues to treat models of capitalist development with holy trepidation, the situation in the country will steadily deteriorate.

[Question] And what is the government position on the problem of violence and how do you as a trade union leader see it?

[Answer] In order to deal with this question, one must start above all from the fact that reaction and rightwing circles on the whole well understand that the struggle of the popular masses is on the rise. They are extremely disturbed by this and are taking preventive measures to prevent the popular struggle, the trade union movement, and all leftist revolutionary parties from developing.

We believe that at the present time imperialism and the rightwing forces in the country are interested in greater instability and a situation which

creates the appearance of a "threat to national security" in order to prepare for and seem to justify in advance a fascist-type coup d'etat. In all probability it seems to them they have no other way. The Aprista [from APRA--American Popular Revolutionary Alliance] government which according to their plans should have strengthened their positions in any case does not fully justify these hopes. The government is experiencing the pressure of the popular masses. If it begins to satisfy the demands of the International Monetary Fund and imperialism, then it will prove to be isolated. However, the Aprista's hope to stand at the head of the nation for a long time. And it happens that pressure from the popular masses is a decisive factor.

At the same time, repressive methods are being used in Peru. The necessity to struggle against "Sendero Luminoso" is used as a pretext for escalating them. This organization announced itself using a petard and then real bombs followed: in barracks, at power stations, and in cities. The Senderists concentrated their activities in the most remote zones, in the center of the country, in Ayacucho. But they did not manage to bring the peasantry over to them. That is natural. Pol Pot-type methods convince no one.

In committing acts of terrorism, the Senderists determine their targets quite skillfully and I would say professionally--they blow up objects which are important to the armed forces. And this aggravates the situation more and more. Of course, "Sendero Luminoso" could carry out only 20-30 percent of those terrorist actions which take place in the country. That means that the rightwing forces are involved in them.

Every day a policeman is murdered and every day there are funerals. Now and then one can see this scene in the capital: two on-duty policemen stand on the corner but suddenly two groups or two people in masks appear, riddle them with bullets, and move on. Two corpses remain. The weapons are taken... But recently the matter has gotten to the point of organizing attempts on military commanders. Two admirals have already been killed. Needless to say, the frenzied propaganda of the right took advantage of their murder: "If communism falls upon us, what should we do? Of course we should wipe it off the face of the earth along with terrorism and violence." Is it that simple? But the right hold control of the information media in their hands and we have no television channels nor newspapers. Every day they focus their efforts on one thing, hammering into the people's consciousness that "communism is waging an attack on Peru," and the most terrible thing--"see how they kill!" But they themselves kill 10 or 20 times more people than perish in those acts which serve as a pretext for them.

[Question] Can the retribution in the prison last summer be considered an example of such actions?

[Answer] Of course! There everything started just after the admiral was killed. The point is that one of the prisons is under the jurisdiction of the naval forces. It is located on an island. When the prisoners' rebellion started there, the fleet destroyed everything with its fire in order to "restore order." Not one person escaped. The island almost disappeared under fire of the ship batteries, cannons, and military helicopters... It was razed to the ground. That was their response...

And in another prison the very same thing happened. The difference was only that it is the army that bears responsibility for what happened. Here the insurgents surrendered. But that did not get them anything. All of them were shot with machine guns. No one remained alive. About 400 prisoners perished. If such a thing can happen under a government that talks about democracy and respect for man, then what will happen if the rightwingers come to power, which they are actually already preparing for?

The working class and the entire trade union movement believes that circles that use force cannot solve the problems facing the country. Their strategy is to neutralize the force of the popular movement by stuffing it into the same bag as terrorism, as "Sendero Luminoso."

We believe that the struggle for a just cause served as the starting point for "Sendero's" activities: they opposed the impoverishment and pauperization of our people, above all the peasants and those outcasts and marginal, as we say, strata of the population passed over by modern civilization. Such even now are the arguments they use to try to justify their actions. But we, the trade unions, are for political forms of struggle and against repressive methods. Meanwhile it turns out that the government used armed force to suppress terrorism and at the same time and in concert suppresses and persecutes completely innocent people and organizations whose activities merely express the urgent demands of working people.

[Question] But where must the solution be found?

[Answer] We are struggling for liberation of the country; that is the No 1 goal. For us force means moving backward, which can lead to catastrophe. Then diplomatic solutions will be too late. If a vote was taken on this, everyone would support only political solutions being adopted. For example, the development of those backward regions where the "Sendero Luminoso" movement emerged must be planned, rather than send military subunits there. A whole complex of measures is needed here. Otherwise the number of regions where a state of emergency is introduced will only increase. That involves suspending constitutional guarantees and means that the government hands its political power and its mandate to power received from the people over to the armed forces in one, two, and, finally, several provinces and that democratic rule is finished there, revoked! And more and more departments in Peru are becoming that way. Even in the capital we live in conditions of a state of emergency.

[Question] For how long is the state of emergency introduced?

[Answer] A state of emergency is introduced essentially for an indefinite period of time. It is extended every 60 days. It has already been a whole year! And what is this turning into for us? People cannot be summoned to a rally and a demonstration cannot be held because each time permission from the unified command must be requested... And trade unions must explain themselves to the military. For example, we wanted to mark the 100th anniversary of the May 1 celebration. But when we appealed to the authorities, they answered: "That depends on the armed forces." So we have to go to them and ask them not to prevent us... But they refused. And what happens? We are forced to

"fight for" a street for ourselves and break this state of emergency with the actions of the masses themselves... Of course we held this rally... But since masses of people participated in it and it was held in the very center of the city, on 12th of May Square (that is an enormous square), the military preferred not to intervene. The working class, do you know, is an altogether different thing. They were left behind. But we did not receive permission.

When a demonstration or rally is not so very large, they drive a wedge into the crowd, throw tear gas bombs, and seize whoever comes along. That is one of the results of the state of emergency. What purpose does it serve? The government introduced it in order to fight terrorism. But it is certainly clear that terrorism does not need legality, so a state of emergency is no obstacle to them either. Terrorists operate in any environment. Hence the state of emergency was introduced in order to prevent the free realization of the rights of working people and the rights of trade unions in order to stifle the popular movement. It is absolutely clear what our viewpoint is: a state of emergency is a measure directed against the broad popular masses. That is why we assert that the government's activities are not in keeping with the declared goals. We explain this all the time.

Violence has one other face. We follow events with fixed attention and see that the CIA and the Pentagon are operating completely openly in our country. In what direction? To overthrow the government. The Pentagon, for example, has taken into its hands the training of the Peruvian armed forces. How do they train our military cadres? The selection is made by straightforward McCarthyist canons which turn out not to have disappeared at all and survived the time of Velasco Alvarado, although we naively assumed that they were already coming to nothing. Nothing of the sort.

The stage of the "Pentagonization" of the army has begun in Peru; that is, everything is done at the dictates of the Pentagon. And it certainly does not take pains to encourage the popular or trade union movements. And that is dangerous. It means that the wave of violence will grow. What can the final goal be? Terrorist actions and assassination attempts are all used to create a situation of general uncertainty and tension and to prepare for the moment when they will say: "The present government cannot establish order in the country, admirals and generals continue to be killed, and such-and-such a building has been blown up... " And they will begin the so-called mass psychological treatment. For example, on all television channels they will show: "Here is one person murdered, here is another, see how they prepared it--and the picture will be enlarged--that is how they kill, that is what they are like! That is what these communists have done!"... The right never says "Sendero..." but only "communists..." and the "subversive activities of the communists." And then they pose the question: "Do you agree that everyone who is doing this should be investigated, brought to trial, and punished?"--"Of course!" And such lessons stick in one's memory... Such is the effect of the psychological treatment. That is what can be said about violence.

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TREATY OF TLATELOLCO MARKS 20TH ANNIVERSARY

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 37-40

[Article by V.L. Orlov: "Steps Toward a Nonnuclear World"]

[Text] The year 1987 marked 20 years from the day the Tlatelolco Treaty was signed. The struggle to create a nonnuclear zone on the continent developed in the early 1960's. In March 1962 the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs Manuel Telio spoke at the Committee of 18 States on Disarmament and stated that before a general treaty was signed "deatomization could, can, and must be carried out on the basis of voluntary decisions of states" and that his government had "decided not to have and not to allow any types of nuclear weapons or any means which could be used to deliver such weapons on their national territory."

The initiative of the President of Mexico A. Lopez Mateos became an important milestone of "deatomization"; on 21 March 1963 he sent letters to the presidents of Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador and proposed that they make a joint statement on turning the continent into a nonnuclear zone. As a result on 29 April 1963 the presidents of these countries published the joint Declaration to Proclaim Latin America a Zone Free from Nuclear Weapons. The document expressed the proposal to conclude a multilateral agreement by which the continent's countries "would obligate themselves not to produce, nor obtain, nor store, nor test nuclear weapons or means of delivering them" and emphasized that "the conclusion of a regional Latin American agreement may encourage the adoption of a treaty agreement on a worldwide scale."

At the Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly Bolivia, Brazil, Haiti, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, El Salvador, Uruguay, Chile, and Ecuador introduced a draft of a resolution which brought to attention the declaration of the five presidents to declare Latin America a nonnuclear zone and contained the desire that the region's states begin to study measures to achieve the goals of this declaration. On 27 November 1963 the draft of this resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly.

In 1965-1967 a preparatory commission to develop the multilateral agreement worked in Mexico under the leadership of the prominent Mexican jurist Alfonso Garcia Robles. This commission's activity ended with the signing on 14 February 1967 at the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 14 Latin

American countries of the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, better known as the Tlatelolco Treaty (named after the region in Mexico City where the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] building is located). And on 25 April 1969 after its ratification by the 11th state--Barbados--the treaty went into effect. In September of that same year the Agency to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) began to function; it was a special organization created to monitor the fulfillment of the treaty obligations.

In recent years an absolute majority of the continent's states have joined the agreement. However, 22 states are full participants in it: Mexico, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Barbados, Haiti, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Venezuela, Panama, Colombia, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago, Surinam, and the Bahamas. The point is that in order to join the treaty, in addition to signing and ratifying it, a special declaration to put the treaty into effect is also supposed to be adopted. But certain states (including Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) disagree with certain provisions of it and signed and ratified the agreement but did not adopt declarations to put it into effect and thereby did not put the treaty into operation.

Cuba is also not a participant in the treaty. In principle supporting the idea of nonnuclear zones, it justified its refusal to participate by saying that the United States does not offer reliable guarantees that it will not deploy nuclear weapons in the region, including at Guantanamo Base located on Cuba's territory.

The main goal of this international legal document is to prohibit nuclear weapons in any form on the territory of all of Latin America. The regions' states are obliged to use nuclear energy and nuclear materials and equipment exclusively for peaceful purposes. Two additional protocols are supposed to guarantee the continent's nonnuclear status. Protocol 1 charges the obligation of observing the treaty's provisions on countries which de jure or de facto possess territories in the zone to which the treaty's effect extends, that is, the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. But Protocol 2 envisions the nuclear powers assuming obligations to respect the status of the nonnuclear zone in regard to the treaty participants.

At the same time the text of the agreement has certain formulas which lessen the significance of the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons which it proclaims. First, there are no precise provisions to prohibit the transport (transit) of nuclear weapons across the territory of the participating states by third countries. Therefore the situation arises where the very principle of "deatomization" is violated. The United States maintaining its right to deploy nuclear weapons at the base on Guantanamo, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands and to transport them across the Panama Canal undermines the nonnuclear status of the zone.

Secondly, the treaty recognizes the right for the participating states to explode nuclear devices for peaceful purposes--including explosions which presuppose using mechanisms similar to those used in nuclear weapons (Article 18), which contradicts the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear

Weapons which most of the countries of the world signed, including many countries in the region.

Finally, it is not clear whether the obligations of the countries which signed the treaty operate outside the "zone of application" or if they can participate in tests of nuclear weapons outside this zone as well as obtain nuclear weapons with the condition of keeping them outside the zone.

Despite certain shortcomings, the Tlatelolco Treaty substantially strengthens the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Its ideas have a great deal of influence on many countries which are trying to safeguard themselves against the nuclear threat. Thus, on 6 August 1985 13 countries which are members of the South Pacific Forum signed the Treaty on the Nonnuclear Zone in the Southern Part of the Pacific Ocean. In the east its borders touch the Latin American nonnuclear zone and in the south--the region of effect of the Antarctica Treaty, by which this region was essentially turned into a nonnuclear zone. As a result an enormous, practically unified territory of the Earth is being formed which is free of nuclear weapons. In this way the real prerequisites for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons practically throughout the Southern Hemisphere have taken shape.

Brazil's proposal to turn South America into a nonnuclear zone was a major step on the way to this. Speaking in September 1986 at the Organization of American States headquarters, President J. Sarney said: "Brazil's initiative is focused on turning the region in the southern part of the Atlantic Ocean from the shores of Africa to Latin America into a region of peace and cooperation among coastal states." The formation of this zone can be achieved as an addendum to the Tlatelolco Treaty.¹

The goal of this important initiative, in the words of the Brazilian leader, is to protect the region from tension and the arms race, which is necessary for the countries of Latin America and Africa to successfully resolve the complex economic problems facing them, exploit the mineral wealth of the Atlantic Ocean, create the corresponding climate of trust, and, ultimately, to consolidate universal peace. It is therefore natural that this proposal received the broad support of a number of Latin American and African states located along the Atlantic coast and was the basis of the document introduced for review of the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly by 11 states of the 2 continents. On 27 October 1986 the resolution declaring the South Atlantic a zone of peace and cooperation was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes (124 votes for, 8 votes abstaining, and 1 vote [the United States] against). The resolution contains an appeal to all states to rigorously observe the region's status by reducing and ultimately eliminating the military presence and not deploying nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons and points out the need to cooperate in eliminating the centers of tension in this region, to respect the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of the states located in it, and to abstain from the threat of force or its use.

The situation in which the Brazilian proposal appeared is in many respects similar to the one in which the Tlatelolco Treaty was worked out. In the same way that the Caribbean crisis provided the impetus for creating a nonnuclear

zone in Latin America, the armed conflict between Great Britain and Argentina was the direct cause and catalyst of the emergence of the idea of creating a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. And that is very significant. Obviously, the region's countries are trying to counter local conflicts which in present conditions are fraught with the danger of developing into a war using nuclear weapons with a system of security which would guarantee preserving the condition of peace in this region, and hence, would help consolidate peace on Earth as a whole. While in the first postwar years it was believed that questions of nuclear disarmament were the sphere of activity of the great powers, above all the USSR and the United States, a number of foreign policy documents--from the Tlatelolco Treaty to the formation of the "Delhi Six" and Brazil's proposal to create a nonnuclear zone in the South Atlantic--are evidence of the essential change in the position of the continent's states on this fundamental problem of modern times.

It is therefore natural that the Latin American countries' struggle for a nonnuclear world causes dissatisfaction in Washington. By trying to thwart these peace-loving efforts, the United States directly pits itself against the international community. The American representative in the UN voted against Brazil's proposal, justifying it by saying that "the text of the resolution 'may affect' the sea lanes and restrict the principle of free navigation." However, the whole point is that the proposal to rid the South Atlantic of nuclear arms contradicts U.S. policy to build up the military potential in this region. As Ch. Redman, the State Department representative, said, "the growing number of proposals on regional nonnuclear zones might potentially undermine the policy of deterrence which has been the cornerstone of the West's security since World War II times.² Thus the Reagan administration expressed a negative attitude toward the antinuclear sentiments which have enveloped the developing countries.

At the same time these sentiments are encountering active support on the part of the Soviet Union. A consistent supporter of creating nonnuclear zones in various regions of the world, the USSR sees in this an important means of struggle to end the arms race and strengthen the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The USSR supports the Tlatelolco Treaty, advocating that the zone's status be fully observed. The desire to prevent the militarization of the South Atlantic and turn it into a zone of peace and cooperation was highly praised. In December 1986 the Soviet representative signed protocols to the Rapotonga Treaty on strict observance of the status of the southern part of the Pacific Ocean.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 14 September 1986.
2. PRAVDA, 7 February 1987.

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U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR DETAILED, CRITICIZED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 41-44

[Article by S.Yu. Morozov under the rubric "Reports": "Military 'Therapy' of the Crisis in El Salvador"]

[Text] The Reagan administration's policy regarding el Salvador is one of the instructive examples of the "neoglobalism" and use of methods of force to satisfy the United States' foreign policy interests. According to the opinion of Washington strategists, all-out military support of the Duarte regime will allow the puppet government to independently "bear responsibility" for resolving the national crisis. Otherwise the United States would be forced to fulfill this "duty" itself at the price of expenditures of significant material and human resources. The presidential directive on issues of arms sales signed by Reagan on 9 July 1981 emphasizes that "intelligently organized deliveries of arms can strengthen our positions by improving the position of our friends and allies" in various regions, including in Latin America.¹ Washington's policy on these issues is based on the principle "aid for the purpose of security has priority over developmental aid programs."²

While arming the Salvadoran regime the White House is trying at the same time to create a beachhead for possible military intervention in the Central American subregion and for organization of aggression against the Sandinist revolution.

At the present time the main goal of American military aid in El Salvador is to prepare a potential theater of military actions in case of U.S. direct intervention for the purpose of giving "direct support" to the regime in the struggle against the patriots. Although official White House representatives deny press reports on the administration's intention to resort to direct invasion of El Salvador, they nonetheless cannot refute that Pentagon leaders have operational plans for the participation of U.S. army subunits in combat actions against FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] in the event of the emergence of a real threat of the regime's collapse. According to admissions of U.S. Defense Department associates, conditions have by now been ensured for the arrival of American armed forces units and their direct participation in anti-insurrectionist operations.³

American military aid to El Salvador is varied and includes sending weapons, military equipment, and spare parts through state and private channels (on credit and free-of-charge), participation in building military objects, services to repair and service equipment, training of army personnel, police, and special services, and the utilization of military advisors.

During the period from 1950 through 1980 El Salvador received a total of 16.8 million dollars worth of military aid from the United States. In this same time period 2,113 Salvadoran officers went through training at American military educational institutions.⁴ In addition, the United States gave active assistance to strengthen security forces.

Officers trained with American assistance, including those trained at the international police academy located in Washington, in time occupied key posts in various subunits, in particular in the finance, customs, and immigration police. American advisors organized a police school in El Salvador, prepared textbooks for associates of the finance police, and trained and equipped special police and national guard subunits to put down mass demonstrations of workers. A so-called group to study the activities of subversive elements was created with the Americans' participation; the group's task included struggling against patriotic forces and organizations.

However, while in the period 1950-1980 the total sum of American military assistance amounted to 16.8 million dollars, in the following 6 years 839.8 million dollars was offered. In 1986 U.S. military aid to El Salvador exceeded 126 million dollars, which comprised more than 66 percent of the total amount of U.S. military assistance to all Central American countries.⁵

Washington continues to consider training officers and military specialists one of the most important forms of military assistance. The main goal of the training programs is to establish relations with the officer corps which would ensure their support for American policies. In this connection, the Pentagon rigorously approaches the selection of candidates for training, singling out above all "those officers who occupy or will occupy influential posts in the army or government of their country."⁶

Most of the programs of professional-technical and military-strategic training include sections on ideological issues which are directed at indoctrinating a "critical attitude" toward any government whose policies show anti-American nationalist tendencies. And the students are persuaded that it is an "incorrect and dangerous policy" and their duty is "to take measures to correct it." In characterizing these programs, one of the former associates of the State Department noted: "The word 'communist' is interpreted in such a way that any government or movement can fall under this definition, if they support implementing at least one of the following measures which the State Department does not approve of--nationalization of private enterprises, in particular foreign corporations; radical land reform; establishing state control over trade; acceptance of Soviet assistance; implementation of an anti-American foreign policy or a policy of nonalignment."⁷

Familiarization with the American way of life is an important part of the training course. Trips around the country, sightseeing and visits to

government institutions in Washington, plants, and farms, and meetings with representatives of American business and political circles are organized within the framework of this program. Living in a "typical" American family which takes one or several students into their home for a certain period of time and acquaints them with the "daily" life of Americans is also practiced.

In the period from 1950 through 1985 the United States spent a total of 24.5 million dollars to train Salvadoran military men. In 1987 El Salvador's share in the total volume of this type of aid to Central American countries reaches 43.8 percent. In 1981-1985 about 6,800 Salvadoran soldiers and officers were trained using money allocated by the Reagan administration; they included three special-purpose battalions numbering 1,000 people each (the Atonal, the Atlacatl, and the Ramon Belloso battalions), more than a thousand students at Fort Benning, and about 2,500 people in other educational institutions, including in the Panama Canal zone and Honduras.⁸

Programs of free military aid are becoming increasingly important; in the Pentagon's opinion they are an effective instrument for carrying out American foreign policy. El Salvador is one of the leading recipients of this type of aid not only in Central America but also among the developing countries as a whole: 13.5 percent of this type of American aid (more than 134 million dollars worth) has been allocated to it in the 1987 financial year.⁹

Aid through export sales of arms has also increased fundamentally. In deals made along these lines, the U.S. government acts as the intermediary who buys the arms from private production companies and sells them later on credit under very favorable conditions. The Pentagon also issues guarantees for loans from private banks granted to buy American arms. Crediting of deliveries of American arms to El Salvador sharply expanded when the Republicans came to power. In the period from 1950 through 1986 the United States loaned this country about 115.6 million dollars to buy arms, and 70 percent of this amount was allocated after 1981.

American military advisors play an important role in training the Salvadoran army. In late March 1981 President Reagan gave instructions to send 55 instructors to El Salvador. Among them were members of a military group attached to the U.S. Embassy, a mobile group of instructors, naval consultants, technicians to service helicopters, three groups of specialists on counterinsurrectionist war, and consultants to help district headquarters plan combat operations. The official representatives of the administration assert that the number of American military advisors in El Salvador never exceeds 55 people. However, these assertions do not coincide with reality. Thus, while in 1981 9 members of the military attached to under the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador were taken into account in the quota of 55 people, in 1984 this group already numbering 16 was counted separately. In this same way the 25 instructors on "medical" issues are not included in the established quota. Specialists working on contract to service aircraft equipment and associates of the military attache apparatus, whose number reached 26 people in 1984, are also not officially taken into account. Several hundred people from the staff of a reconnaissance battalion based in Honduras who regularly fly into El Salvador to gather information are also not included in the total.

With the passage of time the direct involvement of American advisors in combat actions is also being intensified. In particular, in 1981 the zone where instructors could be was restricted to the so-called "safe regions" near San Salvador. However, in 1984 operational planning and support groups (usually from 2-3 people) were attached to each of the headquarters of the six brigades located throughout the country's territory. These groups gave the Salvadoran troops help on questions of preparing operations and supervising combat actions. American crews carry out reconnaissance flights over battle zones from airbases in Govarde (Panama) and Ilopango (Honduras).

Extensive American military aid has led to a sharp increase in the Salvadoran army. While in 1980 the number of armed forces totaled about 7,300 people, in 1986 it has reached more than 41,500 people. The army of El Salvador today is armed with 12 AMX-13 tanks, 45 armored personnel carriers of various types, 615 various artillery weapons, 48 antiaircraft guns, 20 patrol launches, 8 Hurricane attack planes, 2 C-47 planes, 6 CM-170 planes, 8 A-37V fighter bombers, as well as 40 combat helicopters.

Nonetheless, the measures being taken by the U.S. ruling circles to strengthen the Salvadoran regime are not making it possible to achieve military defeat of the patriotic forces. According to the admission of American military, the fighting spirit of the governmental army remains on the usual low level and cases are frequently noted where soldiers of the regime have thrown down their weapons under fire from the FMLN. Despite the large-scale U.S. infusions, the regime is constantly forced to increase its own military expenditures which at the present time absorb 47 percent of all the state's expenditures (the highest indicator among the countries of Latin America), paralyzing the country's economy.¹⁰

In turn by helping escalate the arms race in other countries of Latin America, the militarization of El Salvador has a serious negative influence on the domestic policy situation in the subregion and reduces opportunities to develop these countries to naught. Thus, the "low intensity conflicts" policy essentially leads to further intensification of the Central American crisis and creates a volatile situation where any accidental or provocation incident on the borders of the subregion's countries may lead to an open military conflict. Such a conflict is fraught with dangerous consequences not only for the peoples of Central America but also for the international situation on the whole. In these conditions the struggle against "neoglobalism" and the search for an acceptable political solution in El Salvador becomes especially meaningful and important.

FOOTNOTES

1. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, Washington, 1981, Vol 18, N 2057, p 72.
2. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Paris, 30 January 1981.
3. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 April 1984.

4. "Dollars and Dictators: A Guide to Central America," Albuquerque, 1982, p 187.
5. Calculated from: THE DEFENSE MONITOR, Washington, 1984, Vol 13, N 3, p 10; CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. FISCAL YEAR 1984, p 349; CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. FISCAL YEAR 1987, Vol 2, p 47.
6. "Latin America NACLA Report," New York, 1982, p 38.
7. Ibid., p 26.
8. CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION. SECURITY PROGRAMS. FISCAL YEAR 1987, Vol 1, p 94; THE DEFENSE MONITOR, 1984, Vol 13, N 3, p 11.
9. Calculated from: CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. FISCAL YEAR 1987, Vol 1, p 63.
10. "Keesings Contemporary Archives," London, 1986, Vol 32, p 34414; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Boston, 24 November 1986.

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LATINSKAYA AMERIKA READERS CRITIQUE ARTICLE ON LEFT-RADICALISM

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 86-101

[Letters under the rubric "Polemical Notes"]

[Text] Old Schemes and New Thinking

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N.A. Vasetskiy's article [for translation see USSR REPORT: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS JPRS-UIA-87-002, 13 January 1987 pp 49-60] in No 10 for 1986 could not fail to arouse controversy. The polemical note [for translation see USSR REPORT: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS JPRS-UIA-87-028, 3 June 1987 pp 91-94] in No 1 for 1987 was the first reaction to it. But the fact justifiably mentioned by the editorial office that "the views of Comrade N.A. Vasetskey are apparently not shared by him alone" (p 120) makes it impossible to abstain from further discussion. We are speaking of a certain interpretation of Latin American reality whose popularity among certain authors is inversely proportional to their knowledge of this continent and its problems. It is true that one does not often encounter this viewpoint in such pure form as in N.A. Vasetskiy's article. It is useful to analyze any system of views when it is brought to its logical conclusion--that helps understand its actual content. Therefore we must in fact return to the article with the gloomy title "The Impasses of Pseudorevolutionary Spirit."

The author asserts that all Latin American organizations which he considers ultraleftist are "petty bourgeois reactionary(!) political trends, above all Trotskyism and anarchism" (p 18). That is doing a great honor to the contemporary Trotskyites and anarchists. These minor sectarian groups scarcely even dream of setting the tone in Latin American left radicalism. In terms of their political importance they cannot be at all compared to military-political organizations like the Chilean MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left], the Uruguayan MLN [National Liberation Movement], the Colombian M-19, and others. In terms of ideology and politics these organizations are literally opposite in everything to "Trotskyism and anarchism." Instead of the Trotskyite myths of a "purely proletarian" revolution and a "workers' state" they have a desire to launch the revolutionary struggle of the people against the proimperialist oligarchy; instead of the anarchic cult of spontaneity they preach the creation of a

strong military-political organization; instead of national nihilism they emphasize the revolutionary traditions of the country and the region; instead of hostility toward real socialism they are oriented to Cuba's experience and show growing respect for the socialist community. Nor is terror as a tactical line, which in principle is not calculated for mass struggle, characteristic of them. These organizations have never considered individual terror the main and only means of struggle. And besides, to groundlessly classify an armed struggle against a dictatorship in conditions of a complete absence of opportunities for legal activity terror¹ essentially means to take the viewpoint of Reagan, who declared the entire national-liberation movement terror.

Even Vasetskiy was essentially compelled to admit all this (p 30). But how can these circumstances be reconciled with the initial thesis? Very simply: point out that in any of these organizations "it is possible to encounter representatives of all directions of leftism" (p 28). That means that one can judge the political line of the entire organization by the views and actions of individual persons! According to this logic the activity of the agent-provocateur Malinovskiy should have converted the Bolshevik party into a weapon of autocracy. That is precisely how the reactionaries of all times have reasoned, practicing slander against revolutionaries and democrats. What a swamp one could enter if instead of a concrete analysis of the ideology and tactics of serious political organizations excessive attention were devoted to the "mounds of view" of chatterboxes, demagogues, and provocateurs who hang around with them. With such a unique assortment of sources, Latin American left radicals appear in precisely the "light" in which the enemies of revolution and socialism would like to see them. But the chaff must be separated from the wheat and the provocateurs from their victims!

N.A. Vasetskiy is far from such a distinction. One idea permeates the article: in any country and under any historical conditions left radicalism was, is, and will be "petty bourgeois revolutionarism" which plays into the hands of the class enemy. It would be a small loss if the author had presented this as his personal viewpoint. But he ascribes it to K. Marx, F. Engels, and V.I. Lenin. For a reader who is insufficiently familiar with the primary sources, the skillful selection of quotations must create the impression: this is a 100-percent Marxist, purely communist position. If one does not agree with it--it means that he has not yet reached the "boiling point" with which the "new quality" begins to form (p 31). It is easy to imagine how this could affect the prestige of the journal and, worse than that, the prestige of the Soviet social sciences and Marxist theory among those Latin American readers whom the article does in fact bring to the boiling point.

But in actual fact K. Marx, F. Engels, and V.I. Lenin never tried to groundlessly divide the entire world revolutionary movement into proletarian-communist and petty bourgeois. They made such a division only in the three countries of Europe where the antagonism of the working class and the large bourgeoisie objectively became the axis of the entire sociopolitical struggle. Under other conditions Marxism "recognizes the petty bourgeois movement as a unique initial form of proletarian, communist movement."² In other words, a revolutionary movement guided by people originating from the middle strata

does not express their specific interests and is not permeated with their specific perception of the world, but represents the interests and perception of the world of entire social blocks or conglomerates (the nation or people).

In Latin America the major axis of the sociopolitical struggle passes not between the workers' movement and the large bourgeoisie but between the proimperialist oligarchy and the people, including politically mature representatives of all those classes and strata which are oppressed by the oligarchic state power. In countries where national liberation in the narrow sense (state independence) was achieved more than 150 years ago, the people's liberation movement already has deep historical roots. It gained its first real victory in 1959 in Cuba. The practical experience of the Cuban revolution and the theoretical views of its leaders (above all F. Castro and E. Guevara) served as the main source of the formation of most of the leftist military-political organizations of Latin America. The name "left radicals" (not to mention "ultraleftist") does not adequately convey the specifics of this political tradition. They are people's revolutionary parties, many of whom also play a prominent role in the workers' movement. The Sandinist people's revolution was a historical service of theirs. Their contribution to the liberation struggle of the peoples of El Salvador, Guatemala, and other countries is a great one.

Of course, it is very easy to pass over the successes of this political direction in silence, merely mentioning failures and defeats. That is how Vasetskiy acts in regard to the Chilean MIR, the MLN--"Tupamaros," "M-19," and others. It comes out that defeat always testifies to the bankruptcy of the organization as such. One might think that communists have never suffered defeats...

The article is permeated with a latent but inflexible certainty that the revolutionary movement should be evaluated on a scale of successes-failures. If there are successes, then it means "we" are right about everything, period. If there are failures, it means the intrigues of the leftists and the social reformists are to blame but "we" are right, since we always criticized them. However, the Leninist position is completely different: even in those cases where the reason for the defeat was the revolutionaries' mistake, Lenin did not turn them into scapegoats, not to mention search for links between them and the class enemy (let us recall his attitude toward the revolutionary populists). Therefore, he did not derive the actual criterion of the revolutionary spirit of a particular movement from the level of its "success."

The defeat of actions is not yet proof of the "petty bourgeois revolutionarism" of its participants. Otherwise even Fidel Castro and his comrades-in-arms could have been called adventurists if they had been defeated. "One may speak of 'putsch' in the scientific sense of the word," Lenin wrote, "only when an attempted uprising did not reveal anything except a circle of conspirators or absurd maniacs and did not arouse any sympathies among the masses." But "either the nastiest reactionary or a doctrinaire who is hopelessly unable to imagine social revolution as a living phenomenon" can call an uprising which "was expressed in the street battles of some of the urban petty bourgeoisie and some of the workers after long-standing mass

agitation, demonstrations, banning of newspapers, and the like" putsch or terrorism.³

It is least of all our intention to violate the generally accepted rules of mutual respect when conducting scientific polemics, and certainly not to "hang" any labels on the opponent. We also hope that N.A. Vasetskiy will not accuse us of a wish to characterize him within the framework of a strict Leninist-principled opposition: "either reactionary or doctrinaire." But to see in left radicals only conspirators and absurd maniacs who have broken away from the masses means, at the very least, not to know Latin America. And therefore to write about it, starting from general and basically outdated schemes that are half a century old according to the principle "if it was like that then and there, it is always and everywhere so" is still, from the scientific standpoint, wrong and even irresponsible.

The Leninist methodology of evaluating a mass movement confirms the revolutionary spirit and popular character of many left radical organizations of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Colombia of the 1960's-1980's. If we were speaking of groups of adventurists and "there were much more ostentatious pseudoradicalism than real revolutionary spirit in their actions" (p 25), then they would have disappeared from the political arena long ago as a result of the enemy's savage repressions. But nothing like that is happening. Almost destroyed people's revolutionary parties revive like a Phoenix from the ashes and the reason is that sufficiently broad strata of working people which one would in no way call the social base of reaction have marched and continue today to march behind them. Many of these organizations are overcoming the infantile disease of "leftism" and are learning to combine illegal forms of struggle with legal ones and to form political alliances (for that certain fighters against leftism accuse them of social reformism!). Surely this does not prove that before us is one of the important forms of the activism of the masses and their faculty, in Lenin's expression, "for independent historical action."

A mass movement can change only through its own experience of struggle and, particularly, social changes as a result of this struggle. The masses cannot be reeducated with ideological polemics alone. It is rather capable of doing harm if it is carried on in the abusive form of "exposures" (p 19), laying claim to a monopoly on truth without a shadow of tact and respect for people who sacrifice their lives in the struggle against the common enemy. None other than V.I. Lenin warned: sticking abusive labels on the "heroic uprising of the most mobile and intelligent part of certain classes of an oppressed nation against the oppressors" is not scientific criticism but "terrible in its doctrinaire attitude and pedantry of evaluation."⁴ The communist parties of Latin America have literally through suffering learned to reject such forms of the "ideological struggle" and to follow a policy of unity among revolutionaries. Certain people's revolutionary organizations "exposed" by Vasetskiy have already become allies of the communists and work is underway to achieve this alliance with others.

In these conditions it is especially intolerable to see "anticommunism" in any of the disagreements which are inevitable among different parties. As a rule, from people's revolutionary organizations we encounter not "a prejudiced

attitude toward the international communist movement" (p 26) but criticism of the particular actions of a certain communist party in a certain period. This criticism is in many respects the result of the real mistakes of certain communist parties and stagnant or crisis phenomena in them. The particular harm of the abusive "polemics" which Vasetskiy's article is full of is that it induces people to shift responsibility to others instead of correcting their own shortcomings. It is instructive that the Latin American communist parties are breaking away from this type of thinking. Thus, the 16th Argentine CP Congress admitted it was a mistake to refuse cooperation with other leftist revolutionary organizations. The Argentine CP is making efforts to correct the mistakes committed.⁵

At M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with a delegation of this party held in March 1987, it was noted that the communist movement "needs to overcome the stereotypes which emerged in the previous stage in connection with shortcomings and weaknesses in a number of its links."⁶ The restructuring which is now underway in the USSR helps update the strategy and tactics of many foreign communist parties and is welcomed by people's revolutionary organizations.⁷ "It is returning interest in socialism not only among the working class but especially among the intelligentsia and other strata which had begun to break away from it."⁸ At such a time there is no greater political tactlessness than summoning the ghosts of an evil past, citing yellowed documents of the time "when the new processes and phenomena were inopportunately evaluated and when backwardness in the theoretical interpretation of its tasks took place..."⁹ But let us try to correct chronic mistakes more quickly. In order to do so we must always sense our responsibility to our time and to living and dead fighters for social justice.

FOOTNOTES

1. In recent years conditions have taken shape in a number of countries for the participation of these organizations in the legal political struggle, and some of them (the MLN-"Tupamaros," for example) have renounced armed actions.
2. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], Vol 10, p 59.
3. Ibid., Vol 30, pp 53, 54.
4. Ibid., pp 56, 53.
5. GRANMA, Havana, 7 November 1986.
6. PRAVDA, 4 March 1987.
7. L. Urbano, "Raul Sendic reflexionando en voz alta," BARRICADA, Managua, 17 February 1986.
8. PRAVDA, 4 March 1987.
9. Ibid.

Serious Discussion Is Needed

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The journal's idea to set up direct contact with the reader on its pages must be welcomed. However, it would be naive to assume that a dialogue concerning the questions dealt with in N.A. Vasetskiy's article would not develop into a scientific debate. After all, the most active readers of the journal LATINSKAYA AMERIKA are Soviet specialists on Latin America. But since we have started talking about such a dialogue-debate, its theme should be specified since N.A. Vasetskiy's views, you will agree, in spite of all the "co-comrades" standing behind him--look somehow unconvincing as such a topic. Or they look like a hint at something which only the chosen ones are given to understand. However, they in turn are motifs from the recent past. But life has invented new songs.

That is why we should try to formulate the sought-after theme in this way: "On the question of the policy of alliances in revolution: the 'noncommunist left' in Latin America."

From this point of view, the picture drawn in N.A. Vasetskiy's article leads to a rather unequivocal conclusion. You would not, as they say, take the kind of "leftists" that come from his pen with you on reconnaissance. But to what degree does the image of the "noncommunist leftist" created by him, N.A. Vasetskiy, correspond to reality? In his interpretation not only have the differences between Trotskyites and, let us say, Maoists (former or present) or left radicals in all their diverse hypostases disappeared, but even the differences between Trotskyites and the left extremists of Western Europe.

There are other observations on N.A. Vasetskiy's article. But in any case they require serious discussion, since behind the very many controversial assertions of N.A. Vasetskiy stand, if you like, almost a spontaneous--and some resultant confusion in their presentation--rejection of the fetishization, manifested more and more in recent years, of unification processes in the camp of the leftist forces and their conversion into a new "philosopher's stone" of revolution of the ill-remembered type of "Fokism" [translation unknown]. Indeed, what could be more attractive than the ideas that if only all leftists--both communists and noncommunists--would unite, then the cause of revolution would certainly win out throughout Latin America. Such primitivization of the Nicaraguan experience (the author of these lines himself even came down with this "disease") ultimately turned unification processes from the means to the end of the revolutionary struggle.

But, after all, the question of who will prove to be the vanguard of revolution is of a fundamental nature even when we speak of an alliance of leftist forces. Latin American variants of Pol Pot rule already exist and do nothing but compromise the cause of revolution.

Yes, let us repeat, N.A. Vasetskiy's article demands a serious approach. But instead of that, the invective of I. Tverskiy has appeared. It is precisely invective since it also contains attacks of almost a personal nature. First, in itself it is already lowering the general level of the dialogue-discussion. Secondly, I. Tverskiy's attempt to write his criticisms as if he himself took up the pen immediately after setting down his machine gun as his partisan unit stops for rest is very questionable. Yes, there exists such a fashion among a whole group of our specialists in Latin America. And, thirdly, I. Tverskiy's coquetry surrounding the assertion that he supposedly is no specialist is more than inappropriate. And this is said in such a tone that all doubts regarding I. Tverskiy's qualifications must immediately vanish. But if you still have the vestiges of these doubts, he disperses even them with opinions on the real influence of Trotskyites on the "noncommunist left" in Latin America or on the degree to which reformism is alien or characteristic of the Chilean MIR.

I believe that the fine idea of holding a dialogue with the reader will not be wasted because there can be no 100-percent guarantee that materials created on the not very fruitful model proposed by I. Tverskiy will not appear. And yet I believe that many Soviet specialists in Latin America would be interested in taking part in the further development of the dialogue-debate which arose on the pages of the journal "around" N.A. Vasetskiy's article in the form, for example, of a roundtable discussion. Employees of the editorial office do not need to borrow know-how in the work of holding roundtable discussions.

What Ignorance of the Subject Leads To

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N.A. Vasetskiy's article published in the No 10 journal for 1986 "Impasses of Pseudorevolutionary Spirit" at first gives the impression of a practical joke and a highly skilled parody on the pseudoscientific press material which multiplied abundantly in the 1970'-early 1980's. However, upon more careful reading one is convinced that this is by no means parody; it is blasphemy. For that Trotskyism (not to mention anarchism) as a serious force worth spending so many ardent words, citations, and strong expressions on hardly still exists in today's Latin America. Perhaps he refers to the orthodox Trotskyite groups, who are so small and devoid of any hint of political influence, they can only be discerned under a very strong microscope? Or are they organizations like the Revolutionary Workers' Party in Argentina in which there has been nothing Trotskyite except origin for a long time now?

Upon reading the article it becomes clear to anyone who knows Latin America even a little that its pathos is really directed against left radical military-political organizations--the same trend which the 26 July Movement, the Sandinist National Liberation Front, and the insurrectionist organizations of El Salvador and Guatemala came from. It is precisely to this trend rather than to difficult-to-distinguish Trotskyites and mythical anarchists that the "Tupamaros," "Montoneros," "M-19," and MIR (Chile) belonged and still belong. I readily allow that N.A. Vasetskiy himself may not even guess whom he is branding with the general name of "other leftist groupings" (p 21). But in the performance of its duty the editorial office was obliged to understand that those participating "in strengthening the alliance of all reactionary

forces and trends in the struggle against the forces of social progress and national liberation" (p 22), according to N.A. Vasetskiy's article, are the very rank-and-file warriors and commandantes who now fight and die for the victory of the revolution on the continent whose name the journal bears; that Latin American revolutionaries also owe the many years of forced prevalence of the "trial and error" method and, consequently, the amount of blood spilled to those same possessors of the "monopoly on eternal truths" who for many decades reveled in their own independence from the "metamorphoses of reality" (p 24).

It has long since been time for a debate on the problems of left radical movements, but N.A. Vasetskiy's article can scarcely serve as the basis for it. Scientific polemics can be conducted with views and positions whose necessary criteria are the existence of reasoning, respect for other points of view, and the main thing--a desire to understand the object of study. But in this case we are dealing with an undifferentiated stream, not of consciousness but of dense ideological cliches in unclouded form inherited by the author from those still quite recent times when the noncommunist leftists were unfailingly accused of all the misfortunes of the Latin American revolutionary movement.

Moreover, N.A. Vasetskiy's article came to us not simply from the "past" but from the "long past" times. It could be brushed aside like a relic if not for the tenacity of the Stalinist perception of the world which penetrates the article: the most dangerous and insidious enemy is the enemy disguised as a revolutionary ("social-fascist"), the one who "poses for himself the task of secretly--under the guise of struggling against imperialism--checking the onward march of the world revolutionary process, and if he is successful, tries to drive it back from frontiers already reached" (p 22). Categorizing everyone who thinks and acts differently as deliberate or thoughtless apologists (and I would like to say--agents) of imperialism (p 19) is, speaking in the words of N.A. Vasetskiy, a too "familiar motif" (p 24).

But this tradition is not the only thing that educated the author: the article represents a classic model of the style of criticism of Trotskyism which has become established in our literature. Any other trends and deviations are still characterized in essence and the corresponding theoretical postulates are presented, against which the authors try to pit their own system of argumentation. But as soon as the subject of Trotskyism comes up, the authors are immediately seized by an anger which is so sacred and righteous that they are no longer able to say anything articulate: they can only relentlessly chastize--using citations from the classics--everyone in sight. It is impossible to get rid of the feeling that the very object of their studies inevitably affects the critics of Trotskyism: it is precisely the representatives of this trend that typically come to perceive themselves as the bearers of the final truth.

In terms of the essence of the problems dealt with, N.A. Vasetskiy's article is so much beneath any criticism that, it seems, it deserves incomparably more ridicule than it is subjected to in I. Tverskiy's letter. N.A. Vasetskiy himself set the level of possible polemics: the "metamorphoses" to which his "scientific" creativity has been subjected, unlike leftism, "reach the 'boiling point' where the 'new quality' begins to form" (p 31). Thus, before

the appearance of the article on the "impasses" it was impossible to even imagine that political trends could act as the social vehicle of something (p 18). In general one would like to quote the article over and over again--its ignorance of Latin American affairs is so stunning. I. Tverskiy is wrong to believe that the author deliberately disguises the object of study--he simply does not know those organizations which he is writing about. Otherwise, how can the MIR of Chile be considered an example of a social-reformist organization? Is this perhaps a misprint and the author had in mind the Bolivian MIR? Although it is doubtful that N.A. Vasetskiy in general doubts the existence of the latter, since it is completely obvious that the author was molded as a "professional fighter" (against Trotskiyism) on soil other than Latin American soil. Attesting to this are the persons he mentions and the very, as N.A. Vasetskiy likes to say, "image" of the noncommunist leftists. Did the author see noncommunist leftists who start a fight with the participants in antigovernmental demonstrations or strikes in any country of Latin America (p 20)? Who do the "senseless bloodlettings link with the extremists of the right fascist persuasion" (p 25)? Is it possibly the Argentine "Montoneros" in the years of the fascist dictatorship or the Chilean Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front or the Salvadorean partisans? Does the author know that the communists of Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Argentina, and many other countries of the continent consider unity with those in whose actions, he believes, there is "more ostentatious pseudoradicalism than genuine revolutionary spirit" (p 25) to be a necessary condition for creating the political vanguard of revolution?

The list of such questions can continue endlessly. Although it is completely obvious that they do not at all disturb the author. For him the important thing is not Shakespeare, but commentaries on him: God help it, Latin America. The main thing is a constant struggle against Trotskiyism. Incidentally, the question of N.A. Vasetskiy's competence and scientific courtesy is not very interesting; to me the fact that the journal has published material on such a level is much more serious and disturbing.

In Regard to a Certain Polemic

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The polemic which appeared on the pages of the journal revealed the obvious need for a serious and detailed review of the exceptionally important processes which are occurring in the 1980's among the Latin American leftist forces, including their ultraleft flank. Unfortunately, they have not been adequately covered in the journal's articles. The attempt to systematize the new trends in the continent's revolutionary movement made in the debate and in a number of articles primarily on the basis of analyzing the events in Central America after the victory of the Nicaraguan revolution have not become the basis even for developing and refining the terminology which is used in our research. And as a result hackneyed cliches and stereotypes formed back in the 1960's are current even now. The debate on this problem area, although it is for the purpose of refining the conceptual apparatus, became necessary long ago. However, the tone set by I. Tverskiy's polemical note is questionable. Criticism should be constructive and not be reduced to hanging labels.

When the phenomenon of ultraleftism in Latin America is studied, evaluating the role and place of the left radical and ultraleft movements in the contemporary revolutionary process on the continent is of fundamental significance. As the history of the Latin American revolutionary liberation movement of the 1960's-1980's shows, the existence of a block of organizations, extremely mixed in terms of make-up, which occupy "more leftist" positions than the communist parties in terms of goals, forms of struggle, and assessments of the degree of maturity of the revolutionary situation is not a situational short-term phenomenon. We are speaking of a historically determined phenomenon which stems from the peculiarities of the region's sociopolitical development. The general backwardness and dependence of Latin American societies which made a marked impression on the specifics of the social class structure are characterized by a great proportion of middle urban and marginal strata and give a frequently nonproletarian, petty bourgeois tint to the anticapitalist aspirations of the masses and open up a certain range for the activity of left radical and left extremist, Maoist, neo-Trotskyite, and other such organizations.

In the 1960's, despite fundamental differences in ideology and policy of the broad spectrum of ultraleftist groups, a whole number of general features could be found in their activities. The absolute majority of organizations attempted to force processes occurring in society and skip over certain stages of the struggle, without considering the socioeconomic and political situation in the particular country, and immediately seize power. The slogans they advanced suffered from maximalism, the struggle's need to improve the people's status under the existing order was denied, and the armed struggle, which frequently took on the character of extremist and terrorist actions while rejecting all other forms of sociopolitical activism, was raised to the absolute. The main emphasis was put on military training and organization and the role of the political party as the leader of the masses was denied or underestimated. Most of the organizations advocated spontaneous actions, believing that the personal example of the revolutionaries was enough to mobilize the working people. The proclamation of socialist ideals as the goal of the struggle did not have a precisely worked out platform under it. When the moving forces of the revolution were evaluated the role of the working class was underestimated and the revolutionary potential of the student body, the intelligentsia, and the peasantry was exaggerated. Many ultraleftist organizations took up sectarian and vanguard positions, ignored the task of using contradictions in the enemy camp and gaining temporary allies, and frequently had a hostile attitude toward communist parties. The latter were accused of right reformism and revisionism. Anti-Soviet and anticommunist attacks were also tolerated.

In the 1970's and especially in the 1980's in connection with the further intensification of the anti-imperialist struggle, the growth in the political activism of the proletariat, and changes in the political situation on the continent and in the world, as well as because of analysis of the causes of their own failures and mistakes, many of these organizations were forced to revise their views on the goals and tasks of revolution and its nature and moving forces, and in many respects change their tactics and strategy. At the present time a noticeable demarcation has occurred among them; this in turn

requires a more differentiated approach to evaluating their activities and prospects of development. In terms of character of actions and ideological-political precepts, they can be divided with a certain share of conventionality into three main trends: ultraleft (including organizations under the influence of the ideas of Trotskiyism and Maoism), left reformist, and left radical.

The ultraleft trend is represented by advocates of senseless terror, the "revolutionary phrase," and adventurist actions which frequently do enormous harm to the revolutionary movement. Characteristic features of this trend are rejection of concrete analysis of the situation, replacing it with a unified schematic picture and set of slogans; contempt for domestic problems; and a simplified and distorted understanding of the international situation and the dialectics of the national and the international.

The left reformist trend supports reform-oriented modernization of development and is as a rule strongly affected by the ideological influences of the West (contemporary social democracy, left Catholicism, the ecologists, and others).

As the experience of the revolutionary struggle on the continent attests, relying on a link with the masses left radical groups and parties can fulfill the functions of the revolutionary vanguard and to the fullest extent use their military-political and organizational potential to fundamentally restructure society from the perspective of performing the tasks of socialist construction. Until the mid-1980's military-political organizations remained the basic form of political reality of the continent's left radical trend which was formed independently back in the 1960's and in the ideological-political sense traveled a complex and contradictory path of development toward assimilating Marxist-Leninist doctrine (in the figurative expression of R. Arismendi, "through the fire and blood of deadly sociopolitical skirmishes").¹ Characteristic of the left radical movement of Latin America are many specific features which are not typical of either the "classic" revolutionary democratism of the Afro-Asian region or of the left radicalism of the developed capitalist countries. In this connection the need to specify the meaning of the concepts "left radical" and "revolutionary-democratic" and "left reformist" on the one hand and "left radical" and "ultraleft" on the others seems obvious. The importance of formulating these categories is dictated by pressing scientific and political necessities. The complexity of defining the left radical trend is related to the mobility of its content which changes in the process of sociopolitical development and during the class struggle.

The development of the Cuban revolution into a socialist revolution and its consolidation given the support of world socialism defined the long-term ideological-political guidelines of this trend which was formed on a broad revolutionary-democratic basis. This sector of the anti-imperialist movement was initially distinguished by a more precise formulation of the tasks of revolution (unlike, for example, the representatives of the patriotic wing of the army), significant remoteness from left reformist elements, and a general orientation to the ideology of class (unlike the eclecticism of the ultraleftists). The contours of a new revolutionary-socialist trend which is typologically close to the revolutionary parties in the countries of socialist

orientation began to gradually appear. Of course, the process of the formation of this trend on the continent has not ended and the boundaries separating it from the ultraleftists and revolutionary democrats are flexible and continually changing. Its transition to a firm platform of scientific-socialist ideology occurs at different rates in different countries and encounters great difficulties related, among other things, to the weakness of the Marxist ideological traditions in certain countries: the heterogeneity of the initial political-ideological expanse on whose basis the left radical movement began to develop.

The process of the formation of vanguard trends of the type transitional to Marxism-Leninism was manifested most clearly in Central America. However, this process, which exists in the form of a tendency, remains a nondirect and by no means irreversible one by virtue of the influence of internal and external factors. The events in Grenada were an especially tragic example in this regard.

More complicated phenomena are observed among the military-political organizations of the countries of South America in connection with the greater diversity of conditions. In Chile, in an environment of activization of the antifascist movement, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), which earlier acted from sectarian positions, shifted from confrontation to cooperation with communists and supported the slogan of unity of leftist and democratic forces in the struggle against the Pinochet regime. In Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay--countries which have joined the path to return to representative democracy regimes, the process of reshaping [perestroyka] the organizational structure, the system of values, and the guidelines of movements in the left flank of the political spectrum is characterized by incompleteness and inconstancy. Taking these circumstances into account, the communist parties of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay avoid unequivocal assessments of leftist trends which are in the stage of restructuring their activity. In the new conditions a desire to unify leftist forces on the basis of a joint struggle to strengthen and intensify the democratic process has begun to appear.

Correctly determining priorities in the policy of alliances and establishing a hierarchy of unity demands a careful and consistent study of those phenomena which arise among the leftist and ultraleftist organizations. Ignoring them inevitably involves political miscalculations, prevents putting an end to the lack of communication among revolutionary organizations, and strengthens centrifugal tendencies in their midst. In this regard the self-critical analysis carried out by the Argentine communists on the eve of and during the work of the 12th Argentine CP Congress (November 1986) is instructive. The political resolution of the congress notes that "for a long time the party has given preference to general democratic alliances rather than strategic agreements or confused these two concepts and, as a result, frequently found itself reduced to the status of a force which supported bourgeois-reformist projects as the 'lesser of evils'." Such a position, the General Secretary of the Argentine CP A. Fava emphasized, took shape as a result of mistakes made in the policy of alliances. In the 1960's-1970's the party was justifiably criticized for the adventurist methods of the ultraleftists, but could not see the new revolutionary forces emerging among them whose activity in a number of

cases was equated with the activity of the most right extremists. The roots of this phenomenon, A. Fava noted, are related to the mistaken precept that genuine revolutionaries cannot launch their activity outside the ranks of the party.²

The fact that certain leftist organizations of Latin America which have endured the main burden of repressions still have a distrustful attitude toward the liberalization of social life draws attention. Thus, up to the present time in Argentina a military-political organization which was active in the past--the People's Revolutionary Army--has not appeared in the political arena. At the same time, however, different factions of the "Montoneros" are trying to operate within the framework of the legal mass organizations and are taking the first steps to expand their influence in the Peronist movement, above all in its youth wing. In Brazil the Revolutionary Movement of 8 October (MR-8) rejected armed forms of struggle, joined in parliamentary activity, and launched work to expand the mass base of the party and strengthen its youth organization. In Uruguay the 26 March Independence Movement actively supports an association of progressive forces--the Broad Front--and concentrates its efforts on work in the trade union movement and the armed forces, stressing the need for unity in the struggle for democratic transformations and a solution to the crisis. The "National Liberation Movement--Tupamaros" (MLN-T) has worked out a program of democratic transformations and turned to a policy of forming anti-imperialist and democratic alliances.

It should be mentioned that changes in the social-psychological aspiration of the masses fundamentally undermine the direct sources of ultraleftism. The appearance of a number of leftist military-political organizations of the countries of South America beyond the bounds of the ultraleftist sector can be seen in two directions: forming revolutionary-socialist movements or slipping toward left reformist positions and converging with international social democracy and new mass movements (ecologists and others). Thus, two factions of the MIR (Bolivia), which was a left extremist movement in the past, legalized their activity and began to orient themselves to national-reformist precepts and strengthening ties with the Swedish social democrats.

However, there can also be backsliding and relapses into far left extremism which fuses into extreme right reaction, as happened in Colombia where several terrorist groupings immediately acted against the truce between the government and the revolutionary military-political organizations. One of them--the "Ricardo Franco" group, created in 1983 by elements from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (a military organization which cooperated with the Colombian CP) set as its task physically annihilating the leaders of the Colombian CP and FARC and began to realize it. The country's very influential partisan organization--the 19 April Movement (M-19), in whose ranks three wings actually coexist--the left radical, the left reformist, and the ultraleft wings, also follows an extremely inconsistent political line regarding the truce.

We should specially dwell on the processes occurring among Maoist organizations. In the late 1960's-first half of the 1970's they managed to gain rather strong positions in the youth and student movement and begin

practical realization of the theory of the Chinese type of people's revolutionary war and establishment of armed formations in a number of countries. Attempts were made to expand the social base by recruiting some of the working class and the peasantry to their side. Above all organizations who deviated somewhat from orthodox Maoism achieved relative successes in this area. The Colombian Independent Revolutionary Workers' Movement (MOIR), which at one time numbered more than 10,000 people, may serve as an example. Since the mid-1970's the influence of Maoist organizations has begun to fall in most countries. The Latin American public's negative attitude toward China's foreign policy (expanded contacts with the Chilean junta, support of the U.S. reactionary policy, and Beijing's armed provocations in Southeast Asia, and the like) could not fail to be reflected in their reduced popularity. After China's reorientation to interstate cooperation and refusal to support the activities of Maoist organizations the latter proved to be isolated. Military defeats convinced most of the groups in practice of the bankruptcy of the ideological-political postulates of Maoism. Thus, at the Second "People's Liberation Army of Colombia" Congress (1980) Maoism was described as a variety of revisionism and all the previous activity of this organization was criticized. The disorientation of the Maoist groups and their desire to reinterpret their practical experience led to intensification of the factional struggle and the Maoist parties splitting into numerous rival groupings whose size usually did not exceed a few dozen people. At the present time Maoism in Latin America does not exist as an organically unified trend and centrifugal tendencies have prevailed in it. The number and influence of these organizations continue to decline. Many parties have collapsed or disbanded and others have declared their break from Beijing. Most of the organizations have changed tactics, rejected armed struggle, and begun to take part in election campaigns, including alliances with a broad spectrum of political forces--from national-reformist and populist movements to communist parties (Colombia, Peru, and others). As a result of the evolution which is occurring most of these organizations can only be conditionally included in the Maoist camp. The "Sendero Luminoso" which emerged in the late 1960's in Peru is an exception.

And, finally, I want to say a few words about Trotskyism as a variety of ultraleftism. Many Trotskyite organizations of the continent trace their history back to 1929, but most of them emerged in the 1970's when Trotsky supporters managed to recruit the disoriented masses of the petty bourgeoisie and student body to their own side. In themselves Trotskyite parties as a rule are small and represent small groupings of the intelligentsia. However, they manage to have ideological influence on certain mass organizations. The traditionally petty bourgeois ideology of Trotskyism was widespread in the student milieu. In recent years in order to maintain their influence Trotskyites have been trying, and here N. Vassetskiy was correct, to expand their social base and go beyond the boundaries of universities. They actively operate among the middle urban strata, the marginals, and the peasantry. The working class is becoming an object of their concentrated attention and the slogan of proletarianization of Trotskyite parties is being advanced. In order to disseminate their ideology Trotskyites frequently utilize the tactics of entrism [possibly joining] in regard to trade unions and political parties of different orientations. However, despite the quite substantial material resources and broad propaganda network, Latin American Trotskyites have not

managed to create stable mass parties. Trotskyism has a substantial influence among the working class only in Bolivia, where Trotskyism has traditionally intertwined with another branch of petty bourgeois revolutionarism--anarchic-syndicalism. In the late 1970's-early 1980's marked changes occurred in the tactics of Trotskyite organizations. Unlike the preceding period, many Trotskyites declare the need for a struggle to improve the position of the masses and take active part in anti-imperialist demonstrations to restore democracy and punish those to blame for repressions. Many groups participate in election campaigns and have abandoned anti-Soviet and antisocialist attacks which discredit them, express solidarity with the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions, and take realistic positions on a number of other international problems. As a result of the evolution taking place, a number of the region's communist parties have begun to follow a more differentiated policy toward some of these organizations and consider joint actions in the struggle to achieve particular goals possible. As was mentioned at the Seventh Colombian CP National Conference on Organizational Questions, "in connection with the crisis of Maoism, Trotskyism, and other groups an approach to their rank-and-file members must be found."

In this way, a brief analysis of the policies and ideology of organizations which occupy the left flank of the political spectrum of the countries of Latin America bears witness to the acceleration in the 1980's of the process of stratification and differentiation among them. The theory and practice of different parties and groupings are on the whole evolving. Many of them have abandoned absolutizing armed forms of struggle, favor utilizing legal methods of work, are against repressions and for observing democratic freedoms and for satisfying the direct demands of working people, are taking active part in election campaigns, have withdrawn from sectarian positions, and recognize the leadership role of the working class in the revolutionary process. At the same time, however, the intensified struggle and increasing disagreements are leading to demarcation of forces within these organizations and the withdrawal of both certain members and whole factions from them. The changes occurring within their ranks require a more attentive and differentiated approach to them, taking into account the potential for further evolution of their individual representatives toward scientific socialism. The present interpretation of the new realities makes it possible to see and maximally utilize the new opportunities in the struggle for peace, democracy, and social progress.

An attempt has been made in these notes to outline only certain contours of those problems which demand a new approach in keeping with the spirit of the times and with the new realities of the continent. Many important questions remain outside our scope: terrorism, the revolutionary armed struggle, and the liberation movement; the most effective means of deflecting imperialist intervention in conditions of Washington's extensive utilization of methods of state terrorism; moral-ethical aspects of the revolutionary struggle in the nuclear age, including the nature of interrelations among different trends of the revolutionary movement, on the one hand, and the "price of victory," on the other. All of them may become the basis for a discussion at the roundtable.

FOOTNOTES

1. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 7, 1980, p 13.

2. QUE PASA, Buenos Aires, 8 January 1986.

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LA INSTITUTE MONOGRAPH ON REFORMISM, WORKING CLASS REVIEWED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 132-133

[Review by S.M. Khenkin of book "Rabochiy klass i ideologiya reformizma v Latinskoy Amerike" [The Working Class and the Ideology of Reformism in Latin America], responsible editors--A.F. Shulgovskiy and B.M. Merin, USSR Academy of Sciences Latin America Institute, Moscow, 1985, 372 pages, number of copies not given]

[Text] The timeliness of the collective monograph by associates of the Latin America Institute is determined by the significant role which reformism plays in the workers' movement of many countries of the continent, especially in light of the tendencies which appeared in the late 1970's-early 1980's. The 20 articles which are published in the book create a multifaceted picture of reformist ideology, its influence on the workers' movement, and the attitude of the vanguard detachments of the proletariat toward it. The works combine a regional problem approach to covering the reformist ideology with a by-country approach; this allows the authors, on the one hand, to reveal the general patterns of influence of reformism's social doctrine on the workers' movement and, on the other, to analyze in detail the various forms of this influence.

The authors have focused main attention on revealing the economic, sociopolitical, and ideological sources of reformism in the workers' movement and analyzing its ideological content and political practice. The problems of reformism are studied in close relationship to the processes of development of capitalist relations and to the changes in the distribution of social class forces in the region. The book devotes a great deal of space to analyzing the features of the reformist strategy of the ruling classes of Latin America, in particular to cultivating the ideology of "social partnership" in the workers' movement. The chapters which cover the role of transnational corporations, the church hierarchy, and the trade union bureaucracy in disseminating reformist views among working people are interesting. The historical digressions which make it possible to trace the genesis and evolution of reformist ideology and thus interpret its meaning in contemporary conditions in more depth are among the merits of the work.

The monograph examines the activities of certain Latin American communist parties focused on overcoming the split in the workers' movement and analyzes both the disagreements and the spheres of possible cooperation between

communists and social reformist trends in the struggle against imperialism and for democracy. On this level the identification of the heterogeneity of Latin American social democracy and the attention which the leftist directions along with the right and centrist trends devote to it are important.

Attempting to give the study more breadth, in certain cases the authors compare Latin American national reformism to social reformism of the European parties of the Socialist International. In doing so they justifiably draw attention to both their common grounds and to the differences which are manifested in the attitude toward imperialism (pp 57-58).

At the same time, however, it seems that the comparison of Latin American and Western European social reformism could be continued. An important difference here is that in Western Europe social democracy is above all a trend in the workers' movement, although in recent decades it also represents the interests of the "new middle strata" to an ever-greater extent. As for Latin America, there this trend often develops within the framework of the multiclass movements--general democratic, anti-imperialist, and populist-nationalist movements. Therefore, reformism's penetration into the workers' movement of Latin America uses bourgeois-nationalist and populist slogans to a greater degree than in Europe.

On the whole the study of the problems of Latin American reformism in the monograph seems somewhat isolated from the processes occurring in the zone of developed capitalism. But closer attention to the experience of contemporary Western European reformism would, in our opinion, be very timely. In this connection it is appropriate to mention that a number of recent studies of contemporary Western European reformism deserve the unconditional attention of Latin American experts.¹

I would also like to express other desires. The latest phenomena in the region's workers' movement related to the social-psychological consequences of the technological restructuring which has begun and the acute unemployment crisis are inadequately revealed in the monograph. Among them can be included advances in the structure and consciousness of the working class and modification of the ideological-political course in reformist parties, trade unions, and so on. It would also be worth more broadly utilizing the data of sociological surveys of Latin American scholars which make it possible to reconstruct the social-psychological make-up of the proletariat and show the real correlation of forces in the workers' movement.

FOOTNOTE

1. "Sotsial-demokraticheskiy i burzhuaznyy reformizm v sisteme gosudarstvenno-monopolisticheskogo kapitalizma" [Social-Democratic and Bourgeois Reformism in the System of State Monopoly Capitalism], Moscow, 1980; "Razmezhvaniya i sdvigi v sotsial-reformizme. Kriticheskiy analiz levyykh techeniy i zapadno-yevropeyskoy sotsial-demokratii" [Demarcations and Changes in Social Reformism. A Critical Analysis of Leftist Trends in Western European Social Democracy], Moscow, 1983; "Sotsial-reformizm i trudyashchiyesya. Vzaimootnosheniya sotsial-demokraticheskikh partiy s

profsoyuzami i sovremennymi demokraticeskimi dvizheniyami v Zapadnoy Yevrope" [Social Reformism and Working People. Interrelationships of Social Democratic Parties with Trade Unions and Contemporary Democratic Movements in Western Europe], Moscow, 1986.

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KIEV SYMPOSIUM VIEWS PROBLEMS OF WORLD REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 137-139

[Report by Ye.N. Kiryushin under the rubric "Scientific Life": "Objective and Subjective Conditions of the Revolutionary Process"]

[Text] On 3-5 November 1986 the regular, seventh symposium was held in Kiev by the Academy of Social Sciences Scientific Council on Problems of the Contemporary World Revolutionary Process jointly with the Higher Party School at the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and the journal RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNIY MIR. The symposium was devoted to the theme "The Revolutionary Process: Objective Conditions and the Subjective Factor."

The debate which developed noted the pivotal importance of the 27th CPSU Congress for the destiny of socialism and its impact on the world revolutionary process. The idea of the need for strict historicism when evaluating the objective and subjective conditions of the revolutionary process resounded in the speeches of Doctor of Philosophical Sciences A. Krasin, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences G.G. Vodolazov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences I.K. Pantin, and others as a major methodological precept. The viewpoint that the objective conditions for revolution in the West seemed to mature (even "overmature") and the reason that it is delayed is concealed in the weakness of the subjective factor was sharply criticized. The error of this view, in the opinion of the speakers, stems from the fact that the criterion for evaluating the maturity of these conditions characteristic of the early 1920's (the period of the "assault") is mechanically transferred to the situation of the last four decades when the revolutionary forces shifted to "besieging" capitalism. In this situation other criteria are needed to evaluate the subjective factor which would make it possible to "measure" its ability to wage "trench" (in A. Gramsci's expression) warfare.

Confusing the objective conditions for socialism and the objective conditions for revolution is also methodologically mistaken. Essentially, the objective conditions for socialism exist in the West, starting with the Paris Commune, whereas the objective conditions for revolution (that is, according to Lenin, a revolutionary situation) arise quite rarely and as a rule last for a short time. It was also noted that as the capitalist formation develops from one phase to another the type of maturity of the objective conditions for socialism also change. Thus, these conditions in the West reached the type of

maturity where the potential exists for moving to a society with some fundamental features of communism, whereas for the "third world" countries and for Latin America in particular, it is right to speak of the maturity of the objective prerequisites of a lower type of socialism resulting from the fact that capitalism in these regions is not in as high phases of its development. However, this does not mean that in Latin American societies these prerequisites are less "mature" than in developed capitalist countries. It merely means that socialism which might arise as a result of a revolution in the West will be more progressive in the formational sense than socialism arising on the basis of the objective conditions that exist in the developing world.

"Third world" problems occupied a prominent place at the symposium. The 27th CPSU Congress orients Soviet researchers to a strictly differentiated approach to the developing countries, which are frequently still presented only in black and white terms. A number of speeches pointed out that profound mass revolutions are altogether likely in certain states of this region. At the same time, however, the main difficulties of the revolutionary process are of an economic nature: revolutions seem to "spin their wheels" when it comes to realization of economic programs. The enormous complexity of revolutionary regimes withdrawing from the world capitalist economy was revealed. This emphasizes all the importance of the international interaction of the progressive forces of the developing countries with world socialism and with the working class of the imperialist countries.

The speech by candidate of historical sciences S.I. Semenov was specially devoted to Latin America. The economic situation continues to become more aggravated and the foreign debt which the state sector is in the process of repaying is increasing. On the whole the crisis of dependent capitalism is entering a new phase. Relying on a breach in capitalist development at its middle level in such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela no longer works, since in many decisive instances this level has already been surpassed and anti-imperialist and class battles are developing on a fundamentally different social basis. Therefore, a solution to the crisis along the path laid by Cuba or Nicaragua seems rather improbable for most of the large countries of the continent. Today public consciousness sees Cuba and Nicaragua as a unique kind of lightning rod to divert the United States from pressuring the region's other countries rather than a particular model for solving the problems of the crisis. Bourgeois-democratic governments proceed from the idea that if the Sandinist revolution is crushed by American aggression then their own position will become substantially more unstable.

In these conditions an independent theory of the democratic process must be worked out and the revolutionary parties' place in the system of the subjective factor of this process must be determined. Some communist parties are trying to shift from outside pressure on democratic governments to the prospect of power, that is, participation in this government along with petty bourgeois and reformist parties. This means working out an effective democratic and at the same time socialist strategy. Achieving the interaction, in R. Arismendi's expression, of peoples and governments on such problems as the Central American crisis and the debt is becoming an important direction of the struggle.

In conclusion the speaker expressed disagreement with the idea expressed at the symposium that the coming to power of the S. Allende government in Chile represented revolutionary forces gaining power before a true revolutionary situation had developed. In his opinion, there was no revolution in Chile but rather a surge in the democratic movement which was cut short by reaction.

In many respects candidate of historical sciences A.A. Chelyadinskiy expressed the opposite point of view on the question of the correlation of objective conditions and the subjective factor of the revolutionary process in the region. While the objective prerequisites for revolution exist, still a subjectively revolutionary change is not ensured. On the other hand, the practice of political struggle has shown that without the influence of the vanguard, the maturity and especially the integratability of the objective conditions necessary for the revolution to begin, not just to win, do not come of themselves. Intense debates are going on in the liberation movement itself on the entire spectrum of questions of the dialectics of the objective and the subjective.

The speech by Doctor of Historical Sciences V.F. Li was polemically pointed against the dogmatic evaluation of the broad spectrum of sociopolitical forces of the developing world called "left extremism." The speaker discerned various groups of trends within this spectrum. An incorrect attitude toward these forces and at times groundless categorization of them as "Maoists" have narrowed the opportunities for ideological work with them and done serious harm to the anti-imperialist struggle. After all, the broad masses frequently follow the extreme leftists. The speaker emphasized that he was speaking not of rehabilitating ultraleftists but of the need to actively work with them and study their political and ideological platforms for the purpose of finding opportunities for interaction.

Candidate of historical sciences G.B. Khan dwelled on the international aspects of the development of the subjective factor in the zone of the developing world. The history of the national liberation movement shows the decisive role of external--objective and subjective--conditions in the formation of the internal subjective factor. An important foreign policy aspect of the formation of the revolutionary vanguards in the developing world is that the unification of Marxism-Leninism with the mass national liberation movement is occurring more rapidly on the international scale than within the confines of individual countries.

The symposium demonstrated that a serious reevaluation of the schemes and concepts which have become fixed is going on in Soviet social science under the influence of the 27th CPSU Congress, new political thinking is gaining a foothold, and a realistic and at the same time optimistic view of the world revolutionary process is being formulated in sharp debates.

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ROUNDTABLE ON SOUTH ATLANTIC ZONE OF PEACE, COOPERATION HELD

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 140-141

[Report by I.N.: "Zone of Peace and Cooperation in South Atlantic"]

[Text] Late last year a roundtable was held at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) on the theme "Problems and Prospects for Creating a Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic." In addition to the MGIMO specialists on Latin America, associates of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies (SSOD) took part in it.

The initiative to declare the South Atlantic region a "zone of peace and cooperation" was proposed by the President of Brazil Jose Sarney in a speech in September 1985 at the UN General Assembly. The initiative is encountering ever-broader support of the world community; this is illustrated by the fact that along with Brazil 13 states of Africa and Latin America acted as coauthors of the draft of the resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes at the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly. Questions related to the evolution of the doctrine of "national security" in Brazil, Argentina, and other countries of the region and the naval activity in the South Atlantic and problems of intercontinental and regional cooperation in Latin America and Africa, as well as international factors influencing the realization of the Brazilian initiative were the focus of the debate at MGIMO.

Opening the meeting, its director Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor A.F. Shulgovskiy (MGIMO) directed the participants' attention to the complexity and ambiguity of the processes of democratization occurring in a number of Latin American countries in conditions of the departure of military-authoritarian regimes from the political arena. Taking into account the increased attention which has traditionally been devoted in these states to the doctrine of "national security," it is especially important to determine what new things the changes occurring are bringing to their development. The analysis of the Brazilian foreign policy initiative is interesting, in particular, because it was proposed during the democratization processes and important changes in the socioeconomic structures of the society. In this connection the participants in the discussion face yet another task--identifying the degree to which the latter foreign policy concepts reflect the

process of the formation in Latin America of new centers of antagonism and new "centers of strength."

The speech by P.I. Filonenko (MGIMO) was devoted to a critical analysis of the evolution of foreign policy concepts and doctrines advanced in Brazil in the 19th and 20th centuries as well as the role they assign to the states of South America bordering on Brazil and the African countries. The conclusion of the speaker was reduced to the assertion that in the last decade the process of the formation of a new--South American--center of imperialist influence has been going on. It was also noted that a civilian government's foreign policy should be evaluated when taking into account the features and degree of modernization of the socioeconomic structures which became established in the years of the rule of military regimes.

I.N. Kapyrin (MGIMO) examined the main features of the Brazilian version of the doctrine of "national security" which was reflected in the works of Golberi do Couto-e-Silva and their evolution in connection with the development of new systems of weapons, above all naval weapons, and the place of the southern part of the Atlantic Ocean in this doctrine. He recalled that Brazil in 1962--before the military governments came to power--had already made a proposal to simultaneously declare Latin America and Africa nonnuclear zones.

The report by A.G. Spitsin (SSOD) examined the specific features of the evolution of the doctrine of "national security" in Argentina. It emphasized that the 1982 Malvina crisis was a turning point in the formation of its foreign policy aspect; at that time the country's leadership was forced to seek support from the developing countries against England. In the opinion of the speaker, the country's present leadership is interested on a long-term basis in realizing the Brazilian initiative, since that could help strengthen its position in solving the problem of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and create more favorable conditions for economic cooperation among the countries of the South Atlantic.

In the opinion of A. Shchetinin (MID) up to now the degree of realization of Brazil's foreign policy potential is not in keeping with its economic potential. For a long time Brazil kept out of resolving such important political problems of the region as the problem of the foreign debt or the situation in Central America and surrendered the initiative to the two leading states of the continent--Argentina and Mexico, who had joined the "Delhi Six." Taking into account these factors, the Brazilian proposal, in the reporter's opinion, represents a civilian government's attempt to strengthen positions within the country and maintain the process of democratization by following a more active foreign policy line.

Such problems as the borders of the proposed zone and the make-up of its possible participants, ways to carry out the initiative in practice taking into account the experience of formulating such proposals regarding other regions and the water area of the Pacific Ocean, the nature of the programs of development of the Brazilian naval forces and the production of naval weapons, the recent restoration of official contacts between the Brazilian and American military, and others were discussed during the debate. The participants in

the discussion also studied the prospects for strengthening the positions of Brazilian capital in the economy of the African countries located on the Atlantic coast and possible contradictions which could arise between Brazil and the former colonial powers.

The advancement of the Brazilian initiative bears witness to the continued change in the correlation of forces on the continent and to the developing process of a major country of the region becoming a great power. The initiative has ever-greater influence on consolidating integration processes in Latin America. The objective idea of the initiative, which takes a course to oppose the United States and other developed capitalist powers, signifies a desire to carry on a dialogue with them as equals. The Brazilian proposal carries significant peace-loving content, has a favorable effect on the international situation, and provides a broad field for seeking points of contact of the positions of the most diverse countries in the struggle against the United States' aggressive course in the world arena.

In concluding the discussion, A.F. Shulgovskiy noted that the debate demonstrated how multifaceted and contradictory the problem of creating a "zone of peace and cooperation" in South America is. However, this idea's time has come, since it is the basis for a complicated complex of both objective and subjective reasons. At the present time it would obviously be premature to evaluate the Brazilian initiative on the level of the possibility of its full realization. Or rather, attention should be focused on possible ways to develop it, identifying the positions of various political forces which stand behind particular approaches to this initiative.

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SOVIET JOURNAL VIEWS TREATY OF TLATELOLCO ON 20TH ANNIVERSARY

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 37-40

[Article by V.L. Orlov: "Steps Toward a Nonnuclear World"]

[Text] The year 1987 marked 20 years from the day the Tlatelolco Treaty was signed. The struggle to create a nonnuclear zone on the continent developed in the early 1960's. In March 1962 the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs Manuel Telio spoke at the Committee of 18 States on Disarmament and stated that before a general treaty was signed "deatomization could, can, and must be carried out on the basis of voluntary decisions of states" and that his government had "decided not to have and not to allow any types of nuclear weapons or any means which could be used to deliver such weapons on their national territory."

The initiative of the President of Mexico A. Lopez Mateos became an important milestone of "deatomization"; on 21 March 1963 he sent letters to the presidents of Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Equador and proposed that they make a joint statement on turning the continent into a nonnuclear zone. As a result on 29 April 1963 the presidents of these countries published the joint Declaration to Proclaim Latin America a Zone Free from Nuclear Weapons. The document expressed the proposal to conclude a multilateral agreement by which the continent's countries "would obligate themselves not to produce, nor obtain, nor store, nor test nuclear weapons or means of delivering them" and emphasized that "the conclusion of a regional Latin American agreement may encourage the adoption of a treaty agreement on a worldwide scale."

At the Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly Bolivia, Brazil, Haiti, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, El Salvador, Uruguay, Chile, and Equador introduced a draft of a resolution which brought to attention the declaration of the five presidents to declare Latin America a nonnuclear zone and contained the desire that the region's states begin to study measures to achieve the goals of this declaration. On 27 November 1963 the draft of this resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly.

In 1965-1967 a preparatory commission to develop the multilateral agreement worked in Mexico under the leadership of the prominent Mexican jurist Alfonso Garcia Robles. This commission's activity ended with the signing on 14 February 1967 at the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 14 Latin

American countries of the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, better known as the Tlatelolco Treaty (named after the region in Mexico City where the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] building is located). And on 25 April 1969 after its ratification by the 11th state--Barbados--the treaty went into effect. In September of that same year the Agency to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) began to function; it was a special organization created to monitor the fulfillment of the treaty obligations.

In recent years an absolute majority of the continent's states have joined the agreement. However, 22 states are full participants in it: Mexico, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Barbados, Haiti, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Venezuela, Panama, Colombia, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago, Surinam, and the Bahamas. The point is that in order to join the treaty, in addition to signing and ratifying it, a special declaration to put the treaty into effect is also supposed to be adopted. But certain states (including Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) disagree with certain provisions of it and signed and ratified the agreement but did not adopt declarations to put it into effect and thereby did not put the treaty into operation.

Cuba is also not a participant in the treaty. In principle supporting the idea of nonnuclear zones, it justified its refusal to participate by saying that the United States does not offer reliable guarantees that it will not deploy nuclear weapons in the region, including at Guantanamo Base located on Cuba's territory.

The main goal of this international legal document is to prohibit nuclear weapons in any form on the territory of all of Latin America. The regions' states are obliged to use nuclear energy and nuclear materials and equipment exclusively for peaceful purposes. Two additional protocols are supposed to guarantee the continent's nonnuclear status. Protocol 1 charges the obligation of observing the treaty's provisions on countries which de jure or de facto possess territories in the zone to which the treaty's effect extends, that is, the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. But Protocol 2 envisions the nuclear powers assuming obligations to respect the status of the nonnuclear zone in regard to the treaty participants.

At the same time the text of the agreement has certain formulas which lessen the significance of the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons which it proclaims. First, there are no precise provisions to prohibit the transport (transit) of nuclear weapons across the territory of the participating states by third countries. Therefore the situation arises where the very principle of "deatomization" is violated. The United States maintaining its right to deploy nuclear weapons at the base on Guantanamo, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands and to transport them across the Panama Canal undermines the nonnuclear status of the zone.

Secondly, the treaty recognizes the right for the participating states to explode nuclear devices for peaceful purposes--including explosions which presuppose using mechanisms similar to those used in nuclear weapons (Article 18), which contradicts the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear

Weapons which most of the countries of the world signed, including many countries in the region.

Finally, it is not clear whether the obligations of the countries which signed the treaty operate outside the "zone of application" or if they can participate in tests of nuclear weapons outside this zone as well as obtain nuclear weapons with the condition of keeping them outside the zone.

Despite certain shortcomings, the Tlatelolco Treaty substantially strengthens the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Its ideas have a great deal of influence on many countries which are trying to safeguard themselves against the nuclear threat. Thus, on 6 August 1985 13 countries which are members of the South Pacific Forum signed the Treaty on the Nonnuclear Zone in the Southern Part of the Pacific Ocean. In the east its borders touch the Latin American nonnuclear zone and in the south--the region of effect of the Antarctica Treaty, by which this region was essentially turned into a nonnuclear zone. As a result an enormous, practically unified territory of the Earth is being formed which is free of nuclear weapons. In this way the real prerequisites for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons practically throughout the Southern Hemisphere have taken shape.

Brazil's proposal to turn South America into a nonnuclear zone was a major step on the way to this. Speaking in September 1986 at the Organization of American States headquarters, President J. Sarney said: "Brazil's initiative is focused on turning the region in the southern part of the Atlantic Ocean from the shores of Africa to Latin America into a region of peace and cooperation among coastal states." The formation of this zone can be achieved as an addendum to the Tlatelolco Treaty.¹

The goal of this important initiative, in the words of the Brazilian leader, is to protect the region from tension and the arms race, which is necessary for the countries of Latin America and Africa to successfully resolve the complex economic problems facing them, exploit the mineral wealth of the Atlantic Ocean, create the corresponding climate of trust, and, ultimately, to consolidate universal peace. It is therefore natural that this proposal received the broad support of a number of Latin American and African states located along the Atlantic coast and was the basis of the document introduced for review of the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly by 11 states of the 2 continents. On 27 October 1986 the resolution declaring the South Atlantic a zone of peace and cooperation was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes (124 votes for, 8 votes abstaining, and 1 vote [the United States] against). The resolution contains an appeal to all states to rigorously observe the region's status by reducing and ultimately eliminating the military presence and not deploying nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons and points out the need to cooperate in eliminating the centers of tension in this region, to respect the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of the states located in it, and to abstain from the threat of force or its use.

The situation in which the Brazilian proposal appeared is in many respects similar to the one in which the Tlatelolco Treaty was worked out. In the same way that the Caribbean crisis provided the impetus for creating a nonnuclear

zone in Latin America, the armed conflict between Great Britain and Argentina was the direct cause and catalyst of the emergence of the idea of creating a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. And that is very significant. Obviously, the region's countries are trying to counter local conflicts which in present conditions are fraught with the danger of developing into a war using nuclear weapons with a system of security which would guarantee preserving the condition of peace in this region, and hence, would help consolidate peace on Earth as a whole. While in the first postwar years it was believed that questions of nuclear disarmament were the sphere of activity of the great powers, above all the USSR and the United States, a number of foreign policy documents--from the Tlatelolco Treaty to the formation of the "Delhi Six" and Brazil's proposal to create a nonnuclear zone in the South Atlantic--are evidence of the essential change in the position of the continent's states on this fundamental problem of modern times.

It is therefore natural that the Latin American countries' struggle for a nonnuclear world causes dissatisfaction in Washington. By trying to thwart these peace-loving efforts, the United States directly pits itself against the international community. The American representative in the UN voted against Brazil's proposal, justifying it by saying that "the text of the resolution 'may affect' the sea lanes and restrict the principle of free navigation." However, the whole point is that the proposal to rid the South Atlantic of nuclear arms contradicts U.S. policy to build up the military potential in this region. As Ch. Redman, the State Department representative, said, "the growing number of proposals on regional nonnuclear zones might potentially undermine the policy of deterrence which has been the cornerstone of the West's security since World War II times.² Thus the Reagan administration expressed a negative attitude toward the antinuclear sentiments which have enveloped the developing countries.

At the same time these sentiments are encountering active support on the part of the Soviet Union. A consistent supporter of creating nonnuclear zones in various regions of the world, the USSR sees in this an important means of struggle to end the arms race and strengthen the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The USSR supports the Tlatelolco Treaty, advocating that the zone's status be fully observed. The desire to prevent the militarization of the South Atlantic and turn it into a one of peace and cooperation was highly praised. In December 1986 the Soviet representative signed protocols to the Rapotonga Treaty on strict observance of the status of the southern part of the Pacific Ocean.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 14 September 1986.

2. PRAVDA, 7 February 1987.

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SOVIET ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSES SOUTH ATLANTIC PEACE ZONE

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 140-141

[Report by I.N.: "Zone of Peace and Cooperation in South Atlantic"]

[Text] Late last year a roundtable was held at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) on the theme "Problems and Prospects for Creating a Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic." In addition to the MGIMO specialists on Latin America, associates of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies (SSOD) took part in it.

The initiative to declare the South Atlantic region a "zone of peace and cooperation" was proposed by the President of Brazil Jose Sarney in a speech in September 1985 at the UN General Assembly. The initiative is encountering ever-broader support of the world community; this is illustrated by the fact that along with Brazil 13 states of Africa and Latin America acted as coauthors of the draft of the resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes at the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly. Questions related to the evolution of the doctrine of "national security" in Brazil, Argentina, and other countries of the region and the naval activity in the South Atlantic and problems of intercontinental and regional cooperation in Latin America and Africa, as well as international factors influencing the realization of the Brazilian initiative were the focus of the debate at MGIMO.

Opening the meeting, its director Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor A.F. Shulgovskiy (MGIMO) directed the participants' attention to the complexity and ambiguity of the processes of democratization occurring in a number of Latin American countries in conditions of the departure of military-authoritarian regimes from the political arena. Taking into account the increased attention which has traditionally been devoted in these states to the doctrine of "national security," it is especially important to determine what new things the changes occurring are bringing to their development. The analysis of the Brazilian foreign policy initiative is interesting, in particular, because it was proposed during the democratization processes and important changes in the socioeconomic structures of the society. In this connection the participants in the discussion face yet another task--identifying the degree to which the latter foreign policy concepts reflect the

process of the formation in Latin America of new centers of antagonism and new "centers of strength."

The speech by P.I. Filonenko (MGIMO) was devoted to a critical analysis of the evolution of foreign policy concepts and doctrines advanced in Brazil in the 19th and 20th centuries as well as the role they assign to the states of South America bordering on Brazil and the African countries. The conclusion of the speaker was reduced to the assertion that in the last decade the process of the formation of a new--South American--center of imperialist influence has been going on. It was also noted that a civilian government's foreign policy should be evaluated when taking into account the features and degree of modernization of the socioeconomic structures which became established in the years of the rule of military regimes.

I.N. Kapyrin (MGIMO) examined the main features of the Brazilian version of the doctrine of "national security" which was reflected in the works of Golberi do Couto-e-Silva and their evolution in connection with the development of new systems of weapons, above all naval weapons, and the place of the southern part of the Atlantic Ocean in this doctrine. He recalled that Brazil in 1962--before the military governments came to power--had already made a proposal to simultaneously declare Latin America and Africa nonnuclear zones.

The report by A.G. Spitsin (SSOD) examined the specific features of the evolution of the doctrine of "national security" in Argentina. It emphasized that the 1982 Malvina crisis was a turning point in the formation of its foreign policy aspect; at that time the country's leadership was forced to seek support from the developing countries against England. In the opinion of the speaker, the country's present leadership is interested on a long-term basis in realizing the Brazilian initiative, since that could help strengthen its position in solving the problem of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and create more favorable conditions for economic cooperation among the countries of the South Atlantic.

In the opinion of A. Shchetinin (MID) up to now the degree of realization of Brazil's foreign policy potential is not in keeping with its economic potential. For a long time Brazil kept out of resolving such important political problems of the region as the problem of the foreign debt or the situation in Central America and surrendered the initiative to the two leading states of the continent--Argentina and Mexico, who had joined the "Delhi Six." Taking into account these factors, the Brazilian proposal, in the reporter's opinion, represents a civilian government's attempt to strengthen positions within the country and maintain the process of democratization by following a more active foreign policy line.

Such problems as the borders of the proposed zone and the make-up of its possible participants, ways to carry out the initiative in practice taking into account the experience of formulating such proposals regarding other regions and the water area of the Pacific Ocean, the nature of the programs of development of the Brazilian naval forces and the production of naval weapons, the recent restoration of official contacts between the Brazilian and American military, and others were discussed during the debate. The participants in

the discussion also studied the prospects for strengthening the positions of Brazilian capital in the economy of the African countries located on the Atlantic coast and possible contradictions which could arise between Brazil and the former colonial powers.

The advancement of the Brazilian initiative bears witness to the continued change in the correlation of forces on the continent and to the developing process of a major country of the region becoming a great power. The initiative has ever-greater influence on consolidating integration processes in Latin America. The objective idea of the initiative, which takes a course to oppose the United States and other developed capitalist powers, signifies a desire to carry on a dialogue with them as equals. The Brazilian proposal carries significant peace-loving content, has a favorable effect on the international situation, and provides a broad field for seeking points of contact of the positions of the most diverse countries in the struggle against the United States' aggressive course in the world arena.

In concluding the discussion, A.F. Shulgovskiy noted that the debate demonstrated how multifaceted and contradictory the problem of creating a "zone of peace and cooperation" in South America is. However, this idea's time has come, since it is the basis for a complicated complex of both objective and subjective reasons. At the present time it would obviously be premature to evaluate the Brazilian initiative on the level of the possibility of its full realization. Or rather, attention should be focused on possible ways to develop it, identifying the positions of various political forces which stand behind particular approaches to this initiative.

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REVIEW OF THE JOURNAL LATINSKAYA AMERIKA NO 6, 1987

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 26 Jun 87 pp 1-4

[Text] The June issue opens with an article by V. Volkov entitled "Dangerous Consequences of Militarization." The military expenditures of the Latin American countries, the author writes, have had a direct negative influence on the state budget, as they are a prime reason for its increasing deficit. It is a known fact that the state budgets of the region's countries have been deep in the red for many years now, in a number of instances its level comprising a substantial part of the gross domestic product. In Argentina, for example, the figure was 13 percent in 1983. Hence the unending inflation, the rate of which during the 1973-84 period stood at 180.8 percent in Argentina, 71.4 percent in Brazil, 11.7 percent in Venezuela, 31.5 percent in Mexico, 56.7 percent in Peru, 75.4 percent in Chile and 23.8 percent in Colombia.

The record for Latin American countries which import large consignments of weapons and military supplies shows that what with the unstable economic situation and the absence of extremely favourable rent conditions (like those which Persian Gulf oil exporter-countries enjoy), even relatively limited purchases have a direct effect on the external economy sphere, which is burdened by a huge foreign debt. Unlike "productive" credits, credits for the purchase of armaments and military supplies do not create an expenditure compensation fund even in the distant perspective.

The creation of an all-embracing system of international economic security, Volkov stresses, is a realistic alternative to militarism throughout the globe, the Latin American region included. The formation of such a system would make it possible to use part of the funds that would be released as a result of military budget reductions for socio-economic development. Latin America would doubtless stand to gain from such a solution of the problem. After all, aside from the damage which the arms race does, the region's economies are becoming victims of state-sponsored economic terrorism in various forms--from illegal mining of approaches to the seaports of sovereign states and the arbitrary establishment of 150-mile economic zones, to food, technological and credit blackmail. The international economic security system being suggested erects a barrier to economic terrorism and is aimed at the removal of all forms of discrimination from international practice, the establishment of a new international economic order, the adoption of a code of

behaviour for transnational corporations, and at pooled efforts in exploring and peacefully utilising outer space, the World Ocean resources, etc.

There is a contribution by B. Martynov entitled "The OAS: Renewal or Facelift?" The adoption of the protocol of OAS Charter reforms at the 14th extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the Organisation of American States (Cartagena, December 1985), the author points out, was characterised by many media agencies as "the start of a new OAS" and "a radical restructuring of the inter-American system." These assessments are not fortuitous. As the stand taken by Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela at the OAS General Assembly session in Brazil in November 1984 showed, the prestige of the organisation in resolving the most topical problems of the Western Hemisphere had been soundly undermined. Its decline is not a present-day issue. Dissatisfaction had begun to accumulate in the mid-60s, when actions like the blockade of Cuba and the aggression against the Dominican Republic demonstrated once again to Latin American countries that the "inter-American system" continues to serve the interests of one of its member states--the most powerful.

A highly contradictory situation has taken shape in the OAS at present, Martynov points out. The Latin American countries are striving to realistically implement the many new provisions of the charter, on the one hand, and the United States is no longer able to dictate its writ in the OAS, on the other. Specifically, its plans to substitute the OAS for the Contadora are suffering a debacle. On the eve of the Guatemala session of the OAS, Secretary-General Jao Clemente Baena Soares expressed the opinion of the majority of the members of this organization when he declared that the OAS did not need to become more closely involved in the Central American problem, "since a process is in existence which has continued for over three years now." He was referring to the Contadora.

All this predetermines the inevitability of continued confrontation between the US and most Latin American states in the OAS on questions pertaining to the future of the inter-American system.

"Honduras on Washington's Leash" is the title of the contribution by S. Morozov. The Reagan Administration, the author writes, has been devoting increasing attention to Honduras of late in hopes of turning it into its "strategic ally" in Central America and acquiring an instrument for countering anti-American tendencies in the region as Israel is in the Middle East. The US has used its territory as a springboard for aggression on a number of occasions.

Today Washington is again using Honduras as a springboard, this time for provocations against free Nicaragua.

Washington has an influence on Honduras above all owing to the two countries' close and long-standing military ties, the history of which dates back to the 1930s. American military aid pursues a dual goal--by maintaining close contacts with the military, which play an important role in the country's political life, Washington acquires an effective instrument for exerting pressure on the government. At the same time the Americans plan to use the

Honduran army as a strike force against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, and also for suppressing the patriotic forces both in Honduras itself and in neighbouring Central American states. It is with this goal in mind that the US is extensively supplying the Honduran troops with arms, hoping in this way, as Pentagon officials put it, "to directly promote stability in Central America."

The journal also carries an article by N. Zaitsev entitled "Latin America in the International Trade in Services" and a number of other materials.

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PROBLEMS BETWEEN U.S., LATIN AMERICA OVER AMENDED OAS CHARTER

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 87 pp 31-36

[Article by B.F. Martynov: "The OAS: Renewal or Cosmetic Repairs?"]

[Text] The adoption of a protocol of reforms for the OAS Charter at the 14th Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (Cartagena, December 1985) was characterized by much of the mass media as "the beginning of a new OAS" and a "radical re-arrangement of the inter-American system." These evaluations are not accidental. The prestige of the organization in solving the most topical problems of the Western hemisphere, as shown by the positions taken by Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Columbia and Venezuela at the 14th OAS GA Session (Brasilia, November of 1984), proved to be fundamentally undermined. Its decline is not a present-day issue alone. The dissatisfaction began to accumulate in the middle of the 1960s, when actions like the blockade of Cuba and the aggression against the Dominican Republic demonstrated anew to the Latin American countries that the "inter-American system" would continue to serve the interests of its single most powerful member state.

The "diplomatic offensive" undertaken by the states of the region in the OAS at the beginning of the 1970s greatly facilitated its democratization. The tactics of the "unified front" to which they, as a rule, tried to adhere in relations with the northern giant repeatedly forced Washington to take a defensive or waiting position and to suffer criticism that was often of a quite sharp nature. Notwithstanding the fact that at the end of the 1970s the fight for radical reform of the OAS has come to a halt, the specific results were quite palpable: the United States could no longer run this organization without being monitored.

With the coming to power of the Reagan administration, an attempt was made to halt the erosion of its influence. However, two circumstances--the Falklands crisis and the intervention in Grenada--not only failed to facilitate the restoration of White House positions in the OAS, but rather divided this organization still further, heightening the crisis of trust in the northern neighbor on the part of its Latin American neighbors.

The organization of the Contadora Group in January 1983 forced one immediately to begin to speak of it as "a powerful competitor to the decrepit OAS."

At the same time, as political experience in the region shows, it would have been premature to speak of a radical turnaround in the consciousness of Latin Americans toward the OAS. Although the Contadoras arose as a reaction to the ineffectiveness of the OAS, it did not at all pursue the aim of eliminating this organization from the political stage and replacing it with some new mechanism of collaboration. In the words of one of its most active founders, former Columbian president B. Betancour, it "was called upon to fill a vacuum, but in no way to replace the OAS."² Furthermore, to the extent that the Contadora process developed in the Latin American countries, its own participants were the first to display increasing interest in further improving this organization.

A candid opinion was expressed in the U.S. press on this issue: for the purpose of easing anti-American sentiments, Washington must "display a vested interest in restructuring the OAS and the system of collective security, i.e. in reforming the principal institutions of the inter-American system, which was once again being mentioned in public in Latin America. Its alignment with the more active campaign for reorganizing the inter-American system was associated with a desire to restore the faith that had been fundamentally undermined in 'pan-American solidarity.'" As Mexican researcher S. Morales further noted, the United States was afraid that the Contadora group would become an alternative to the Monroe Doctrine that could lay the foundation of political unity of action among the Latin American countries.³

In developing its new policy in relation to the OAS, the White House was counting on extracting maximum political benefit from the "wave of democratization" that was sweeping the continent, ascribing to itself the principal contribution in the cause of replacing military regimes with bourgeois-democratic ones. In this context, the United States strengthened propaganda in inter-American organs on the "ideological commonality" and "joint adherence to democratic institutions in the Americas." In other words, a return to the "good old days"--that was the goal pursued by Washington in taking part in developing the protocol of reforms for the organization's charter.

Compared to the 1970s, however, two new propositions more or less connected with the Latin American problem have decade been added to the two main propositions of the Latin American countries--collective economic security and ideological pluralism--in this decade: a proposition for improving the mechanism of peaceful resolution of disputes and a halt to the arms race in the region.

In the new edition of the charter, the concept of "economic development" was replaced with the phrase "integral development," proposed by Peru as early as in the 1970s and envisaging the necessity of assisting the economic, social, cultural and technological development of the member states. The resolution of the issue of creating a mechanism for collective economic security, the need for which has been insisted upon by some Latin American states since the 1970s, was once again postponed for an indefinite period of time at the insistence of the United States.

As for the adoption of "ideological pluralism," its consolidation in the protocol gave no guarantees at all that it would be observed in practice. The United States does not conceal its negative attitude toward this principle, and its Central American policies personify the complete lack of acceptance of any sort of "pluralism of ideology." "The present-day problem," asserts American political scientist R. Sheman, "is namely the fact that we are forced to be occupied with ideological issues that have divided our hemisphere and engendered new forms of subversive activity, thus violating the principles of non-intervention."⁴ The opinion of the majority of Latin American states, as expressed by B. Betancour, differs from the American approach. "If someone thinks," he declared, "that he will be able to instil harmony in the relations among the states in the hemisphere by uniting them under his own aegis, whatever forms it takes, then he will soon discover that the era of unanimity has passed."⁵ Judging by everything, the protocol's entering into the force of an article on "ideological pluralism" will serve more than once as a stumbling block in the disputes that arise so often in the OAS. This will evidently be facilitated by the following article that proclaims "representative democracy" "a condition of stability, peace and development" in the region and affirming its "improvement and reinforcement" as one of the principal ideas of the organization.⁶

Another goal fixed in the document is limiting the arms race and allocating the funds freed up for the needs of development. Just like the call for "restraining from acts of economic aggression," this provision of the protocol, due to the absence of specific mechanisms for incarnating it, is inevitably of a declarative nature. "It is obvious," notes Columbian scholar Alfredo Garcia, "that the reform does not create the mechanisms that would facilitate the limitation of the arms race, a halt to economic aggression and the integral development of the member countries."⁷

Expansion of the authority of the general secretary of the OAS in the realm of the peaceful settlement of disputes, as envisaged by the Cartagena protocol, was welcomed by all of the members of the organization, including the United States. It envisages not only the right of the general secretary to bring any issue that, in his opinion, touches on the peace and security of the member states to the attention of the General Assembly or the OAS Permanent Council, but also to participate personally in mediating functions.⁸ Nonetheless, the practical implementation of these provisions has met with a negative reaction from Washington. The United States tried to impede the inclusion of OAS General Secretary J.C. Baena Soares among the "peace mission" of the Contadora group, which included, aside from the ministers of foreign affairs of the Contadora and the "support" groups, UN General Secretary J. Peres de Cuellar. When it was unable to accomplish this, Washington, as is well known, made every effort to disrupt the achievement of concrete agreements by the "peace mission." Deputy Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs E. Abrams and Special Envoy on Central American Affairs P. Habib were hurriedly dispatched to Central America. As a result of their "diplomatic efforts," Costa Rica and Honduras advanced an "alternative plan for a peaceful settlement" that reduced the activity of the "peace mission" to naught.

And, finally, it is necessary to note the distinctions in the approaches of the OAS member states to the problem of expanding membership in the

organization. Article 8 of the charter currently in force forbids entry into the organization to a state that is the subject of a territorial dispute with any of the member states. For this reason, the acceptances into the OAS of Guyana (a dispute with Venezuela) and Belize (with Guatemala) have been delayed. The issue of the acceptance of the non-self-governing island nations of the Caribbean basin has also remained unclear. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the White House has come out actively in favor abrogating Article 8 so as to achieve an increase in the number of Caribbean island states in the organization, forming a pro-American bloc within it. A number of Latin American countries (Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela and Peru) have traditionally been against the abrogation of Article 8. In the middle of the 1980s, an opinion took shape in the Latin American countries, however, that "universalization," i.e. the entry into the OAS of all of the states of the Western Hemisphere and Cuba and Canada would help move it forward from stagnation and include them in the active resolution of the urgent problems of the continent. At the Cartagena session, the Caribbean OAS member states declared that they would not ratify the proposed draft reforms if Article 8 were not altered. As a result, a compromise was adopted according to which Guyana and Belize, as well as the non-self-governing states, would obtain the right to enter the OAS after 10 Dec 90. At the same time, the United States was again able to block successfully a proposal to restore Cuba to the organization.

The disparity of interests of the two Americas, smothered in every way possible by the apologists of the "renewed OAS," was displayed in all clarity during the 16th General Assembly Session that was held in November 1986 in the capital of Guatemala. A week before the session, the United States signed the Cartagena protocol, accompanying this document with such caveats that would in effect reduce all of the innovations to naught. "The protocol," stated the first amendment, "does not limit the rights and functions of the OAS that have been implemented by it over the last 40 years and cannot bring into question the legality of its acts in defending democracy and the security of the continent." The nature of these amendments compels one to recall the doctrine of "incompatibility of Marxism-Leninism with the principles of the inter-American system" that was bankrupt in the 1970s.

The effort of Washington to resurrect old doctrines was also reflected in the next amendment, which envisaged that the provisions on the procedure for peaceful settlement of disputed issues "does not affect the obligations of the OAS member states in presenting these issues for the consideration of the UN Security Council." The amendment is called upon to return the OAS to the times of the "doctrine of immediacy" that envisaged the jurisdiction of the OAS over the jurisdiction of the UN in the investigation of inter-American disputes. And, finally, the amendments to the economic articles of the Cartagena protocol cancel out the hopes of the Latin American countries for the possibility of resolving their urgent economic problems within the framework of the inter-American system. "The articles concerning integral development," says one of them, "create no legal obligations whatsoever and do not affect the sovereign rights and freedom of agreement between donor states and recipient states in economic aid."

These amendments evoked profound concern among the Latin American states, who felt that Washington was in that manner "proposing a model for the OAS that does not correspond to the level of political development of the countries of the region." The results of the 16th session show that the political influence that the United States has within the organization and its economic weight and significance for the financing of its budget (up to 66 percent) allows it to have a powerful "leveling" effect on the initiatives of the Latin American countries. It is no accident that Peruvian representative L. Gonzales called for the creation of a Latin American political organization outside the OAS without U.S. participation, pointing out that the latter could better manage the solution of Latin American problems than the other discredited organization.

Important trade and economic issues and the problem of foreign debt once again remained outside the field of view of the session. The Guatemala Declaration, quietly reacting to the ever worsening currency and financial situation of the majority of the states in the region, was limited by the traditional call for "seeking suitable measures for countering the problem of the colossal foreign indebtedness of the Latin American countries."

Although the concluding document of the session--the Guatemala Declaration--called upon the Contadora group to continue to make every effort in the cause of resolving the Latin American crisis, the forum once again turned up the fundamental disparities of the approaches of the OAS partners to this most acute regional problem. Notwithstanding the fact that the speech of U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz sounded words of support for the Contadoras, it was in fact aimed against its activity. This is the only treatment possible of his words that the principal cause of instability and violence in the region is "the interference of foreign ideologies." It is far from coincidental that the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, J. Londono Parades, was forced to declare that the Contadoras "are not a tool for strengthening foreign ideologies pandering to interference in the internal affairs of individual states on the continent."⁹

An exceedingly contradictory situation has thus currently taken shape in the OAS. On the one hand, the Latin American countries are striving to give real substance to many new provisions of the charter, while on the other hand the United States cannot conduct the OAS at its own discretion. Their plans to supplant the Contadoras with the OAS are suffering ruin in particular. On the eve of the opening of the Guatemala session, OAS General Secretary J.C. Baena Soares, expressing the opinion of the majority of the members of the organization, declared the lack of necessity for the closer involvement of the OAS in the Central American problem, "insofar as there exists a process that has already lasted over three years," having in mind the Contadoras.

All of this predetermines the inevitability of a continuation of confrontation between the United States and the majority of the Latin American states in the OAS on issues of the future of the inter-American system.

FOOTNOTES

1. Since the very beginning, Nicaragua has repudiated the idea of the mediation of the OAS in the Central American crisis, since, as declared by Nicaraguan Vice President S. Ramirez, "The United States is transformed into the chief judge."
2. G. Arciniega. La suerte de una institucion regional. Bogota, 1985, p 30.
3. Cuadernos americanos. Mexico, 1985, N 1, p 46/
4. CEI. Colombia internacional. Bogota, 1986, N 4, p 2.
5. Ibid., p 11.
6. Protocolo de Reformas a la Carta de la Organizacion de los Estados Americanos. Prtocolo de Cartagena de Indias. Articulo I. Preambulo, inciso, Articulo 11, Articulo 2b. CEI. Colombia Internacional, 1986, p 4.
7. Ibid., p 5.
8. Ibid., Articulo II, Articulo 116.
9. El Herald. Barranquilla, 13 Nov 86.

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SCALE OF AMERICAN-HONDURAN MILITARY COOPERATION DETAILED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 87 pp 37-42

[Article by S.Yu. Morozov: "Honduras on Washington's Leash"]

[Text] The Reagan administration is devoting more and more attention to Honduras lately, counting on transforming it into its own "strategic ally" in Central America and acquiring the same sort of tool for opposing anti-American trends in this region as Israel in the Near East. The Americans did not choose Honduras by accident. Its territory has been used repeatedly by the United States as a beachhead for aggression: in 1954 as a support base for intervention in Guatemala, organized by the CIA; in 1961 a group of ships with Cuban counter-revolutionaries left the Honduran shores with the blessing of President Kennedy and made an unsuccessful attempt to strangle the first socialist state in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba; and, in 1965 aggression was committed against the Dominican Republic from the territory of the country.

Washington is once again using Honduras as a beachhead, this time for provocations against free Nicaragua. The total number of "contras" here is about 12,000 today, and they have in effect occupied the border regions of the country, now calling them "new Nicaragua."

Washington has influence over Honduras first of all thanks to close and prolonged military ties, the history of which begins in the 1930s. American assistance along the lines of armed forces has a dual purpose: supporting close contacts with the military, which plays a vital role in the political life of the country, Washington acquires an effective tool for pressuring the government. At the same time, the Americans are planning to use the Honduran army as a strike force against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, as well as to pressure the patriotic forces both in Honduras itself and in the neighboring Central American states. For this purpose, the United States is literally pumping the Honduran troops with weapons, thus counting, as Pentagon leaders have declared, on "directly facilitating the assurance of stability in Central America."¹

After the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, a turning point has ensued since 1979 in the development of American-Honduran military collaboration. Whereas over 1946-79 the armed forces of the country received American aid in a total amount of 21.6 million dollars, over the 1980-86 period its annual volume was

increased by 31 times--from 3.9 million dollars to 121 million. In 1987, the Reagan administration plans to grant Honduras military aid in the amount of 179 million dollars.²

The military deliveries are made on favorable terms. In 1983, the U.S. Department of Defense, under the pretext of "the difficulties that Honduras is having in procuring vitally important arms," proposed selling weapons to its army on more favorable terms and, in particular, with considerably longer deferrals of payments than is customarily envisaged in weapons export sales programs. The Americans are further giving the Honduran military a chance to "be in on a good thing" with the funds passing through them to the Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries. The White House is inclined to look the other way at the corruption and abuses of the local generals in counting on the fact that this will facilitate a strengthening of its vested interest and direct participation in implementing the militarist plans of Reagan in Central American. Thus, former Defense Minister Walter Lopes Reyes appropriated 1 million dollars for himself from the 14 million that was allotted to the counter-revolutionaries in 1985. In connection with the resolution adopted by the U.S. Congress to grant 100 million dollars to the generals, a fight shaped up among the generals for control of the channels for the transmission and distribution of those funds.

The activity of the United States is having definite results. Honduras is currently one of the most militarized states in the region. The size of the country's armed forces has increased from 14,000 men in 1979 to 33,200 in 1986. Special new subunits have been created within the army: in particular, a second infantry battalion, also known as a "special tactical group," that has been transformed into the first parachute-assault battalion. The servicemen of this battalion completed training in conjunction with American soldiers. An antitank unit was also created that is stationed in immediate proximity to the Nicaraguan border. Battalions have furthermore been created with the name of Cobra along with artillery subunits that take part in joint American-Honduran maneuvers.³ The army is armed with 12 Scorpion light tanks equipped with 76mm guns and two 7.62mm machine guns and able to travel at speeds up to 75 km/hr [kilometers/hour], as well as 24 105mm howitzers that can fire three rounds a minute with a maximum range of 14.5 km. There is a considerable quantity of mortars, antitank guns and missile installations, as well as firearms of various types. The Honduran air force, considered the most powerful in Central America, has 14 Super-Mister fighter-bombers (that can carry a bomb and ordnance load of up to 3 tons), 11 A-37B fighters, 32 combat helicopters and 39 transport and auxiliary aircraft. The navy has 9 patrol vessels and 9 patrol boats.

At the same time, the U.S. military presence is also increasing. In 1981, some 54 American military advisers were sent to the country to teach anti-partisan warfare to the army subunits of the pro-American regimes in the region. The next year over 100 instructors arrived here from the mobile training group based in in the Panama Canal Zone, whose principal mission was to train specialists for the Honduran army in the maintenance of helicopters, patrol boats and communications equipment. In June of 1983, a Regional Military Training Center was opened on the territory of the country, where the initial training was conducted by 116 American military advisers, and their

number had already increased to 179 by the following year. There were an additional 70 specialists active in training local security forces in the tactics of counter-insurgency warfare, as well as another 100 instructors that were assisting the pilots of the Honduran air force in developing methods of carrying out bombing raids.

The joint maneuvers of the American and Honduran armed forces have great significance in the increasing American military presence. Over time the intensiveness of the exercises has increased continually, and in certain years they overlap each other in time and go on practically without interruption in various parts of the country. Under the pretext of exercises, the Pentagon is increasing the number of soldiers and officers without the appropriate permission of Congress. Overall, in the opinion of military experts from the United States, the maneuvers actually give the Reagan administration a convenient opportunity for deploying its armed forces in Honduras.⁵

The Big Pine series of exercises occupies an especial place among the American-Honduran maneuvers. The Big Pine II maneuvers in particular are the largest and most prolonged military collaboration between the United States and Honduras in history. These exercises began on 5 Aug 83 and concluded on 8 Feb 84, and special-purpose subunits, ground forces, marines, engineering troops and communications and medical specialists took part in them. During this period there was an average of 2,000 American soldiers and officers on Honduran territory, and in November of 1983, when the exercises were at their peak, the number reached 6,000. In the course of these maneuvers there were artillery barrages and naval and land battles, and methods were developed for assaults from the air and sea. But their significance is not defined solely by their scale. In the words of Kirkpatrick, various types of action by the armed forces of the United States were used to suppress revolutionary movements in the Central American countries and, in particular, the technique of a military naval blockade.⁶ It is typical in this regard that, along with the Big Pine II exercises, naval maneuvers were held near the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Central America in which the aircraft carrier America took part. Upon the conclusion of the exercises, the United States left about 1,000 soldiers and officers on Honduran territory on a permanent basis. They were later joined by about 300 men from a reconnaissance subunit who were charged with carrying out aerial reconnaissance of the adjoining territory of Nicaragua and El Salvador.

An important stage in the militarization of Honduras was the series of exercises in 1984. In March, parachute assault drops with about 390 men were conducted that carried out operations in the San-Lorenzo region in the seizing and holding of airfields until the arrival of the main forces. At the same time, a group of combat vessels headed by the aircraft carrier America was sent into the Caribbean Basin to take part in the Ocean Venture-84 large-scale naval maneuvers, in which a total of 30,000 men were active and, aside from the combat vessels, included over 250 aircraft. At roughly the same time, the Grenadero-I exercises were conducted on the territory of the country in which about 1,000 American servicemen took part.

In the course of the large-scale wargames under the name of Reliable Shield that began in May of that year, Honduras was literally overrun with American

troops. In addition to the 2,000 American servicemen permanently stationed there, another 870 soldiers and officers from the air force arrived. These maneuvers were preceded by the Pegasus-87 air force exercises that had begun in April under the General Vicente Tosto-87 program of maneuvers that continued from January of 1987.⁷

The United States is devoting serious attention to expanding the military infrastructure on Honduran territory. Over the period of Big Pine-I and Big Pine-II, four landing strips that can handle C-130 heavy transport aircraft were built, two radar installations were set up and roads were laid to these facilities. In addition to this, airfields were built in Puerto Lempira, San-Lorenzo, Trujillo and Aquacat. Barracks for 800 men were also built not far from Trujillo.

The Reagan administration has concluded an agreement with the Honduran government according to which the Palmerola airbase near Comayagua has been placed at American disposal along with the airfields of Golason not far from the small town of La Seyba Las Mesa near San Pedro Sula. In Palmerola, the Americans have lengthened the runway to 2,500 meters, spending 13 million dollars on it, and constructed barracks for 1,600 men along with a hospital, a 50,000-barrel fuel dump and radar complexes. The runway was also lengthened at La Seyba. The Aquacat base in the department of El Paraíso, under CIA control and used for the distribution of munitions intended for the Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries, is of great significance. For the purposes of gathering information about the situation in the Central American theater of combat operations, the United States has installed, aside from the two radars on the continental portion of Honduran territory, another radar on the island of Tigre in the Fonseca Gulf that is supported and maintained by over 100 American servicemen.⁸ It seems impossible to determine the true cost of the operations, since the Reagan administration tries to conceal these data. It is known, however, that over 1984-85 alone over 2.6 million dollars worth of military facilities were built.⁹ Overall, in the estimation of the leaders of the El Salvadoran patriots, Washington has made efforts to use Honduras as a beachhead for intervention in Central America.

An important factor of U.S. influence on this country is its economic dependence. The American United Fruit and Standard Fruit corporations operate here practically without control, since the beginning of this century dominating the principal sectors of agriculture--the production and export of bananas, citrus fruits, meat, vegetables and coffee. In the 1960s the financial system of the country fell under the control of New York and California banks, and first and foremost Citicorp, Chase Manhattan Bank and Bank of America. The key positions in industry are also occupied by Americans, and the firm of Texaco in particular has the only oil refinery in Honduras.

The economy of the country is in a state of decline overall. Foreign debt is about 3 billion dollars. Agriculture--the foundation of the national economy--is suffering a serious crisis due to the fall of prices on the world market for sugar and coffee. The mechanism of economic operation practically cannot function normally without outside support. It is no accident that Honduras is the second largest recipient of American foreign aid in Central

America after El Salvador. The high annual growth rate of the volume of aid in recent years should also be noted: 111 million dollars in 1984, and over 200 million in 1986.¹⁰

Military and economic dependence on the United States and the immediate presence of American armed forces on Honduran territory puts the country in practice into a subservient position. It is acknowledged in local political circles that "it is first and foremost the troops of the United States that control the country. The base commander of the United States base in Palmerola has more influence than the commander of the armed forces of Honduras. The American embassy has considerable power. The power of President Azcona is weak: he is sixth in the pyramid of power and is subordinate to the orders of the Honduran and American military." The Honduran government, however, is forced to subordinate itself to American pressure "more than once not out of any feelings of sympathy, but out of poverty."¹¹

Instructive in this regard is the contradictory position of Tegucigalpa on problems of settling the Central American crisis. The government, evidently under American influence, is refusing to sign the draft of a peace agreement developed by the Contadora group under the pretext that it does not give "sufficient guarantees for the security" of Honduras. This is in fact connected with the dissatisfaction of Washington with the article in the draft treaty that forbids the creation of foreign military bases in the Central American states and thus deprives the Pentagon of the opportunity of using Honduran territory as a support base for the counter-revolutionaries. At the same time, President Azcona, in defiance of American instructions, is refusing to boycott the activity of the Contadoras in trying to find ways of resolving the conflict politically. On the other hand, the government of the country must reconcile itself to the presence of Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries on its territory, but at the same time has a vested interest in maintaining normal relations with the Sandinista leaders. Proceeding from this fact, the Hondurans feel that it is best "not to notice" the contras: officials, including the president himself, do not openly acknowledge the presence of armed formations of foreign citizens in the country; the contras are considered to be emigrants and are considered private individuals temporarily located in Honduras. For this reason, the government is trying to ignore certain incidents at the border in connection with the actions of counter-revolutionary groups. This position, however, does not suit the Reagan administration, which is trying to use any pretext to foment military and political tension around Nicaragua. Under pressure from the Americans, Tegucigalpa is forced to react to border clashes, although they in essence do not affect the immediate interests of the country.

The United States is not only interfering in foreign policy in Honduras, but is having a direct influence on internal political processes as well. The progressive forces of the country associate the actions of Washington and the Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries with the increased activity of local ultra-rightist groups. The United States is furthermore trying to prevent an increase of trends in the Honduran army that are negative for them. They are using every possible method (right up to physical annihilation) of suppressing opposition sentiments among the officer corps. The murder of a former major

in the Honduran armed forces, Ricardo Sunigi Morasan, who was actively in favor of limiting the presence of the CIA and the so-called "Nicaraguan Democratic Forces"--one of the contra groups--in the country, by Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries in August of 1985 serves as confirmation of this.

The American interference in internal affairs is evoking increasing dissatisfaction among various segments of Honduran society. One reason for this is the serious economic harm in connection with the presence of Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary formations. In just the border department of El Paraiso in particular, losses are estimated at 8 million dollars. Coffee producers are suffering significant losses. Military spending, 67 million dollars in 1986, places an unbearable burden on the economy. Taking indirect subsidies into account, this item of spending is reaching 125 million dollars, i.e. 15,6 percent of the budget.¹²

There are groups of nationalistically inclined officers in the armed forces as before who feel deep humiliation "from the fact that foreign troops rule the country."¹³ Many military personnel are against the command policy of supporting and even participating in the anti-Nicaraguan actions and are inclined to feel that "enemy number one" is not Nicaragua, but rather El Salvador. They are trying to exact revenge for the defeat in the Salvadoran-Honduran "soccer war" that cost the lives of almost 2,000 Hondurans. On the other hand, a number of representatives of the officer corps, including some generals, are stressing that the army can monitor the situation in the country but can hardly inflict defeat on the battle-tested Sandinista People's Army. In the acknowledgment of commentators, "soldiers are recruited into the army by seizing them at the movies or at concerts. And the commanders that send them into battle fly to Miami as soon as the events take a turn for the worst."¹⁴

Overall, these incidents reflect a process of increasing polarization in ruling circles and the army. Along with those groups that are ready to follow in the wake of American policy unswervingly in the region, representatives of nationalistically inclined forces are coming out more and more actively. It is natural that these forces are for neutrality in the Central American crisis not out of sympathy for the Sandinista government. They proceed first and foremost from the fact that participation in large-scale conflict does not meet the strategic class goals of the Honduran bourgeoisie--the preservation of the capitalist system in the country. Under conditions where 65 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty, 71 percent of able-bodied Hondurans are either fully or partially unemployed, 75 percent of the children suffer from hunger and 170,000 peasant families do not have plots of land, a social explosion could result from any spark. An understanding is growing in local political circles that "it is impossible to destabilize Nicaragua without destabilizing Honduras."¹⁵

The massive American economic and military aid is making it possible to restrain to a considerable extent the processes of worsening socio-political tensions in the country. At the same time, however, the gross interference of the United States is objectively creating conditions favorable to the radicalization of the sentiments of broad segments of the population. From

this point of view, the current situation in Honduras is very similar to the one that took shape in Nicaragua at the beginning of the 1970s.

FOOTNOTES

1. Dollars and Dictators: a Guide to Central America. Albuquerque, 1982, p 78.
2. U.S. Military and Economic Assistance to Honduras 1946-1984. Central America Historical Institute. Washington, 1984, p 1; Congressional Presentation. Foreign Security Assistance. Fiscal Year 1987, vol. II, p 49.
3. Excelsior. Mexico, 1 Apr 86.
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5. The Defence Monitor. Washington, 1984, vol XIII, N 3, pp 7, 6.
6. The Philadelphia Inquirer. Philadelphia, 31 Jun 83.
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LATIN AMERICANS PRAISE MOSCOW INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORUM

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 87 pp 43-46

[Materials from the Moscow International Forum "For a Nuclear-Free World and the Survival of Humanity": "Toward Planetary Solidarity"; first 2 paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text] The dream that the skies of the third millenium will be clear attracts all common-sense people on the planet regardless of their philosophical and political convictions, religious beliefs and aesthetic preferences. This was confirmed with full clarity at the International Forum "For a Nuclear-Free World and the Survival of Humanity" that was held in Moscow. This was an event unprecedented in many regards: 1,350 participants from over 80 countries of the world, a broad spectrum of professions, an unusually high level of representation and an enormous number of greetings of solidarity with the idea of the forum from those that could not attend.

Representatives of Latin American countries also took part in the forum.

Volodya Teytelboym, writer and member of the political commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Chile: We are today passing through an important moment in the history of mankind: a time of convergence. This has been clearly demonstrated by the Moscow forum, the impression from which is stupendous--such as the world has never seen before. The most striking thing is that former military representatives of the militarist circles of Western countries also took part, and they were in solidarity with the common opinion expressed at the forum: peaceful co-existence can become the cornerstone upon which peace can be built. This is convergence among all people regardless of where they live, what they do and what they think about.

The speech of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev, constructed upon irreproachable logic and irreproachable reasoning, was also addressed to all of mankind. I would like to note its moral grandeur, since it sounded first and foremost a concern for the ordinary man, whatever nation he may belong to.

The political scientists and commentators, businessmen and scientists, physicians and representatives of various churches and cultural figures have turned out to be as on a single ship which we have built with common efforts

and in which, all thinking together about tomorrow, we should sail in the same direction. And I join with the words of Gabriel Garcia Marques, who, speaking at the opening of the meeting of heads of state of the "Delhi Six" in Mexico, said: "With all modesty and at the same time with all determination of the spirit, I propose right now and right here that we give each other our word that we will create a 'time capsule' that will survive the atomic deluge."

Adolfo Hem, priest and president of the Cuban Ecumenical Council: All representatives of Latin American churches at the forum, without pre-arrangement, have expressed the spirit that, acknowledging the undoubted nature of the nuclear threat hanging over the world, we feel that the greatest danger to our continent is the threat of hunger and unemployment. And I recall the famous phrase of Fidel Castro: "Destroy the philosophy of robbery and the philosophy of war will disappear." We think that when the exploitation of the peoples of the Third World ends, when the capitalist system disappears, militarism will also disappear. It is, however, undoubtedly necessary to support the conclusion of regional agreements on zones free of nuclear weapons, such as the Tlatelolco Treaty, and we support all the initiatives of the Soviet leadership for disarmament.

The church enjoys strong political influence in many countries. It is true that in some countries this influence is positive, while in others it is negative. In the United States, for example, one problem is schism within churches and religions themselves. But the so-called "historic" (traditional) churches here enjoy powerful support and could do much to moderate the warlike nature of the current American administration.

The Council of Latin American Churches and the Conference of Churches of the Caribbean Basin hold clear anti-imperialist positions and condemned the occupation of Grenada, while the National Council of Churches of Grenada itself approved and even blessed this act, which engendered serious internal problems. Although I am a Protestant, I must say that recently the Catholic Church in Latin America holds more progressive positions than the Protestants. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that we are too closely connected with the bourgeois mode of thinking.

The birth of a "national church" in Latin America seems to me a very serious phenomenon over the whole history of Christianity, which is equivalent to a reform of the whole church, and even more radical than that which occurred in the 16th century. The positive consequences of this are difficult even to imagine today.

Emilio Monti, pastor of the Evangelical Methodist Church of Argentina, dean of the theology department of the Higher Evangelical Institute of Theological Research and one of the founders of the Commission on the Affairs of the Missing and the human rights movement in Argentina: The Argentine church officially supports the idea of disarmament, which should be accompanied by a process of genuine liberation for the peoples of Latin America.

The conflict in the south Atlantic showed everyone that nuclear catastrophe threatens not only the other side of the globe, but us as well. And then the idea of disarmament was adopted by many. The church circles in Argentina have

been quite determinedly in favor of an end to nuclear weapons testing. And although there is not unity in them, the "theology of liberation" preached by many is leading to such a unity.

Pablo Uneus, writer and sociologist (Chile): Not one person has yet been able to tell what the instant of death will be like. But today the note of the possibility of collective annihilation sounds more and more often: the annihilation of mankind as such. If we accept this senseless idea of self-annihilation, the simplest things will ultimately outlive us, since the lower the living creature's level of organization, the greater the chances it has of surviving nuclear catastrophe. And if universal death doesn't faze us, this signifies recognition of the fact that all of the experience of the preceding generations of mankind means nothing.

Lisandro Chavez Alfaro, Nicaraguan writer: I am sure that the Moscow forum will have enormous significance for the future. The cultural figures invited to take part in its work understand that the fate of people in our difficult times should not be the concern of political scientists alone, and we are all obligated to take upon ourselves full responsibility for the future of the planet and oppose the catastrophe that threatens everyone.

Reflecting on the global problems of modern times, however, we should not forget that there are in the world countries where the people are subjected to physical torture and where they are being deprived of the right to life. And when I speak of our responsibility, I recall the words of the great Peruvian poet Cesar Vallejo that "we should not permit them to make meat of people."

Fernando Birri, Argentine film director and one of the founders of the new Latin American cinema: I would like to touch first and foremost on the problem of a new way of thinking. In the name of all progressive Latin American cinematographers, I want to say that everything that is happening in the Soviet Union today is completely understood in our country. We support the fight of the new against the old, which hinders our forward movement. Because such a power as the USSR, so rich in cultural traditions, cannot fear the truth leading to a new future. Because the trust that we have spoken of at the forum signifies first and foremost an openness to peace and an understanding of how another people lives, even if they stand in different positions, and a desire to hold a democratic dialogue with anyone that wishes to speak with you.

What is stronger than the concept of a new way of thinking? The fact that it is the Soviet Union that comes forward with it. It is important that many ideas have been advanced anew today namely by the Soviet Union, which is proposing specific steps for their incarnation.

I am also troubled by another problem--the problem of survival. The very question of survival is itself close to the peoples of the Third World: to survive is an urgent issue every day for the majority of the population of the developing countries. But the Soviet Union has brought the word "survival" to the level of a problem for all mankind: the preservation of life on earth. And the problems of the Third World peoples, to some seeming not very connected with the problem of universal survival in the nuclear age, should

also become close for us--and then the very idea of a new way of thinking will lead to planetary solidarity.

Joaquin Gutierrez, Costa Rican writer and commentator: The task facing the people of Latin America today is to join the fight for economic development and against foreign indebtedness with the fight for peace and against the dictate of the military-industrial complex of the United States, which is the chief guilty party in the arms race and many other misfortunes. The people of Nicaragua alone lost 40,000 people in the fight against Somoza, who was supported by the United States; about 30,000 have given their lives in battling the contras. The scandal associated with "Irangate" has undermined the prestige of America in the eyes of all peoples in most powerful fashion.

I would like to note that the specific processes that in upcoming years will play an all-encompassing role in the cause of averting thermonuclear war are more eloquent than any propaganda. They are first and foremost the processes of democratization and the acceleration of economic development transpiring in the USSR. They make the image of the Soviet Union even more attractive, and this is a most powerful factor in the struggle for peace. Another factor could be the powerful movement of the Third World peoples in the fight for the restoration of the wounded or lost sovereignty of their countries.

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BOOK ON ETHNIC PROCESSES IN BRAZIL REVIEWED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 87 pp 124-125

[Review by A.D. Dridzo of book "Etnicheskiye protsessy v Brazilii" [Ethnic Processes in Brazil] by M.G. Kotovskaya, Moscow, Nauka Publishing House, 1985, 134 pp]

[Text] Brazil differs from its neighbors not only in language, but in the comparatively greater significance of Indians in its ethnic development, which in interaction with the strong Negro component of the population left an indelible impression on the whole ethno-cultural appearance of the country. The new arrivals from Europe, among whom emigres from Portugal predominated, to the land of Brazil landed in such an ethnic environment. This specific nature engenders a consistent question--what specifically did this combination of all these elements spill over into, what was its ethnic result? An exceedingly important conclusion--the ethnic core of the Brazilian nation, what in Brazil can be deemed "the most Brazilian"--depends on the answer.

In trying to answer this question, the author has divided the book into four chapters. The first three correspond to the most important periods in the ethnic history of the country, and the fourth summarizes the results of ethno-cultural development. At the center of the research are the mixed ethno-racial groups of northeast Brazil, since this region was assimilated by the Portuguese earlier than the others. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the cultural and economic enter of the colony was namely here. The fight to abolish slavery and overthrow the monarchy took shape most actively in the northeastern part of the country. But the main thing is that here "sooner than elsewhere an ethnic unity took shape on the basis of which the Brazilian nation later took shape" (p 6). If we take into account the fact that the ethnic structure of contemporary Brazil is dominated by the mixed population, the selection of the object of research in Kotovskaya's book cannot fail to be deemed extremely successful and is of greater scholarly interest, insofar as earlier the ethnic history of Brazil had not been specially studied by either Soviet or foreign specialists.

The first chapter gives a description of the interaction of the three principal ethnic elements--Indian, Negro and Portuguese--as well as a brief description of non-Portuguese immigration from Europe. The fixed attention of the author toward the social aspect of ethnic processes should be deemed a

powerful aspect of the section. It is namely this that made it possible to find the principal line of exposition, determine the essential amount of material and distribute it in the most rational fashion. The pages devoted to popular movements, the acknowledged center of which in Brazil was the northeast, are also read with great interest. The chronological framework of the first chapter encompasses almost four centuries--from 1500 through 1889.

The second chapter reviews the period up to the beginning of the Second World War. The affirmation of capitalist relations defined the nature of the new stage of Brazil's ethnic history. The author traces in detail the further evolution of all of the aforementioned ethnic groups. Many specialists, in writing about Brazil, are inclined to depict it as a country of "racial harmony" where there is no "color barrier" and racial discrimination. Brazil, of course, is not the southern United States, but the situation of the dark-skinned people here is far from serene, as it is sometimes depicted. The merit of the work is that this position is proven on the basis of extensive factual material and the inclusion of data for other regions of the country besides the northeast. The section where it is shown how considerable is the share of mulattoes calling themselves white among the inhabitants of Bani (pp 81-82) is very interesting.

The third chapter is small in size. The research in it brings us to the beginning of the 1980s and encompasses the principal aspects of ethno-social processes on the scale of the whole Brazilian state. The data cited by the author on the further fate of immigrants and their descendants and, in particular, the latest materials on Negroes and mulattoes, are interesting. Based on analysis of the data, Kotovskaya comes to the conclusion that racial discrimination in Brazil has not receded into the past at all.

The fourth chapter returns the reader to the problems of the northeast, but from a different point of view--on the plane of researching the specific cultural nature of its population over the last three decades. The author considers in particular the process of mutual influence and mutual permeation of cultures, which is especially manifested in the ethno-linguistic situation (p 117).

Kotovskaya's book is a substantial contribution to the study of ethnic problems in Brazil. The author succeeded in uncovering the principal directions of the development of ethnic processes over 500 years and determining the groups that played the most important roles in the process of forming the Brazilian nation. The work, clearly organized and attractive in its convincing reasoning, fills in a substantial gap in research on the ethnic past and present of the largest country in Latin America. The aforementioned is also testimony to the fact that the reviewer has no serious complaints for the book's author.

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PERUVIAN BOOK DISCUSSES COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 87 pp 125-126

[Review by V.P. Sudarev of book "Relaciones Internacionales del Peru" [The International Relations of Peru] by the Centro peruano de estudios internacionales (CEPEI), Lima, 1986, XXXVI+498 pp]

[Text] The latest publication of the Peruvian Center for International Research is based on materials from the international symposium held in Lima at the end of 1985 devoted to an analysis of the place and role of Peru in modern international relations. This voluminous anthology attracts attention for a number of reasons. First of all, the group of authors is very representative, including visible Peruvian international researchers, leading political figures of the country, professional diplomats, representatives of the research centers of other Latin American states and functionaries of the U.S. State Department. Second, and this is perhaps the most important, the work goes far beyond the framework of the designated topic and reviews the principal trends in contemporary international relations, researched, as a rule, from various points of view, since after each section there is commentary by several specialists in the given realm. Finally, under conditions where Peru is playing an ever more appreciable role in the region, the evaluation of the foreign policies of this state is also of no small interest.

A considerable portion of the anthology embraces global problems, which reflects the growing attention in Latin America to questions of nuclear opposition, disarmament and development and the struggle for peace. The research gives an overall objective picture of the reasons for a worsening of the international climate in the 1980s, which is connected with the aspirations of the Reagan administration and the military-industrial complex of the United States to change the overall balance of power in the world in its favor. It justly notes that the "counterforce doctrine" advanced by the White House at a global level envisages the achievement of nuclear superiority with the aid of "star wars," and at a regional level envisages interference in any "peripheral conflict."

The General Secretary of the Socialist Revolutionary Party of Peru, Senator B. Ballesteros, writes of the threat hanging over Latin America, encircled by two "aircraft carriers," which is understood to mean the military facilities of

England and the United States on the Malvinas Islands and Easter Island (p 377). Mercado Harrin, former minister of foreign affairs and prime minister of Peru who heads up the Peruvian Institute of Geopolitical and Strategic Studies, speaks in this regard of the "Anglo-Saxon pincers" that the region has fallen into as a result of the creation of strongpoints on these islands by the United States and its NATO allies (p 74).

A separate chapter in the book is devoted to the Central American conflict, considered from the point of view of the positions of two sides--the United States and the Contadora group. Its author, leading Mexican scholar C. Rico, makes a series of interesting, albeit not entirely incontrovertible, observations on the reasons for the appearance of the Contadoras, the extent of the disparity of its interests with the interests of the United States and the evolution of the approach of the Reagan administration to the events in Central America.

The sections of the anthology on Peru attract attention not only with their attempt to interpret critically the experience of the country's foreign policy in the 1970s, but also with the efforts to determine its future directions. M. Rodriguez Cuadros, one of the executives of the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cites a series of unique data on the foreign-policy activity of the country (p 362). He notes in particular that the participation of Peru in the non-aligned movement should be raised to a new level so as to become an important part of the struggle for the settlement of global problems, the reinforcement of national sovereignty and the just resolution of the issue of foreign debt. B. Ballesteros, citing data on the arms spending of Peru over the last decade, notes that the level has not dropped below 5 percent of the GNP, which substantially exceeds the funds allocated for the development of agriculture, health care and education. The fight of Peru against the arms race in the region is this directly linked with the interests of national development and is turning into one of the most urgent tasks in the realm of foreign policy. E. Mercado Harrin, analyzing the geopolitical climate in Latin America after the Malvinas conflict of 1982, concludes that it is essential for Peru to develop integration with Brazil in the Amazon region.

The anthology also considers the position of Peru on issues of reforming international maritime law, international economic relations and the activity of the United Nations.

Overall, the anthology under review is of undoubted interest for international specialists. The rich factual material it contains and the interesting conceptual developments make it possible to obtain a more complete representation of the views of Latin American scholars and political figures on a number of important international problems.

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ROOTS OF POLITICAL CRISIS IN ECUADOR DESCRIBED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 87 pp 136-139

[Article by G.Ye. Zhuchkova: "On the Political Situation in Ecuador"]

[Text] The abduction of President Leon Febres Cordero on 16 Jan 87 during his visit to the military airbase at Taura is an episode reflecting the complexity and thrust of the situation in the country. The individuals that abducted the president and the highly placed military and civilian officials accompanying him demanded the release of Lt Gen Frank Vargas Pazzos, who was arrested in March of 1986. This general, coming forward with exposures of Minister of Defense Luis Pineiros and ground-forces commander Manuel Albuja, demanded their retirement in connection with abuses of official status. The president refused to meet the demand, and Vargas, who had held the post of commander of the air force, seized the military base in Mante (Manabi Province) and then, in Quito, declared his intention to begin storming the presidential palace. The position was supported by a portion of the air force and several civilians. Government troops were able to suppress the mutiny and the general was placed under arrest.

The opposition majority in the National Congress adopted a resolution on amnesty for Frank Vargas, regarding his speech as a political protest, but Febres Cordero did not take the resolution into account. This is the history that preceded the incident at the Taura base.

As noted in the Ecuadoran press, the speech of Gen Frank Vargas in March of 1986 was serious test for the government of Leon Febres Cordero and revealed the presence of different trains of thought within the ranks of the armed forces. All political parties and many state and public figures condemned the act of seizing the president, but at the same time the majority of Ecuadorans placed responsibility for the situation that had taken shape in the country on Febres Cordero himself.

As early as the coming to power of the leader of the Social Christian Party, representing the interests of large entrepreneurs connected with imperialist circles in the United States, difficult problems arose between the executive and legislative branches and as emphasized by Ecuadoran sociological scholars, it became clear that a strict course and authoritarian methods of rule would be a characteristic feature of the activity of the new government. The slogan

advanced by Leon Febres Cordero in the general elections of 1984 ("Bread, housing, work for all!") turned out to be more comprehensible and accessible to the masses. Bringing it to life, however, turned out to be considerably more difficult than proclaiming it. The "neoliberal course" for economic development, which guides the current government, led to a worsening of problems already existing in the country. It is enough to cite the following data: over the period from 1984-86, the cost of living increased by 73.2 percent (and the government nonetheless vetoed a resolution of the congress to raise the minimum wage to 16,000 sucres under the pretext that this would lead to further growth in prices and inflation). According to official data, the minimum wage, enacted starting 1 Jan 86, covers only 68 percent of the vital needs of the family. The plan to build cheap housing for the population, according to which some 120,000 houses were to be built over a four-year period, in essence remained on paper. Hidden unemployment reached almost 50 percent. Inflation continued despite a multitude of promises to "exhaust" it within definite limits. Hoping to solve difficult economic and financial problems, the government is striving to obtain new credit from international financial organizations, notwithstanding the fact that the foreign debt of Ecuador will be 8.837 billion dollars by 1988.

All of this has led to a sharp increase in social tensions. A wave of strikes organized by the United Workers' Front, in which the three largest professional centers of the country are included, rolled across the country. The opposition parties in the National Congress also came out against the authoritarian measures of the government, which were undermining the economy of the country and its sovereignty.

The president tried to postpone the partial parliamentary and municipal elections scheduled for 1 Jun 86, foreseeing the defeat of the rightist parties. Next, so as to distract the attention of the masses from the elections, he came forward with an initiative to hold a plebiscite at the same time that would put before the court of the people a proposal that, it seemed, would undoubtedly receive approval. The issue was the introduction of amendments to the constitution that would permit citizens that did not belong to political parties to be candidates for electoral positions in the organs of state power. Despite expectations, however, the majority of Ecuadorans, over 60 percent, answered "no" to the president's proposal, voting not so much against the reform as against the policies of the government and refusing to support it.

In the partial parliamentary elections that took place at the intended time, the opposition parties, having received a majority of the votes, once again restored their control of congress. The Progressive bloc has 43 seats today, while the right-wing Front for National Reconstruction has 19 and unaffiliated parties have 9. Thus, even if the president had been able to attract the delegates of the unaffiliated parties to his side, the opposition would have a majority of 15 seats nonetheless.

It is important to note that the leftist parties (they include the Left Broad Front headed by the Communist Party of Ecuador, the Socialist Front and the People's Democratic Movement) together received 18.6 percent of the votes (13.4 percent in 1984) and 15 seats in congress. This success of the leftist

forces, aside from a definite "overflow" of votes from the Left Democratic Party, was made possible first and foremost as a result of their persistent work among the masses, the trade unions, peasant communes and among the marginal population, as well as thanks to the high prestige of the candidates of the leftist organizations and in particular Ecuadoran CP General Secretary Rene Mozhe Mosker, elected a deputy to the National Congress. The popular masses support the demands advanced by the United Workers' Front: a reduction in prices for basic food products, the use of funds intended for various foreign-debt payments for social needs and the restoration of diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. The Ecuadorans have taken active part in the days of protest against the payment of foreign debt that were held in all of the countries of Latin America on 23 Oct 86. They expressed their dissatisfaction once again with the policies of Leon Febres Cordero and his economic policies subordinate to the dictate of the United States.

As the events of March 1986 and the act of seizing the president at the Taura military airbase demonstrated, the situation extant in the country evokes dissatisfaction among some of the military as well. At the end of the 1970s, after the retirement of Gen Rodriguez Lara, democratic tendencies in the armed forces were considerably weakened. A group of military was gradually formed anew, however, especially among the junior and middle officer corps, that expressed dissatisfaction with the authoritarian method of rule of Febres Cordero and came out in favor of protecting the sovereignty of Ecuador. The actions of Gen Frank Vargas precisely reflected the alarm of these military personnel to the tightening of government policies and their closer convergence with those of the United States.

The crisis in the rule of Leon Febres Cordero had reached its culmination when a majority in the National Congress came forward with the demand that the president resign. The Progressive bloc in parliament, especially the deputies from the Ecuadoran CP, feel that he should depart, ceding his post to Vice President Blasco Penaherrera.

The worsening of social tensions had made itself known in other forms as well. The military organization "Alfaro vive, caraho!", declaring itself to be a "nationalist, democratic, anti-oligarchical and anti-imperialist movement,"¹ began to operate in Ecuador in 1983. Its leaders assert that they will halt the armed struggle if the ruling circles take effective measures to improve the situation of the popular masses. Coming forward with democratic slogans, the organization at the same time makes use in its activity of methods (murder of police, kidnapping of officials for the purpose of obtaining ransom, the seizure of various public institutions) that evoke the condemnation of democratic society and facilitate a strengthening of the position of conservative circles in the armed forces.

Aside from the military organization that has already obtained a certain notoreity, a new group called "Montoneros, patria libre" began operating in 1986 and on 20 May 86 kidnapped Enrique Echeverria, a member of the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees, who was later released. The purpose of this act, according to the declaration of group members, was to put pressure on the Tribunal and demand an investigation of the activity of President Febres Cordero in connection with constitutional violations. Some political figures

in Ecuador, for example former Vice President Leon Roldos Agilera, the brother of President Jaime Roldos Agilera who died tragically in 1981, asserted that that the activity of such organizations and the very fact of their appearance is a display of protest against the worsening of the country's socio-economic problems.

A combination of the most varied of factors is thus leading to an ever greater worsening of the political situation in Ecuador. The problem of unity of the popular masses and all leftist and democratic forces that are able to propose democratic ways out of the crisis therefore acquires particularly great significance. The leftists, and the Ecuadoran CP in particular, feel that it is essential to develop a well-defined and clear alternative that would eliminate the possibility of an outcome of events that is undesirable for the interests of the popular masses and would ensure the victory of democratic forces in the general elections of 1988.

And until then, making use of the fact that the resolution of the extraordinary session of the National Congress is not compulsory for him, Leon Febres Cordero, having assured the Ecuadorans of his readiness to defend democratic institutions, at the same time will not hamper the trials of the 83 paratroopers that took part in the act of abduction.

General Frank Vargas Pazzos, in an illegal position, nonetheless is acquiring ever greater popularity in the country. Local observers note that the possibility of advancing his candidacy for the post of president by a coalition of leftist forces in the 1988 elections has not been ruled out.

FOOTNOTE

1. Alfaro, Eloy (1842-1912)--state and political figure, general, and from the 1860s active in the fight against the reactionary regime of the dictator G. Garcia Moreno. President of Ecuador, 1897-1901 and 1906-1911.

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MEXICAN CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON BORDER PROBLEMS PROFILED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 87 pp 140-141

[Article by A.N. Borovkov under the rubric "From Our Foreign Correspondents": "The Mexican Center for Border Research"]

[Text] The complex and contradictory nature of Mexican-American border relations and a worsening of old problems and the appearance of new ones between the two countries puts on the agenda the necessity of their profound, systematic and comprehensive study. Proceeding from that, upon the resolution of the Mexican government, the Center for Border Research for northern Mexico was created in August of 1982. Its establishment on the Mexican border in the city of Tijuana corresponds to the policy of decentralization proclaimed by President Miguel de la Madrid, making it possible to work in immediate proximity to the object of research. At the beginning of 1986 the center was renamed the College of the Northern Border (COLEF).

The research of the center is of an applied nature. The scientific studies they do there serve as an important basis for the Mexican government in conducting negotiations with the United States on various aspects of bilateral relations concerning first and foremost the border regions.

COLEF is an autonomous scholarly institution. It is 90-percent financed by the federal government and 10-percent by the state of Lower California, on whose territory it is located. It is headed by the well-known Mexican sociologist Jorge A. Bustamante, who has been occupied with border problems for about 20 years. The center has highly qualified personnel: out of 47 researchers, 60 percent have doctoral degrees and 40 percent have masters. The majority of the leading staff members have been trained and defended their dissertations in universities in the United States, West Germany, France and East Germany.

In a structural regard, the center is divided into six departments: social, economic and demographic research, the environment, cultural and state and administrative management. Its staff members are currently developing about 40 projects, the majority of which are comprehensive. Priority areas include: the socio-economic development of the border zone; the economic situation in various industrial regions on both sides of the border; demographic changes; the ecological situation; the socio-economic situation of citizens of Mexican

origin in the United States; the evolution and mutual influence of the two civilizations and ways of preserving Mexican culture.

Over four years of work, COLEF has prepared a number of features on problems associated with the principal thrust of its activity. Once every two months it publishes the bulletin "Correo Fronterizo." Permanent field observation and research conducted at five stations located in the largest border cities--Mexicali, Nogales, Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo and Matamoros--plays an important role in the work of the center. The library at COLEF is not large. It has only about 15,000 pieces of specialized research. COLEF, in the words of its president, does not need a substantial expansion of its library, since its staff members, by virtue of the status of the border zone, have free access to libraries in various cities in the United States. As far as technical equipment, COLEF is privileged compared to other scholarly centers of the country of a similar type, having 26 of the latest computers at its disposal.

There has been post-graduate study at the center since 1984. It is limited as yet to the training of masters candidates, although it has also been granted the right to accept doctoral dissertations for defense. The period of study for graduate students is two years. They attend lectures as staff members of the center, just like the specialists invited from the academic and scholarly institutions of the capital. In 1986 COLEF graduated its first 25 masters-degree holders. The principal purpose of graduate study is to prepare researchers for the universities of the northern states of the country specializing in problems of regional development.

The international contacts of the center are maintained first and foremost with scholarly organizations in the United States. This is explained by the geographical location, the mutual vested interest of both countries in analyzing existing problems and the necessity of interconnection in carrying out the major portion of the research. Also important is the fact that financial assistance is received from the United States for the organization of joint conferences, symposia and roundtables, as well as the preparation of joint COLEF publications.

At the same time, the center implements a quite broad book exchange with various countries of the world and accepts interns from other states of Latin America and Western Europe, and its staff members participate regularly in foreign academic conferences.

COLEF is a new and exceedingly promising scientific research center in Mexico that has succeeded in a short time in winning recognition both within the country and abroad.

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NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COORDINATION BUREAU'S PEACE APPEAL PUBLISHED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 87 pp 142-144

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Documents": "The Georgetown Appeal for Peace"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] The Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries held a Special Conference of Foreign Ministers in Georgetown (Guyana) 9-12 Mar 87 for the purpose of considering the situation in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin. The Georgetown Appeal for Peace here published by the journal was adopted in the course of it.

"Peace in Central America--A Vital Necessity for Peace in the World"

The significant events that are transpiring in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin are facilitating profound changes both in the region overall and in its interaction with the rest of the world.

The need for unity is confirmed anew in Latin America and the Caribbean to strengthen the fight for genuine independence and development. The milestones of this process are: universal solidarity with the right of the people of Panama to ensure sovereignty over all of the territory of the country and the Panama Canal; broad support for the struggle that has already been waged by Argentina for a century for the accomplishment of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands; the consistent efforts of the Contadora group and the "support group" that reflect the will of the whole continent for the achievement of a Latin American solution to the crisis in Central America and intolerance for foreign aggression and intervention; initiatives in the cause of solving problems of foreign debt advanced in accordance with sovereign solutions and the national interests of the Latin American countries.

The coming to power of democratic governments in a number of countries in the region opens the possibility for the peoples of these countries to implement fully the rights of the individual, as well as the inalienable right freely to determine one's own fate. This process is also making a contribution to reinforcing the non-aligned movement in the region and the world.

The fall of dictatorial regimes and their inevitable collapse where they are still in power is proof of the powerful democratic aspirations of the peoples

of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin. The overthrow of dictatorial regimes as a result of heroic popular resistance also reflects the failure of economic models foisted by force and intended to perpetuate dependence and subordination to foreign interests. That is why the process of democratization, which our movement welcomes and supports, is closely linked with the struggle for complete independence and the unity of all Latin American and Caribbean countries, the protection of their national sovereignty and the necessity of coordinating their actions with other developing countries in the fight to establish a new international economic order.

The unbearable burden of foreign debt, eloquent testimony to the existing international economic order (it should be altered), impedes the economic development that the peoples of the region are striving for and subjects democratic stability to serious danger. The foreign debt of Latin American and Caribbean countries cannot be paid off under existing terms and without consistent economic development.

It is necessary to advance and increase efforts in economic and political collaboration and integration in Latin America and the Caribbean, which will facilitate an easing of the most difficult burden of the present-day crisis, a deepening of processes of political and economic transformation in the region and the creation of conditions for economic and social development.

At the same time, the process of economic consolidation, democratization and regional unity requires peace and stability. This is seriously hampered, however, by the Central American conflict, which threatens the principles and values that are fundamental to the region and its peace and security. We therefore devote especial attention to the situation in Central America, one of the most dangerous seats of tension in the world, and we repeat that this conflict should be considered not a result of conflict between East and West, but rather as a consequence of complex socio-economic problems and foreign intervention.

In the last several years, Nicaragua has been the victim of a cruel, unjust and unequal war foisted on it by the strongest power in the world. The interests of peace, development and democracy in Central America inevitably require strict observance of the rights of peoples to self-determination and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. In this context, we decisively repudiate threats or the use of force, especially military pressure, aimed at subverting the political will of any Central American state, and we insistently call on the United States to respect these principles.

The countries of the Contadora group and the "support group" have played a vitally important role in seeking a political solution to the Central American crisis at the negotiating table and should continue their efforts. The Contadora process is the sole true way to peace in the region, and we insistently call upon all Central American states to act within the framework of this process.

In concluding its meeting in Georgetown, the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries appeals to all states, international organizations and the

world community to reinforce and expand solidarity with the representatives and peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin in their efforts to achieve peace in Central America, reinforce national independence and democracy and develop economics and integration, called upon to make them the masters of their own fates.

For this purpose, the Coordinating Buro has adopted a resolution to undertake the following actions:

1. Institute a permanent commission composed of these countries: Zimbabwe (representing the non-aligned movement), Algeria, Guyana, Ghana, India, Congo, Panama, Peru and Yugoslavia.

This committee, among other tasks, will resolve the following issues:

a) meet with representatives of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations and the general secretaries of the United Nations and the Organization of American States so as to transmit to them the unease of the movement with regard to the crisis in Central America and to call insistently for them to continue their efforts aimed at a peaceful resolution of the conflict;

b) transmit to the authorities of the United States the serious unease of the movement with the situation in Central America and to call insistently for them to facilitate the creation of conditions essential for the achievement of a peaceful solution to the Central American conflict that would be based on complete respect for international rights and would answer the proposals advanced by the Contadora group and the "support group";

c) transmit to the foreign ministers of the member nations of the European Economic Community, as well as the chairman of this organization, the serious unease of the movement with the situation in Central America and to call insistently for their more active efforts essential for the achievement of peace in Central America, as well as to make an effective contribution to the economic and social development of the region;

d) inform all of the member countries of the Contadora group and the "support group" that the movement fully supports their actions in the interest of peace in Central America, and express the readiness of the non-aligned countries to render any essential assistance to their noble efforts;

e) visit Nicaragua for the purpose of expressing solidarity with the movement in that country.

2. Appeal to Zimbabwe as the representative of the movement with the request to undertake the following steps:

a) request that the participating non-aligned countries disseminate the Georgetown Appeal for Peace as widely as possible;

b) transmit the text of the Georgetown Appeal for Peace to all regional and international organizations and appeal to them with the request that they disseminate it as widely as possible;

c) take essential steps to see that all information agencies that are part of the Pool of Information Agencies on the Non-Aligned Countries are informed of the Georgetown Appeal for Peace as broadly as possible.

3. Request that the chairman of the non-aligned movement send a special envoy to the leaders of the industrially developed countries included in the "Group of 7" on the issues of the economic crisis and the foreign indebtedness of the developing countries with the singling out of those specific problems that the countries of Latin America are encountering.

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REVIEW OF JOURNAL LATINSKAYA AMERIKA NO 7, 1987

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 21 Jul 87 pp 1-3

[Text] The issue carries an article by M. Gurvits "Venezuela: From 'Representative' to 'Limited' Democracy". Following the consolidation of local big private capital groups and their growing ties with transnationals, the national state, the main obstacle to their activities, has been weakened in Venezuela, writes the author. As a result, the life of most people has worsened and the country's economic and political dependence has considerably grown. "Representative" democracy is increasingly limited for the sake of big private capital. It is less and less reflecting the socio-economic interests of the other groups of the population.

The evolution of the bourgeois-democratic system in Venezuela since the second half of the 1970s shows that "representative democracy" as a form of political rule cannot meet the interests of the broad sections of the population, notes the author. Such a regime is unable to weaken the country's dependence on industrialized capitalist powers. Venezuelan experience proves the need to democratize political life in the Latin American countries that have embarked on this road and to carry out there deeper socio-economic transformations for ensuring true democratic national interests for the benefit of broad masses.

Y. Karash contributes an article "Foreign Policy of Argentine Radicals: Sources and Our Time". Argentina's role in world politics has of late substantially increased. It actively works for preventing a world nuclear conflict, settling the Central American crisis by political means, defending the Third World's economic and political interests, and developing equitable relations with all nations irrespective of their social system. The advent to power of the Civil Radical Union (CRU) marked a sharp turn in Argentina's foreign policy.

The first item of the foreign policy section of the CRU's program says that the Party commits itself to pursue an international policy based on peaceful relations among all members of the world community as well as friendly and mutually beneficial ties with all countries. This is one of the strongest points in the activities of the present Argentine government, which has been recognized throughout the world. Argentina tirelessly works for removing the nuclear threat, which is vividly testified by its activities in the Delhi Six.

The Radicals' support for political settlement of the Central American crisis is an important aspect in their foreign policy. Argentina is member of the group of Latin American support to the Contadora process.

Restoring sovereignty over the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) remains Argentina's sharp foreign policy problem.

The Radicals' advent to power has strengthened Argentina's ties with developing countries and role in the Third World, points out the author.

O. Ushnurtseva contributed an article titled "The Failure of the Policy of Economic Isolation of Nicaragua." For eight years, she writes, the imperialist circles of the United States, who have always regarded Central America as a sphere of its "vital interests" and as a bridgehead for control over the entire Latin American region, have refused to put up with the existence of independent Nicaragua. Along with the use of naked state terrorism, such as the threat of direct intervention and the financing and training of counterrevolutionary bands of mercenaries, a thing decisively condemned by the world community, the USA has put extreme pressure on Nicaragua in the economic field.

In a bid to reduce dependence on the USA, the Sandinist leadership at the start of the eighties embarked on a consistent diversification of foreign trade and the other forms of economic ties, notes the author. A network of more than 20 trade missions to assist state and private companies in handling export-import transactions was created.

Nicaragua now has an expanded range of trading partners and its foreign economic ties are re-oriented toward the CMEA, the Common Market, Latin America, and also Canada, Japan and a number of developing Asian states.

The Sandinist leadership is paying special attention to co-operation with the socialist community, stresses Ushnurtseva.

Trade with the socialist countries brings the goods badly needed by Nicaragua: machinery, equipment, transport vehicles, tractors, other farm machinery, raw materials, food, and consumer goods. In 1981-1986 Soviet exports to Nicaragua totaled over 700 million roubles. Vital are oil and product imports, which in 1985 supplied almost 100 per cent of the country's needs.

The aftermath of US sanctions against Nicaragua, manifest in serious economic difficulties, makes it painfully clear how great is the "price" of developing countries' economic and financial dependence on imperialism. This is especially true of small states with a vulnerable, raw-product or agricultural specialisation of the economy. Yet the example of Nicaragua also shows once again the groundlessness of the claims by Western political scientists and economists that this dependence is "fatal" and impossible to break.

The journal also carries an article by General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Dominican Communist Party Narciso Isa Conde, "The Aggravation of the Crisis and Our Tasks," an interview with General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Mexico Pablo Gomez, and a number of other materials.

EFFECT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES RESTRUCTURING ON LATINSKAYA AMERIKA

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 7, Jul 87 pp 5-8

[Article under the rubric "Editor's Column": "Social Sciences to the Level of Historic New Tasks"]

[Excerpts] In the year marking the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, it may be stated without exaggeration that the attention of the entire world public is riveted on the radical process of changes taking place in the USSR. In the definition of M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, this involves "a real revolution in the entire system of relationships in society and in persons' minds and hearts..." The essence of the restructuring which has been undertaken is the regeneration of all aspects of the Soviet public's life, providing socialism with the most up-to-date forms of social organization, and the fullest possible disclosure of the socialist system's creative potential. The CPSU has been in the forefront of the nationwide struggle for fundamental changes in the economy and political and spiritual areas. The party has shown profound faith in the revolutionary spirit of the people and has proposed a truly revolutionary policy. The objective of this policy is to stir the masses to greater activity in every possible way, to unleash their creative energy, and to involve every working person in firsthand management of the country. Restructuring is possible only through democracy and because of democracy. Taken in a broad historical context, it is not simply a continuation of the October Revolution. It is corroborating and extending the great meaning of October at a new point in world history.

The profound revolutionary movement which has gripped our country and which is having an enormous effect on the world requires a new level of quality in the development of theoretical thought. We can advance to it only after bringing about a fundamental restructuring of social sciences. Meanwhile, stagnation has affected the realm of theory in a very serious way as well. For a long time there have not been enough discussions and conflict of opinions here. Authoritarian opinions and theoretical patterns which took shape in the 1930's and 1940's have prevailed. An influential trend toward the neutralization of social science thinking has been noted. Original works, which made up an absolute minority, were drowned in the wide-ranging flood of mediocrity. A vast number of dissertations, monographs, and pamphlets, in which "everything was correct" and "everything was observed" somehow, but which did not

contribute to increased knowledge and were descriptive in nature, have made their appearance. Fears of "offending" or "scaring away" which significantly take cover in "political considerations" have nearly ruled out the publication of works which contain nonstandard, controversial and innovative points of view. Departmental thinking began interfering with the statement and solution of new problems. As a result, theory began lagging behind in a number of directions of the most current interest.

The 27th CPSU Congress and the April (1985) and January (1987) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee changed the situation. A stream of fresh air burst into the social sciences. In the revolutionary regeneration of society which has begun, the party is proceeding from Lenin's thesis that there can be no revolutionary movement without revolutionary theory. Science has been set the task of becoming the motive force for social changes, not only to give meaning to the life of today, but to surpass it.

The process of restoring the creative spirit of Marxist-Leninist teaching and of freeing theory from dogmatism has begun in the social sciences. New thinking, characterized by scientific courage, close relationship with practice, and a democratic approach, is being firmly established. Only this type of thinking can become the self-awareness of our society's revolutionary regeneration and provide accurate answers to the formidable problems of international development. As noted at the conference of social scientists organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences in April 1987, the question today concerns the enrichment of Marxist thought at a new point in world history and unceasing regeneration and improvement of our world outlook.

The vast importance of the analysis of the entire range of manifestations and processes in international relations which was emphasized at the conference sets important tasks for Soviet Latin American specialists, and for their journal *LATINSKAYA AMERIKA* in particular.

In critically evaluating the work experience accumulated over 18 years, the journal's editorial staff is restructuring its activity in conformity with the requirements of the time. The principal task facing the collective today is to work to overcome the stagnant manifestations in Latin American studies and to bring this branch of social science out to advanced positions, taking into account the sharply increasing role of the region being studied in world development. In this connection, it is necessary to improve the quality of the scientific-methodical role of the journal in reinterpreting out-of-date theoretical propositions, in defining the main directions of scientific thought, and in formulating an integral concept of its development, taking immediate and more distant objectives into account. Long-range planning by the editorial board must be raised to a higher level of quality. The journal should take the initiative in bringing forward fundamentally new problems and search for approaches that are not stereotyped in dealing with themes that are already traditional. Only in this way can we establish the "point of growth" in our theory and enrich scientific knowledge.

One of the worst "bottlenecks" in our activity is the low analytical level of some of the materials being published in the article section, which is especially disturbing. Serious omissions in work with authors contribute to this. For this reason, we have to increase exactingness toward materials submitted and attract new specialists, especially young ones, more boldly.

The journal is planning to concentrate its activity in directions where there are resources for theoretical thought or where it is lagging behind. As in the past, the principal scientific problem is political and economic analysis of Latin American societies, clearly revealing the formative phase in capitalism's development in the region, and taking into account possible alternatives to get out of a structural crisis. Analysis of ways to resolve the problems of debts will require further analysis as well. In conformity with a creative reinterpretation of the problems of socialism, we will have to devote further study to the experience in socialist construction in Cuba and the revolutionary changes in Nicaragua. A key political problem such as democratization in the continent's countries is also timely. The lack of analytical materials on the regional revolutionary process and its interaction with other revolutionary currents of the present day is making itself felt. The level of research on the problem of the subjective factor and the difficulties and prospects of the communist movement is unsatisfactory. Efforts to overcome old patterns and dogmatic stereotypes in problems of the unity of leftist forces are handled in a complicated manner in our science. The task of interpreting the problems relating to the unification of peace movements and the struggle for revolution is imperative in light of the new political thinking. The propagandistic and scientific level of materials unmasking the neoglobalist policy of imperialism in the region is inadequate. There are few articles on the philosophical and cultural anthropology [kulturologicheskiiye] aspects of the problems of culture and social consciousness. Descriptiveness and eulogizing in the work of the bibliography department has to be overcome, and scientific criticism has to be enlivened.

Particular importance will be attached to creative discussions. By having well-defined democratic traditions, the journal will seek to become a center for scientific debates, to strengthen their high degree of quality, and to reflect the entire spectrum of views. It is important that controversy not be turned into an end in itself and that each clash of viewpoints has a meaningful end result. A form of openness in science such as polemic notes also is worthy of further development. We intend to expand the publication of letters to the editorial staff, which will strengthen our relationship with readers.

In restructuring the work, the editorial staff hopes that the active authors and readers of the journal will take part in discussing the problems raised, will express their opinion, and will help with advice and recommendations.

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DOMINICAN COMMUNIST ON COUNTRY'S CRISIS, CP'S PROGRAM

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 7, Jul 87 pp 9-18

[Article by Narciso Isa Conde, general secretary of the Dominican Communist Party Central Committee: "Aggravation of the Crisis and Our Tasks"]

[Excerpts] After the democratic upswing at the end of the 1970's which resulted in the removal from power of the right-wing government of Joaquin Balaguer, and especially after such a social upheaval as the events of April 1984, it is difficult for foreign observers to understand how Balaguer returned to power again. This fact gives rise to anxiety and concern, and suggests to many persons that the country is moving backward. I think that a judgment such as this would be very biased.

WHY DID THE RIGHT WING RETURN TO POWER?

The victory by Balaguer and the Reformist Party headed by him is linked first of all with the unprecedented discrediting of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), which was in power in the country from 1978 to 1986. If the results of its social and economic policy are compared with the activity of the Balaguer government in the 1970's, the comparison obviously favors the latter. By acting in a pre-crisis situation, Balaguer was able to take advantage of favorable economic market conditions, particularly the increased prices for sugar and other export products. Owing to the sharply increased influx of currency, he managed to increase capital investments, especially in construction. The level of unemployment also rose in the country as a whole, although not at the rate of previous years, not to mention the next period. For this reason, a significant part of the population--including those who are the least well off--had a recollection of the period of Balaguer's rule and Balaguer himself which was tinged with nostalgia. This factor is very closely related to the second one: the results of the PRD's economic activity.

WHAT IS NEXT?

As stated previously, Balaguer appeared before the masses mainly as an alternative to the catastrophic results of the PRD's economic activity. Revival of the economy, reactivation of the construction sector, increased

allocations for social needs, reduction of the level of unemployment and prices for food, medicines and everyday services--all this was promised in the Reformists' pre-election program.

However, it was clear that if they won they would not offer anything new, and that the elections were just a political intermezzo in the course of a very deep economic and social crisis. Four years of following the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (1983-1986) led not only to a worsening of the people's lives (a direct result of these recommendations), but also complicated the crisis situation as a whole. In the following 3 years the country, with annual revenues from exports which do not exceed 700 million dollars, will be forced to pay 500 million dollars every year in interest alone. Payments on the debt will make up 120 percent of the total export earnings in 1986 and 70 percent at best in subsequent years! In this respect the situation is now much worse than it was before the IMF's intervention.

Thus Balaguer does not have to count on favorable foreign conditions this time. Moreover, they will be worse even when compared with the period that the PRD was in power. Meanwhile, during the election campaign the Reformists made so many promises that they created the illusion among the masses that they were able to control the rise or fall of prices for exported and essential products, reduce the level of unemployment, and improve the overall situation in the economy. However, this conflicts not only with the depth of the crisis, but the fact that Balaguer is associated with the sector of the local bourgeoisie which bears the most responsibility for the consequences of the crisis and which benefited the most from the economic policy carried out in past years.

The positions of the most powerful groups of private capital and foreign monopolies have been reinforced markedly in the state machinery. Now they control economic policy not only through their corporate organizations (the National Council of Employers and the U. S. Chamber of Commerce), but they have also acquired direct participation in the activity of the government and the finance ministry. In the past, the cabinet consisted of representatives of the administrative system, bureaucratic groups, and party leaders. Now the cabinet posts have been reassigned in favor of the private capital sector and its most influential groupings, and even the direct representatives of foreign capital and the bourgeoisie associated with it.

Thus Balaguer's former "political autonomy," having given the ruling circles the opportunity to carry out a kind of Bonapartist policy (guided by the state sector) from 1966 to 1976, is now restricted on both sides--both by the marked increase in the influence of private capital and by the risk of a "rebellion" of the masses whose hopes have been dashed. To this we must add the limitations connected with Balaguer's physical condition, who is 78 and actually blind.

For this reason, it is not surprising that the government's economic policy began to falter from the very first weeks. It not only has not kept the promise to lower the prices for essential goods, but it has not been able to prevent their further rise. The budget deficit is so high that no substantial revival of activity in the construction sector and consequently, no decrease

in unemployment, is foreseen in the near future. There are now more than 50,000 persons in the state apparatus who are only supernumerary employees. Balaguer suggested that they be dismissed, thereby seeking funds for investments in construction. But even if he manages to repeat the record of the 1970's (50,000 new work places), the number of employed will not be increased in reality. After all, 700,000 still remain unemployed, not to mention the partially unemployed and the 700,000 emigrants living in the United States and Venezuela.

On the whole, the needle of the country's economic compass is pointing toward "worse." The assessments of international economic organizations also attest to this. Thus, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development points out in all the alternatives in its forecast that the Dominican Republic is going through the worst economic crisis in its history and that there will be no improvements in the economic situation before 1990 under the most favorable foreign market conditions.

In this situation, Balaguer raised the question of a 2-year political truce during which the activity of political parties would be limited to an analysis of the economic situation and internal party organizational matters. And this is under conditions which are truly unbearable for the broad masses and in a situation which unquestionably will lead to new disturbances if promises are not kept and hopes are dashed once again! The leader of the Reformists accompanied the truce proposal with the threat of repressions. In discussing the correlation between freedom and order, he stated that freedom is food for society, but order is the oxygen, and that he will protect order from the threat of anarchy at any cost, even the cost of freedom.

Under these conditions, our party's policy is based on the continuity, intensification and realization of the solutions proposed in 1985 and 1986. This refers to the policy which we call "opposition to the program and popular mobilization."

In preparing for the last elections, the left-wing forces worked out and presented to the masses a formula for new rule and a number of measures aimed at leading the country out of the crisis and the people out of poverty. All in all, these measures represent a program which is an alternative to the IMF policy:

- resolving the foreign debt problem based on suspension of interest payments on it and joining the movement on the continent for cancellation of foreign debts;

- shifting all currency coming into the country to the control of the state (it is now being used by the private sector); drafting a program to utilize it in the interests of national development and to improve the welfare of the masses;

- carrying out a new policy in the foreign trade area based on its diversification, oriented on principles of a new world economic system;

--establishing diplomatic and economic relations with all countries in the world (let us remind you that the Dominican Republic is almost the only bourgeois-democratic country on the continent which does not have such relations with the USSR and one of a few which have not re-established them with Cuba); conducting an independent foreign policy;

--improvements in agrarian policy which would be based on consistent adherence to agrarian laws, which were adopted, incidentally, by Balaguer's previous government as far back as 1972 and safely shelved. In this way 300,000 farm workers' families could be provided with land, which would lead immediately to alleviation of the unemployment problem and to increased agricultural production; and

--increasing wages and reducing prices for essential products; restructuring and purging the armed forces; modifying contracts with foreign companies; and confiscating illegally acquired wealth (bribes, taking advantage of official position, and the like).

This program will become the axis of our policy of opposition, and at the same time it will determine the opportunities and limits of our strategy of alliances, which will be built precisely on the basis of the relationship of other political forces in the country toward the provisions of the alternative we have proposed. The communists are prepared for any forms of unity with left-wing forces. Restoration of the Dominican Leftist Front as a strategic alliance capable of playing a decisive role in forming a revolutionary vanguard for the liberation process is our most important task. From these consistently anti-imperialist, democratic positions and around an integral alternative program, we seek to reinforce and develop everything that was achieved from 1984 to 1986 in the process of coordinating the "city" (committees of mass struggle in the housing areas for the poor), trade union, and farm labor movements. Our plan is aimed at rallying all the people's organizations and coordinating their actions and demands directed at overcoming the crisis. And at the same time, we are calling upon all political groups and social currents in the country to establish a broad front of struggle to overcome the crisis through social progress, independence and peace.

Our primary and consistent objective is to defeat the plans for a "political truce." We will achieve this by extending the struggle for the demands which the masses realize are the most urgent and justified (reduction of prices for essential articles, municipal services and medicines; increased wages; and implementation of the agrarian laws).

FOR THE PARTY CAPABLE OF ACCEPTING THE CHALLENGE OF HISTORY

The situation which has developed is a true call for the party, which seeks to become the vanguard of the working class and the masses or an important integral part of the vanguard. This situation makes it incumbent upon us to exert even greater efforts than before to finally overcome everything that is paralyzing our actions and opportunities, and everything that smacks of stagnation and delayed response, hidebound ways, inability to resolve problems

which arise creatively, dogmatism, sectarianism, reformist concepts, poor organizational work, and an indulgent attitude toward one's own weaknesses and those of his comrades. The party's leadership and a considerable number of its active members have been aware of this need since before the Third Communist Party Congress. Nevertheless, it should be admitted that many ideas and organizational and political solutions which were approved then were not realized and did not become a real guide to action. A large gap was formed between word and deed.

In recent months we have discussed all the problems and have made highly important decisions following the critical and self-critical work of the Central Committee and each of its members. The conclusion drawn was that our activity in a phase of acute social crisis proved to be typified to a significant extent by the methods, rhythm, and attitude shaped during a period of low activity in the mass movement and relative sociopolitical stability.

A party and a people's movement are required which are equal to the demands, which are able to offer an alternative to the existing rule, and which are capable of defeating all of reaction's plans.

We ourselves, the party leaders, should have begun to restructure our own house for this. We, the members of the Central Committee, have decided to raise the fulfillment of our objectives and our degree of responsibility to a new level of quality, to put an end to tolerance of "human frailties," lack of organization, and the unfinished work which have reduced the real strength of the party all these years. It was decided to finally overcome the gap between appeals, theoretical concepts, slogans and resolutions and the reality of specific actions and to become fully proficient in the Leninist style and method of party and political work, which is the only thing that can turn us into an organization capable of stirring the masses which is led by more and more skilled leadership united by common responsibility and ability.

THE LIBERATION PROCESS IN LATIN AMERICA

There is an organic link between the national crisis and the regional crisis, which has become most acute politically in the countries of Central America and in Chile and Haiti.

Washington's current economic strategy presupposes direct and indirect intervention, subordination and supremacy. In the final analysis, this policy is dictated by the general line of increasing the empire's military might, a continuous budget deficit, and other manifestations of crisis in the economic development of the United States. The Reagan administration's aggressive aspirations increase in a situation such as this, although it is not able to achieve them or to remove the tension generated by the economic crisis.

Under these conditions, a popular revolutionary and anti-imperialist solution to the problem of the crisis presupposes energetic reinforcement of a multilateral creative struggle by left-wing forces and the masses led by them. The revolution in Cuba was the first blow which opened the way to real independence and social reconstruction. The Sandinist revolution, which is

now marking its eighth anniversary, was victorious 20 years later. This revolution has undermined imperialism's supremacy in the entire region linking the continent's north and south, and has sharply increased the level of confrontation in it between the masses' striving for self-determination and social changes and the attempt by the bloc of imperialism and the local oligarchy to demonstrate the reversibility of revolutionary and historical processes. The events in El Salvador have raised the people's struggle in the subregion to a new level. The question of the continuity and prospects of the liberation process on the continent which was begun by Cuba three decades ago is being resolved precisely in Central America in the heroic struggle by the Nicaraguan people to defend their rule and the development of the revolution in El Salvador. And the problem of blocking the aggressive plans of the Reagan administration, which are aimed in the final analysis at world supremacy, and the doctrine and practice of "neoglobalism" is being resolved at the same time.

The struggle by the peoples of El Salvador and Nicaragua and the policy of the Contadora Group and the "support group" of a political settlement of the conflict faces Washington with the necessity of a choice: either an increase in the level of "low-intensity conflict" using the mechanisms of indirect aggression and limited direct intervention or the path of negotiations, adaptation to regional progress, and recognition of Central American countries' rights to nonalignment and social changes. At present, the Reagan administration is persisting in its attempts to turn back the course of history, seeking to achieve this by force, escalation of intervention, and war.

Obviously, it will not be easy for the United States to follow this path under the present conditions in Latin America and the world. Nicaragua is not the Grenada of 1983 or the Dominican Republic of 1965. The growth of continental self-awareness and the potential for indignation at the United States' actions which has accumulated in recent years will hamper the implementation of the administration's schemes and may lead to an unprecedented outburst of resentment by the people in the region if Reagan runs the risk of carrying them out anyway. All this is so. But it is no less true that the possibility of such an action is not ruled out and that the probability of this may increase either in a situation where there is intoxication with success or in a situation where there is despair from failures...

The present crisis has gripped not only Central America, but the entire continent, although it varies in severity in different regions and countries. The levels of crisis of the system of political domination, the extent to which revolutionary situations have matured--or have been blocked--are definite phases which the liberation process passes through in its development. And obviously it can be said in spite of this that the previous model of imperialist supremacy is in danger in all subregions of the continent.

Everything attests to the fact that Latin America is going through a specific period of development which is characterized by great political and social dynamism.

The situation which has developed--the national, regional, and continental situation--is organically and multilaterally linked with problems which directly concern mankind as a whole, and with the problems of underdevelopment, dependence and survival, and prevention of a new world war first of all. Those who attempt to put the yoke of new economic and political dependence on our peoples today are the same classes, groups, institutions, and persons which are placing mankind under the threat of annihilation in their striving to achieve unlimited world domination. Intervention is being carried out in Central America by the same ones who are speeding up preparations for "Star Wars." Moreover, the plans for this intervention and suppression of the revolutions in El Salvador and Nicaragua are the decisive link, the "proof" of the vitality of the "neoglobalist" policy of the Reagan administration, which has been called upon to become the ideological (and psychological) "lubricant"--within the United States and beyond its borders--for the arms race flywheel which has been set in motion. For this reason, our peoples' struggle for national liberation is a struggle at the same time to defeat the global scheme of the military-industrial mafia of the United States and the most aggressive, reactionary, and chauvinistic elements of world financial capital. And today, in the peaceful offensive of the USSR, in the bold and innovative initiatives of the present leadership of the CPSU in the name of universal security, the right of every people to choose their own path of development and civilized relations among states, we see new proof that it is precisely socialism that feels responsible for the fate of mankind and that it is always prepared to provide support for the peoples subjected to imperial aggression.

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SOVIET JOURNALIST DESCRIBES VISIT TO NICARAGUA

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[Report by S. N. Runov under the rubric "Free Nicaragua": "The Time for Slogans Has Passed (From a Journalist's Notebook)"]

[Text] No elderly persons are to be seen. It is as if there are no old men or women at all; children are scurrying about everywhere offering newspapers and trinkets or to guard and wash your vehicle.

Our Ladas and Moskviches and American limousines are running about, but more frequently Japanese Toyotas strike the eye.

Clusters of persons are hanging on trucks and buses.

Most of the adults are dressed neatly, mainly in bright-colored cotton clothes; even for official meetings, the men prefer to wear their shirts outside their trousers with open collars, although they do not wear "open" shoes (woven sandals, for example).

They accept our badges as a valuable gift and wear them on their chest here.

Many persons are wearing glasses (the frames are attractive, incidentally). There are many smokers, including the women.

Stores are a rarity--practically all trade is carried on in the markets. And a bundle of money is needed to buy something to eat.

There are no coins in circulation. Paper cordobas are used, and they are counted in the thousands.

Every editorial office has a guard: boys and girls in khaki uniforms with machine guns.

They turn off the water in the capital on Tuesdays and Fridays; the capital itself reminds one of a huge urban-type settlement.

Solidly roofed detached houses stand smugly next to wretched hovels put together with pieces of plywood, iron, tires, and who knows what else.

The railroad is narrow-gauge, and when the electric locomotive with two little cars (without window panes and doors) is running on it, it looks like a toy.

The highways are of good quality, without ruts and patches.

Such notes appear for a moment in my bulging notebook among the entries on conversations with editorial and party workers during the trip by a Soviet journalists delegation to Nicaragua at the invitation of the republic's Union of Journalists. Some of them, I think, are worth interpreting. Let us say this is the first one:

FOUR LETTERS

After a 17-hour flight across the ocean, our aircraft broke through the clouds and made a slow turn over the motionless expanse of Lake Managua, the namesake of the capital of Nicaragua. And right on the slope of one of the coastal hills, the four huge letters FSLN began sparkling like nickel. They served as a reference point, the distinctive calling card of the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN).

Afterwards these symbols caught the eye constantly. Either as the republic's symbol on the red and black flags, a watchword on posters, or as an invocation in flourishes of paint on building fronts. And they radiated the confidence everywhere that hopes in the Sandinists are not in vain.

While the revolution which liberated the Nicaraguan people is 8 years old, the FSLN, which led it, has been here for a quarter century already. This organization, founded by the revolutionary Carlos Fonseca and named after the legendary "general of free people," Augusto Cesar Sandino, was tempered in the struggle with the dictatorial regime. Even in the worst times, in the underground, it looked after the fidelity of its ranks and did not rush to expand them. Only after the most difficult tests of their strength of spirit, not in words but in deeds, with weapons in their hands, did the best fighters acquire the right to become Sandinists.

Being Sandinists proved to be much more complicated. After the victory of the revolution, as strange as it may seem. They have to deal with headaches that were not expected during the years of armed combat. Many of them have been brought about by meddling from the outside. In financing the band of contras and in making preparations for direct intervention in order to overthrow the legal government of sovereign Nicaragua, the United States has no scruples about making use of a news blockade, an economic boycott, or armed provocations.

Nicaragua is on the alert, of course. The country has been divided into eight so-called military zones in order to increase its defense capability. Significant human, financial and material resources are being allocated to provide for defense of the revolution and the republic's security. Military personnel receive 40 of each 100 pairs of shoes and 30 of each 100 pounds of maize.

This undeclared war, aimed at the economic attrition and fatigue of the Nicaraguan people, is more dramatic in its consequences than for its daily burdens. It is paralyzing the grandiose plans for social and economic changes and prevents them from overcoming the barrier of backwardness. On the whole, the situation in the country may be defined as a transitional period with many aspects associated with the mixed economic and complex ethnic composition of the population.

The undeclared war is leaving its imprint on everything. Washington's objective is not to allow a quick yield from the changes made, to exacerbate problems connected with the country's revitalization, to instill apathy in the people toward what is taking place, to revive remnants of the old psychology--fatalistic, somehow inevitable predestination and acknowledgment of their place in the backyard of the capitalist world and their impotence to change anything in this world. This kind of situation recruits followers of the opposition, who attack the FSLN with sharp criticism within the framework of "political pluralism." At the same time, the thought that the Nicaraguan revolution is a creative work that cannot be adapted to someone's model is discarded without a trace. The fact that the undeclared war has speeded up the influx of rural residents to the cities is also of considerable importance. The overwhelming majority of those in the cities today are from the rural areas. The fact that they are traditionally followers of religion is exploited by the counterrevolutionaries of different types, including with utterly ridiculous accusations against the Sandinists.

Meanwhile, according to statements by the contras, the "Sandinist tyranny" is not afraid of arming the people. The revolutionary spirit endures in the country, the youth are very patriotic, and practically the entire population is ready at the moment needed to defend the revolution with weapons in hand. And this, like it or not, means a great deal.

GIVEN BIRTH BY THE REVOLUTION

It is not surprising that in a country which has become a single armed camp we expected impressions colored in stark military hues. The opposite turned out to be unexpected: a peaceful way of life exists here all the same. There is a sense of calmness everywhere. There are no defeatist moods or even alarm at the imminent danger. Everyone is engrossed with the concerns of everyday life. One of the primary tasks of the Sandinists is to involve the masses in resolving the economic, social and cultural problems and to pull them out of the trap of backwardness and poverty.

The FSLN Department of Agitation and Propaganda has frankly admitted that Nicaraguan journalists still have not developed a vivid, attractive image for the worker, although they have managed to cite many impressive examples of hero-soldiers. And so many have added frankly that Nicaragua still does not have a unified system of mass media as such. There are five forms of ownership for these media: state, private, joint, party and cooperative. There are a considerable number of editorial staffs: 43 radio stations and broadcast companies, regional and two daily national newspapers, the NICARAGUA NUEVA press agency and a number of magazines and television centers. And

there is a plan to unify their employees with the aid of the Nicaraguan Union of Journalists, which now numbers 586 representatives of 10 parties. But while professional influence on journalists is fundamental for the union, political influence is basic for the FSLN.

Each week Carlos Fernando Chamorro, the head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department and chief editor of the newspaper BARRICADA, the front's official organ, or his deputy for party work Adilia Eva Solis hold a conference of mass media managers at which a political review of the situation in the country is given and arguments are held with those who are "looking at another side."

"Some newspaper editors," A. Solis complains, "have not caught the fact that the time for slogans has passed, and they continue to cram the readers with them as before. We are convinced that fundamental journalism, not superficial, descriptive or reporting journalism, should predominate. That is, analytical journalism which makes it possible to comprehend the underlying reasons for what is taking place and to teach and educate the people. The newspaper BARRICADA can serve as an example. It is successful in going to the heart of people's demands, influencing their awareness, and raising the initiative of the masses to a national level."

This newspaper was begun 6 days after the victory of the revolution on 25 July 1979. And although the silhouette of a fighter with a rifle on his shoulder made its appearance just next to the publisher's imprint, it responds first of all to the needs of the civilian population. Today BARRICADA is also printed in the Miskito language and publishes a special page for those who are learning to read. The fact that only 13 percent of Nicaraguans are illiterate now (instead of 80 percent before the revolution) is certainly to its credit as well. It is not surprising that BARRICADA now has the highest circulation --over 100,000 copies--and is distributed in all departments of the republic.

"FACING THE PEOPLE" .

This is the name of the program which is broadcast once a week--on Friday or Saturday--on Nicaragua's radio and television. It is broadcast directly from the place where President Daniel Ortega and other members of the government meet with the residents of some department of the country or a residential area in Managua. The purpose of the conversations is to avoid bureaucratism in resolving social problems and to contribute to the democratism of public life. The picture, how everything takes place, is quite interesting.

Imagine that you have found yourself on a lawn illuminated in the evening darkness in the outskirts of the capital. Portable lights illuminate the dais of freshly cut planks where about 20 ministers, led by the president, are accommodated. Facing them are a number of benches that have been hurriedly knocked together. Young persons and very tired women with sleeping babies in their arms, and boys in military uniform or in jeans and simple shirts are sitting here. There is the noise of children here, but no one quiets them down. The adults' attention is riveted to the overall discussion, which reminds one of a press conference in which anyone present may take part. Please, take the microphone extended by the girl from the newspaper and tell us what the problem is, ask the question that is troubling you.

"Why aren't there enough medicines?"

"When will order be brought to the roads? Yesterday we had a young boy hit by a vehicle..."

"One of my brothers died for the revolution, and the other is dying of starvation: they closed the slaughterhouse where he was working. How do we live if we have a family of 10?"

"I have no telephone at home, although it is needed desperately."

"Why are the streets dirty in our section and the trash is seldom taken away?"

I am a specialist from Spain and I know that many countries are helping you. But I will say frankly that this is not always apparent. What happens to the funds that have been received?"

"And I am a doctor from California. And you know, only here have I clearly realized that Nicaraguans are peaceful people and that you are trying to build, not to destroy."

Complaints, requests, wishes, and assessments of what is taking place. Either the president himself or those with him provide an answer to every question right away. In one case, members of the government promise to investigate and provide help, in another case they call on people not to be detached observers and to get involved in putting things in order, and in a third case they explain the situation that has developed. It turns out that there are not enough warehouse facilities and cold storage units at the port. The result is that products and medicines received from distant countries are lost in shipment and storage. They closed the slaughterhouse to stop speculation (the cattle were coming to it from the black market). However, there is work in Managua, and they are obligated to offer it to one who has been dismissed. This is why the revolution took place, in fact.

The neighborhood elder presents a report at the end, and then there is an hour-long speech by President D. Ortega. He speaks enthusiastically and persuasively about the Sandinists' policy in general and their specific efforts in particular, and warmly speaks of our country as a peaceful state which lost 20 million persons in the war and defeated fascism, but never (unlike the United States) imposed its own conditions, and as a superpower which is a respectful partner with a small country--Nicaragua--"as an equal." This, the president urges, must be understood and appreciated by economically and sensibly distributing and using the goods that have been received.

WHAT IS THE MINISTER THINKING ABOUT?

Direct contact with state leaders is not unusual for Nicaraguans now. The main "communicator" here--the radio, primarily the government (La Voz de Nicaragua) and the party (Radio Sandino) radios, which have been able to establish an open dialogue of trust with the people--has accustomed them to it.

How was this managed? Firstly, they counted on the activists--the people's correspondents. With their help they set up a network of provincial wired radio outlets and mobile telephones available to every passerby. Secondly, they began using a differentiated approach: broadcasts especially for farm workers, employees, and those at their military stations. Thirdly, they provided listeners with a permanent channel for direct communication.

Anyone can dial three numbers--six, two and zero--and listen to La Voz de Nicaragua. The program is called "Contact 6-20." It is broadcast in the morning and evening for 4 hours and provides the opportunity to ask a question of any official or editorial staff, and immediately, or in a minute after an interval with a current melody, you will receive an answer.

"Tell the minister of health that a person has become ill in our village, but we don't have the ability to treat him. Can't he be helped--taken to a hospital in Managua?"

"A teacher has not come to our school in 2 days. The director justifies this by the fact that she has been in a war zone and has been delayed. Is this really an excuse if there have been no military actions there?"

"Listen, where can I play a sport?"

"Why is there poor transportation on our street? The buses stop wherever they want or generally don't pass by. I am constantly late for work."

"I'm calling from Leon, where the water line is being repaired and they have turned the water off. But what is the minister thinking about if they distribute it during the day when everyone is at work?"

The minister whom the editorial staff contacted does not remain silent on what he is thinking about. About how quickly the defective water line will be exchanged--they have already acquired the sanitary engineering. And about how to persuade persons to use water efficiently: in some places they use as much water as they can for watering gardens, but in other places they don't have any for washing dishes or drinking, and at times they have to buy it if they can. This is why water service has to be stopped in Managua on Tuesdays and Fridays. As far as the specific situation in Leon is concerned, the minister expresses thanks for the suggestion. The central government did not even suspect that there had been such a blunder with water distribution, and it will be corrected, of course.

One cannot promise and not deliver here; it is better not to try to fool persons and to honestly admit one's powerlessness. The minister of health says right away, as an example, that the ill resident of a remote village cannot be brought to a hospital in the capital now. He can only send a doctor from a town nearby to render first aid.

And the editorial staff employee, in turn, requires the ability not only to contact a government representative instantly and prompt him to answer to the point, but to respond to a "notification" himself when necessary. A

journalist's political vigilance is especially important. He needs to react correctly to a telephoned question, catch the provocative implication if there is one, and give a rebuke calmly with precise emphasis. It is important to refute conclusively the fabrications spread by hostile propaganda which speculate on the difficulties endured by the country and which falsify its history.

A broadcast of the speech by Nicaragua's UN representative, discussion of the country's constitution at a UN General Assembly session, and reportage on a government meeting or from an enterprise where far from everyone has turned up for work is put on the air by the method of direct transmission--from "wheels." The openness of information, the director of La Voz de Nicaragua believes, wins the people's trust and thereby sympathy for the revolution. Persons begin listening to us and they lose curiosity in the hostile broadcasts which either bombard them with undisguised lies, bring poison in business and commercial language, or cleverly tack on a religious subject.

THE STRUGGLE FOR MINDS

There are 27 such radio stations, three of which are openly counterrevolutionary and the rest of which are clandestine, which are broadcasting in Matagalpa Department alone. However, the initiative is still with the Sandinists' single local wired radio outlet with rather poor equipment and without spare parts which is operated by personnel whose average level of education is 3 years of elementary school. Only three of the workers have a higher education, and it is probably for this reason that they joke with each other on the editorial staff: we are achieving quality with quantity. This is partly--but not entirely--true. They do not call them clumsy in a professional sense, and you don't make a radio popular by "volume" alone. Judge for yourselves.

They work under the supervision of a regional committee of the front and with continuing tangible assistance by Sandinists from the center, which sends a professional journalist to Matagalpa (as to other places for 6 months or a year, incidentally). They have two-way communication with the central radio: they suggest topics for it, interpret its reports to their listeners, and exchange broadcast messages. Naturally, they make use of the creative experience of the capital's editorial staffs as well; they organize the responses by leaders on a regional scale to questions from residents, for example. But they emphasize interpretation of local life, the features of which dictate both the specialization of the wired radio outlet and the professional methods of its staff.

Matagalpa is attractive first of all, with narrow side streets and houses with the vivid inscription "Viva Sandino!" on their sides. At the same time, it is also quite a large agricultural region, 18,000 square kilometers, with plantations which provide the country with the lion's share of grain crops and its main export product, coffee. Finally, it is perhaps the most dangerous military zone today, extending dozens of kilometers along the border with Honduras, just opposite the contra training centers situated on its territory. Here in Matagalpa, devastating and bloody raids are frequent and the help from the Sandinist People's Army with food and clothing is continuous, here there

are many scattered farms and few roads, and here the revolution has not yet reached all sections, but the local radio journalists have decided to reach every one of them. It goes without saying that farm and border problems have become their specialization and the struggle for minds has become their principle task.

Straightforward contacts are made on a practical basis with the help of the editorial staff, which numbers more than 100 people's correspondents, to make known the feelings and thoughts of particular persons. This makes it possible to broadcast the special program "Let's Speak Clearly in Simple Terms," which is heard from 1300 to 1500, taking into account the work schedule both in the city and in the countryside. It deals frankly, in plain and straightforward terms, with the material burdens of farming and the prices for agricultural products. It states that cooperative work should be performed only on a voluntary basis and not obligatorily under the principle of combining plots of land; that the growing demands of farmers cannot be completely met now, but that control must be exercised over assertions by managers who are hurrying to "look good"; that the authorities are providing good workers with the opportunity to be the first to obtain goods in short supply, such as coffee grinders, for example (Nicaragua imports them); and that the erroneous practice of unfounded accusations against families with members who have been involved in counterrevolutionary matters has been ended. To those persons who often lie low on individual farms, they say: if you have been in the wrong, we will catch you. Recently, according to Nelly Castillo, secretary for ideology of the front's regional committee, they managed to disarm a concealed group of 30 contras with persuasion. The radio broadcasts on the Sandinists' humane treatment of prisoners "come into action" just as well. Radio journalists, as a rule, speak about the fate of a specific person, why he was deluded, how his eyes were opened; he laid down his weapon, and now, after a follow-up, he is gradually becoming a worker on the land and a real master of his fate.

Everything is being done to bring radio closer to the people, to make the Sandinist radio truly the people's radio and useful and necessary to the local population with respect to their everyday concerns. While the counterrevolutionary radio frightens the farm worker (you have received land, but soon they will take it away, it says), the Sandinists' radio suggests to him: let us talk about how to work best on your land and how to raise farm productivity. Different general education programs which have been called upon to increase students' knowledge as well as the level of teachers' training are being offered. A great deal of information is intended for those in military service. There are programs for workers in the Matagalpa mines: basically on government measures to protect the workers' real wages, improve production discipline, and combat sabotage and its concealed form--inertia. All this sinks into the memory and contributes to the shaping of a new outlook.

These are some impressions from the encounter with heroic Nicaragua. And the one that is most vivid is the Sandinists--the persons who have been leading the fierce struggle of their people for a normal life. Having clashed with the American aggressor, they are not losing their self-control; they are living with the hope for a better future, for human reason which urges a peaceful course in accordance with the norms of civilization in any situations.

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CONSEQUENCES OF U. S. TRADE EMBARGO, NICARAGUA'S RESPONSE

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[Article by O. D. Shnurtseva: "The Failure of the Policy of Isolating Nicaragua Economically"]

[Text] It has now been 8 years that the imperialist circles of the United States, which have always considered Central America a sphere of their "vital interests" and a bridgehead for control over the entire Latin American region, have not been willing to reconcile themselves to the existence of an independent Nicaragua. Along with the use of undisguised methods of state terrorism such as the threat of direct intervention and the financing, training and preparation of counterrevolutionary bands of mercenaries, (1) which have been widely condemned by the world community, the United States is exerting the most intense pressure on Nicaragua economically.

It is well-known that food and economic aid was discontinued and all previously promised loans were frozen in 1981. In a year Nicaragua was excluded from the plan for U. S. aid to Central American and Caribbean states--Reagan's so-called "Caribbean Initiative." In the spring of 1983, Washington reduced the Nicaraguan sugar quota (from 58,800 tons to 6,000 tons), which was condemned by GATT, incidentally. A policy of restricting exports, mainly machinery and equipment and products of the chemical industry, was adopted under the pretext that they were produced, they said, with the "most advanced technology." In an effort to force the states which continued to provide assistance and carry on trade with Nicaragua to abandon further cooperation with this country, the CIA resorted to the barbaric action of mining its ports and the approaches to them in March 1984. Finally, as the last milestones in escalating its economic aggression, the United States began an embargo on trade with Nicaragua, discontinued air service, and banned ships under the Nicaraguan flag from stopping at American ports by order of the government on 1 May 1985.

In addition, Washington is taking advantage of its political and economic influence in international financial organizations by blocking the granting of loans and credits to the Sandinist government. As a result, these organizations, which provided considerable assistance to the country from 1979 to 1982, did not grant a single credit beginning in 1983; combined with the drop in domestic production and exports, this led to a critical shortage of

foreign exchange for imported purchases and payments on the foreign debt. So the Inter-American Development Bank (IBD) still refuses to grant Nicaragua the credit of about 60 million dollars, allocated as long ago as November 1984, for financing agricultural projects. In January 1985, U. S. Secretary of State G. Shultz sent a letter to the IBD president in which he directly threatened the bank with reprisals if he allocates funds for Nicaragua. The next manifestation of discriminatory sanctions with regard to the country was its exclusion from the recipients of credit provided to the Central American Bank for Economic Integration by the IBD to rebuild the network of roads in the region.

The pressure exerted by Washington on international financial organizations is in direct contradiction to their charter principles. Condemning such actions by the United States, J. Cuadra Chamorro, the director of the Central Bank of Nicaragua, stated in a speech at the 28th session of the IBD council that "the United States is openly striving to change the multilateral nature of this organization and to turn it into a financial instrument for its own foreign policy." (2) Vigorous actions were undertaken in the relations of the Central American countries. In spite of the fact that not one of them was supporting the embargo, intraregional trade suffered substantial losses. Nicaragua's commodity turnover with its neighbors dropped by 25 percent in 1985 compared with the previous year (3), and by more than 40 percent in 1986. In this connection, Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Trade A. Martinez stressed: "The United States does not wish to understand that the declaration of a trade war against one Central American country has a disastrous effect on the others as well, as a consequence of the close integrated relations which exist." (4)

The U. S. administration is also stepping up pressure on its European allies, trying to compel them to abandon cooperation and maintenance of commercial ties with Nicaragua. G. Shultz sent a special message in this regard to the foreign ministers of EEC member states.

However, the United States' interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and the use of economic sanctions as an instrument for pressure has given rise to widespread protest throughout the world. These actions have not even found support among Washington's closest allies, the developed capitalist states. Participants in an extraordinary session of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) also have spoken out against the aggressive economic policy. The necessity of taking joint actions to alleviate consequences of the embargo was particularly emphasized in the resolution adopted. The administration's illegal actions were subjected to resolute criticism at the urgent UN Security Council meeting held at Nicaragua's request, and the 40th session of the UN General Assembly adopted a special resolution demanding immediate cessation of the discriminatory actions.

The economic sanctions introduced by the Reagan administration flagrantly violate the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and the generally accepted standards of international relations and openly defy international law and order. They are completely incompatible with the charter of the Organization of American States, which prohibits the use of forcible measures

of an economic and political nature against any sovereign state in the region. The discriminatory actions were taken in violation of the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement concluded between the United States and Nicaragua in 1956. The actions by the White House are also undisguised tyranny with respect to the existing rules of international trade. Introduction of unilateral economic sanctions against a country in peacetime is contrary to the elementary principles of foreign trade established in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The first paragraph of this agreement prohibits such actions without prior consultations and approval by the other signatory states.

However, by disregarding international public opinion, the White House is attempting to step up the economic war against the republic even further. The trade embargo has assumed the nature of a complete economic blockade. The FBI is taking legal action against American companies which continue to trade with Nicaragua through third states. The embargo led to a decrease of 15 percent in the volume of Nicaragua's foreign trade in 1 year, it brought about serious difficulties in the functioning of the production infrastructure, and as a result, it was one of the main reasons for the economic recession in 1985--the worst in the entire postrevolutionary period. According to a statement by Sandinist leaders, the direct financial losses in the first year alone amounted to about 100 million dollars.

The cessation of trade relations resulted in a sharp decrease in the export of a number of Nicaraguan commodities to the United States--its traditional market, which led to a drop in foreign exchange receipts. Thus, at the end of the 1970's the United States received 100 percent of the bananas exported, 100 percent of the molasses, more than 70 percent of products from the ocean, tobacco items, and meat, and 50 percent of the sugar. The sale of Nicaraguan goods in the new markets (the countries of Western Europe, Canada, Japan, and the developing states of Asia and Latin America) in the majority of cases involves a definite reduction in income from exports as the result of increased expenses for freight and other costs. (5)

The discontinuation of imports from the United States has had even more severe consequences. The lack of a repair base and the shortage of spare parts for American equipment (according to estimates, it made up 90 percent of the country's industrial equipment when the sanctions were introduced) led to the breakdown of a considerable proportion of the production capacities, agricultural equipment, and transportation facilities, and to disruptions and interruptions in the power supply system. The severity of this problem is related in particular to the fact that the equipment was basically obsolete. Enterprises in the private sector and branches of American firms in Nicaragua have suffered particularly. The state companies, although they are not without problems, have been able to reorient to the equipment coming from socialist countries and certain Latin American states, chiefly Mexico.

The revolutionary government has developed and begun to put into effect a social and economic program to alleviate the effects of the embargo. Attention in it has been directed chiefly toward maximum use of domestic resources, economy in raw material, electric power and fuel, and strict accounting for and distribution of the spare parts and equipment that are

available. A centralized fund for supplying enterprises has been organized, and the National Company for the Repair, Renovation and Production of Spare Parts was established in a brief period of time. Special subunits have been established in ministries and departments which have been resolving the problems of replacing American products through domestic resources on a day-to-day basis.

In pursuing a policy of developing relations with states with a different social and political system and in striving to reduce its dependence on the United States, the Sandinist leadership began a consistent policy of diversifying foreign trade and other forms of economic ties at the beginning of the 1980's. A network of more than 20 trade representations has been established to assist state and private companies in conducting export-import operations.

At this time, Nicaragua has succeeded in significantly expanding its circle of trading partners and in reorienting its foreign economic ties to CEMA, EEC, and Latin American countries, as well as to Canada, Japan, and a number of developing states in Asia. Nicaragua is exporting most of its agricultural products (coffee, cotton, bananas, sugar, sesame) to the West European market. So bananas, which were traditionally exported only to the United States and which have become the item fourth in importance in Nicaraguan exports, have been shipped lately to nine countries, including Belgium, the FRG, Libya and India. The states of Western Europe, as well as Mexico, Algeria, and India, have replaced the United States as the buyers of sugar. Coffee is being purchased by the FRG, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Japan, and Algeria.

NICARAGUA'S FOREIGN TRADE, 1980-1986 (COMMODITY TURNOVER IN PERCENTS)

REGIONS, COUNTRIES	1980	1984	1985	1986*
United States	30.4	14.9	5.4**	0
Socialist countries (including Cuba)	1.0	19.4	31.3	40.0
West Europe	17.6	25.2	28.8	40.0
Japan	3.0	9.9	9.9	***
Canada	2.6	2.9	2.9	***
Latin America	13.5	12.8	9.2	***
Central America	28.1	9.2	7.2	***
Other countries	3.8	5.7	5.3	***

* According to the Nicaraguan press.

** For the period from January to April 1985.

*** 20-percent total for these countries.

Nicaragua has successfully concluded bilateral trade agreements with Costa Rica and Honduras. In 1987 it is planned to substantially increase the volume of exports (compared with 1986) to other Central American countries, which will include mainly products of the chemical, metal working and food industries.

The Sandinist leadership is devoting particular attention to developing cooperation with the socialist community. Relations between Nicaragua and the Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist countries are based on the principles of solidarity and internationalism. Under the conditions in which financial and economic assistance from international financial organizations and a number of developed capitalist countries has been reduced sharply under pressure from the United States, help from the socialist states has become a decisive factor in the "survival" of the Nicaraguan economy. Speaking at a meeting dedicated to a friendly official visit to Nicaragua by a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet (1987), Nicaraguan President D. Ortega noted: "When the American administration sent their mercenaries to Nicaragua to mine the ports and blow up the oil tanks, the Soviet people were the first to come to our aid. When the United States stopped shipments of food and industrial commodities to Nicaragua and introduced its trade embargo, the Soviet Union once again extended the fraternal hand of friendship to the Nicaraguan people." (8)

Trade with socialist countries provides commodities of critical interest to the republic: machinery, equipment, means of transportation, tractors and other agricultural equipment, raw material and materials, food, and consumer goods. Commodities valued at over 700 million rubles were shipped to Nicaragua from the USSR from 1981 to 1986. (7) The importation of oil and petroleum products, which provided for nearly 100 percent of the requirements for liquid fuel, is of vital importance.

Economic and scientific and technical cooperation is being developed fruitfully on a multilateral basis within the framework of the mixed commission for cooperation between CEMA and Nicaragua. It covers such important aspects of the economy as the development of natural resources, power engineering, industry, agriculture, transportation, and communications. The first section of the combine for processing agricultural products will be put into operation this year in Sebaco (Matagalpa Department). Bulgaria is providing aid for this. The USSR is taking part in developing a project for land irrigation in the Masaya-Granada-Tipitapa region, where grain crops, cotton, vegetables and fruit will be grown. Cuba is providing assistance to Nicaragua in building the Muy Muy-Matiguas complex to produce dairy products. Soviet specialists are aiding in reconstruction of the "Tekniksa" [most likely Textiles Nicaraguenses, S. A.] textile combine. The CSSR, USSR, and GDR are taking part in construction of a textile mill in the city of Estelí. Construction of the El Bluff deepwater port on the country's Atlantic coast has become an important project for cooperation between Nicaragua and the CEMA countries. Bulgaria, the GDR, CSSR, Poland and the USSR are providing economic and scientific and technical assistance in its construction.

The consequences of the sanctions applied by the United States of America against Nicaragua and the serious economic difficulties they have created make it clearly apparent how high the "price" is for developing countries' economic and financial dependence on imperialism, particularly for small states with vulnerable raw material and agricultural specialization in their economy. At the same time, the example of Nicaragua once again attests to the groundlessness of the contention by Western political specialists and economists concerning "the fatal inevitability and conformity to natural law" of this dependence and the impossibility of breaking it off.

In this connection, J. Gorostiaga, director of the Nicaraguan Institute of Economic and Social Research, has noted that although the embargo will cause Nicaragua considerable harm in the short term, its influence will have a positive effect in the medium and long term and will make it possible to vitalize trade and economic ties with Europe, the countries of Latin America, the socialist states, and the rest of the world. The implementation of progressive socioeconomic changes within the country and successful efforts to restructure the system of foreign economic relations will provide the opportunity for Nicaragua to establish a structure for its economy and international ties which will enable it to resolve problems of national development independently.

FOOTNOTES

1. Direct physical damage as the result of armed actions by the contras in the 1981-1985 period amounted to 600 million dollars. PENSAMIENTO PROPIO, Managua, No 92, 1985, p 24, and No 32, 1986, p 32.
2. GRANMA, Havana, 25 Mar 1987.
3. EL DIA, Mexico, 12 May 1986; EXCELSIOR, Mexico, 23 Jun 1986 (author's estimate for 1986).
4. Ibid., 1 May 1986.
5. According to available data, expenditures to carry out foreign trade operations increased by 30 percent. EXCELSIOR, 9 May 1986.
6. PRAVDA, 5 Mar 1987.
7. Calculated in accordance with the statistical collections of "Vneshnyaya trgovlya SSSR" [Foreign Trade of the USSR] for the appropriate years. "Vneshnyaya trgovlya SSSR," No 3, 1987, Supplement.

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CHILEAN COMMUNIST DESCRIBES ANTI-REGIME PROTEST, POPE'S VISIT

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 7, Jul 87 pp 79-81

[Article by Volodia Teitelboim, member of the Political Commission of the Chilean Communist Party Central Committee, under the rubric "Facts and Reflections": "In the Epicenter of the Chilean Tempest"]

[Text] Christ was crucified in the 33d year of his life; the trip to Chile by Pope John Paul II, the most conflicting throughout all his activity, also proved to be the 33d, according to the count. For 6 days it was as if he had found himself in the epicenter of clashes between the dictatorship and the people. Manifested acutely and openly, this antagonism became a reflection of the tragedy which has already shaken the country for 13 years. Pinochet endeavored to present Chile before the eyes of the pope as a country that is "completely normal," "peaceful," and simply "a heavenly place," as sung in the Chilean national anthem. But his demagoguery about "rivers of milk and honey" was shattered by the people's determination to overturn the artificial scenery, to show the true reality of the repressions and terror and to express their hostility at the top of their voice.

Coming down the ramp from the aircraft at the Comodoro Arturo Merino Benitez Airport at 1600 hours on 1 April, Karol Wojtylla immediately knelt and kissed the ground, a ritual that already has become traditional for him. The dictator, all dressed up for the ceremonial occasion, went up to the rostrum to brand Marxism--"this extreme form of expression of the ideology of materialism and atheism with which mankind has just been acquainted." Puffing up to become like Saint George slaying the dragon and the pope's guardian angel at the same time, he began giving him advice, trying to impress on him that "such a philosophical premise is extremely necessary for analyzing and understanding the current Chilean reality." Then he added that "the true and profound meaning of all his government's activity is based on the aspiration to create strong and reliable foundations for society resting on such values as freedom, justice and progress."

The pope said in response: "I intend to visit several cities on an evangelical mission." The current pope has traveled more than any since Saint Peter. And indeed, seven Chilean cities were on his itinerary: Santiago, Valparaiso, Puerto Montt, Concepcion, Temuco, La Serena, Punta Arenas and Antofagasta (the last two are separated by 3,500 kilometers).

One Spanish journalist described the atmosphere of the official reception in the words "cold on a hot day," perhaps because everything taking place was a real farce.

But the people, whose access to the airport was very strictly prohibited, waited for the pope on the entire route to the cathedral of Chile's capital. For 20 kilometers, thousands of people with placards lined the sides of Highway No 70 linking the airport with the center of Santiago, and expressed their determination, shouting loudly: "Pinochet--murderer!"; "Holy Father, take him away!"; and "John Paul, they are torturing in Chile!" A huge throng of youths chanted: "He will be overthrown! He will be overthrown!"

And right here one of the integral features of the dictatorship--violent police repression--was demonstrated. The distinguished guest in his armored "popemobile" became a witness to all the bloody peripeteia of a clash between the people and the ruler. When he finally reached the cathedral, numerous priests greeted him with the resounding appeal: "Freedom! Freedom! Freedom!"

During the divine service, the daily secular "liturgy" was spreading around the cathedral: a clash between the people risking their lives appealing for the truth and the forces of the dictatorship sent to beat them.

A little later the pope climbed to the summit of Cerro San Cristobal, from where the panorama of all Santiago is opened before him with its glittering belt of luxurious houses encircled by the endless crown of thorns of the slums--the "callampas," where poverty is "swarming," and where the capital's 3 million poor live, suffer, struggle and die. There at the pedestal of the statue of the Virgin, close to heaven, the persistent fighting between the people and the cruel tyranny was resumed before the eyes of God's governor-general on earth, robed in brilliant silk vestments, who was now not so surprised. (Incidentally, the fighting did not stop for the entire 140 hours that the pope was in the country.)

Then the dictator made up his mind to move on to a counterattack, striving to derive every possible advantage from the promised visit to the palace where Salvador Allende was killed 13 years ago. A correspondent for the Madrid newspaper EL PAIS, which came out on 3 April with the banner headline "The Pope in Hell," reports that "John Paul II prayed with Pinochet at La Moneda Palace." And he adds that the general did not even expect this. "John Paul II departed from the accepted protocol for the dictator's sake. The discussion with the general lasted for 45 minutes. The pope, in a blue garment, came out to the palace balcony with the general three times, greeting and giving his blessing to the parishioners loyal to the government... A church service had not been planned, but toward the end the pope presented the "president" with a gift in the form of his consent to pray together in the palace chapel... The pope knelt on the prayer stool, upholstered in gold brocade. For several moments Pinochet tried to put himself on the pope's left, but not finding a place, he decided to stand behind, with his wife. All three prayed in silence with heads bowed. When John Paul II got up, the general's wife threw herself at his feet, begging for his blessing. Pinochet brushed away a tear of tender emotion..."

The Spanish journalist provided a lengthy description teeming with grotesque details from his accurate and merciless pen. After all, five priests have been murdered during Pinochet's rule and hundreds have been exiled, not to mention the parishes blown up by the secret police of the dictator's regime, which is conducting an "undeclared war" against the church. But what an event it was here!.. Pinochet was beside himself with delight.

And next the Spanish reporter notes the other side of the coin: "From the moment that John Paul II arrived in the Chilean capital, a campaign of protest was spread which covered the entire country." The hunger strike declared by a group of political prisoners went into its 37th day. The words shouted by those who had assembled resounded for the first time at the very walls of La Moneda: "A Christian people opposes the tyrant!" and posters appeared in the poor sections: "Karol Wojtylla, take away the gorilla!"

The cardboard scenery finally collapsed and the truth came out on the stage; the activity was shifted to the poor sections, where a meeting with the slum inhabitants took place. There the lead actor, the character who was never assigned any role in the farce at the palace, stood up straight. There the masses of poor burst onto the stage: a half million people who had assembled in the southern outskirts of Santiago at La Bandera Park attempted to tell the pope about their tragic existence, about the burdens of unemployment, about the cruel and never-ending repressions, and about the terrible poverty which drives girls into the street and young people into the hell of drug addiction.

While La Moneda palace, which was bombed on 11 September 1973 at Pinochet's order, served as the stage for the dictator's hypocritical expression of piety, the national stadium, which had served as a concentration camp and scaffold during the coup d'etat, became a field these days on which 100,000 young persons unleashed an immense demonstration against the dictator. And they won this "match" against despotism "for a clear advantage." At the first outburst of taunts and whistles, a helicopter packed with police arrived. But when a military patrol appeared at the "marathon" gates, the whistling and hooting covered the entire stadium. As if by magic, numerous cloth panels which the young people had brought unnoticed to the stadium were unfurled in the stands. And the walls of the huge coliseum trembled when an infinite number of balloons with the inscription "Freedom!" rose in the air. The entire stadium shouted endlessly: "A united people cannot be defeated!" and it continued this way until midnight.

The regime needed to assert itself, and it thought up a provocation. At O'Higgins Park, during the ceremony to consecrate the statue of Saint Teresa of the Andes and while John Paul II was holding mass, the police attacked the journalists in the stands to teach them not to report the truth about the situation in Chile. They placed the responsibility for the outrage on the left-wing forces and the communist youth, of course. But photographs provide incontestable evidence that the police themselves instigated the provocation.

And what happened after this?

The pope left, but Chile's problems remained no less burning. Perhaps someone also yearned for a miracle, but the Holy Father did not create it. It looks as if Chileans will have to get the better of their dramas themselves by increasing the struggle here on earth. But to tell the truth, we still lack a great deal for unifying all the opposition forces. Perhaps certain parties are expecting too much from the pope as well as from Washington, mistakenly believing that the murderer of believers and nonbelievers will repent and give himself up after praying on his knees beside the pope, absorbed in pious meditation.

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